WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume 43, Number 2 January 1991

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED BY JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD
Henry S. Bienen, *Chairman*
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, John Lewis Gaddis, Stephan Haggard, Takashi Inoguchi, Chalmers Johnson, Miles Kahler, Friedrich Kratochwil, Kenneth A. Oye, Vivienne Shue, Theda Skocpol, Jack Snyder, John A. Vasquez

Editors: Nancy Bermeo, Henry S. Bienen, Richard D. Challener, George W. Downs, Michael W. Doyle, Robert G. Gilpin, G. John Ikenberry, Atul Kohli (*Review Articles*)
Associate Editors: David M. Bachman, Kent Calder, Forrest Colburn, Harold A. Feiveson, Jeffrey Herbst, James R. Hines Jr., Charles A. Kupchan, Paul E. Sigmund, Robert L. Tignor, John Waterbury, Lynn T. White III, William C. Wohlforth
Executive Editor: Ilene P. Cohen; *Assistant Editor*: Denise Thompson

The editors invite submission of articles (up to 10,000 words, including footnotes) bearing upon problems in international relations and comparative politics. Manuscripts and footnotes should be doublespaced throughout and submitted in triplicate, together with an abstract of approximately 125 words. Footnotes should only cite sources; they should be numbered consecutively and placed at the end of the manuscript. Address: WORLD POLITICS, Bendheim Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within three months from date of submission. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of readers' and editors' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for transmitting readers' evaluations to authors of rejected manuscripts. Exceptions may be made if, in the opinion of the editors, such comments contain substantive suggestions for improvement. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere, or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. The journal does not publish communications to the editor or rejoinders to specific articles. Scholars who believe they have been challenged are encouraged to submit an article that will advance the scholarly debate.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material should be sought from Permissions Department, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, MD 21211-2190.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, MD 21211-2190.
Individuals: $20 per year.
Institutions: $40 per year.
Single Copies: individuals, $7.00; institutions, $12.00.
For postage and handling in Canada and Mexico, please add $4.75 per year; outside of North America, $8.50.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, MD 21211-2190.

Advertising: Journals Advertising Coordinator, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, MD 21211-2190.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS), Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886-1974 (RSJ), PAIS Bulletin,* and *Social Science Index*; it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents, International Bibliography of Periodical Literature (IBZ), International Bibliography of Book Reviews (IBR),* and *Current Military and Political Literature*. Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts, International Development Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts,* and *Political Science Abstracts.*

Copyright © 1991 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by The Johns Hopkins University Press. Vol. 43, No. 2, January 1991. Second class postage paid at Baltimore, MD, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, MD 21211-2190. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FE

WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 43 • January 1991 • No. 2

CONTENTS

Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science — *James D. Fearon* — 169

Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization — *Philip G. Roeder* — 196

Explaining Third World Alignment — *Steven R. David* — 233

Review Articles

The Security Problematic of the Third World — *Mohammed Ayoob* — 257

Reform and the Redefinition of the Social Contract under Gorbachev — *Janine Ludlam* — 284

The Contributors — ii

Abstracts — iii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

JAMES D. FEARON is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. His dissertation examines the question of when threats used in international crises deter and when they provoke.

PHILIP G. ROEDER is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of *Soviet Political Dynamics: Development of the First Leninist Polity* (1988) and is currently completing a book that analyzes how institutions created by the Stalin constitution have shaped and limited reform of Soviet politics.

STEVEN R. DAVID is Associate Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University. He has written widely on the Third World, with an emphasis on security issues. This article is derived from a forthcoming book, *Choosing Sides: Third World Alignment and Realignment*.

MOHAMMED AYOOB is Associate Professor of International Relations, James Madison College, Michigan State University. During 1989–90 he was an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow in International Peace and Security at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. His recent publications include *India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies* (1990) and two edited volumes entitled *Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience* (1989) and *Regional Security in the Third World* (1986). He is currently working on a project exploring the security problematic of Third World states.

JANINE LUDLAM has done graduate work in Russian Area Studies at Georgetown University and is an observer of Soviet domestic politics currently residing in Moscow.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by The Johns Hopkins University Press for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the fee of .10 per page is paid directly to CCC, 21 Congress St., Salem, MA 01970. 0043-8871/90 $0.00 + .10

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSTRACTS

Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science

By JAMES D. FEARON

Scholars in comparative politics and international relations routinely evaluate causal hypotheses by referring to *counterfactual cases* where a hypothesized causal factor is supposed to have been absent. The methodological status and the viability of this very common procedure are unclear and are worth examining. How does the strategy of counterfactual argument relate, if at all, to methods of hypothesis testing based on the comparison of actual cases, such as regression analysis or Mill's Method of Difference? Are counterfactual thought experiments a viable means of assessing hypotheses about national and international outcomes, or are they methodologically invalid in principle? The paper addresses the first question in some detail and begins discussion of the second. Examples from work on the causes of World War I, the nonoccurrence of World War III, social revolutions, the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America, and the origins of fascism and corporatism in Europe illustrate the use, problems and potential of counterfactual argument in small-N-oriented political science research.

Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization

By PHILIP G. ROEDER

Central among recent changes in the Soviet Union is an expanding and increasingly public politics of federalism. The Soviet developmental strategy assigned federalism and the cadres of national-territorial administration a central role in its response to the "nationalities question." This strategy offers a key to three questions about the rise of assertive ethnofederalism over the past three decades: Why have federal institutions that provided interethnic peace during the transition to industrialization become vehicles of protest in recent years? Why have relatively advantaged ethnic groups been most assertive, whereas groups near the lower end of most comparative measures of socioeconomic and political success have been relatively quiescent? Why have major public demands—and the most important issues of contention between center and periphery—focused to such a large degree upon the details of the Soviet developmental strategy and upon federalism in particular?

Explaining Third World Alignment

By STEVEN R. DAVID

Many argue that balance of power theory is as applicable to the Third World as it is to other states. Without substantial modification, however, balance of power theory cannot explain Third World alignments, because it ignores key characteristics of Third World states that determine alignment. The author develops a theory, "omnibalancing," that is relevant to the Third World and that repairs these defects. Rather than balance of power's emphasis on states seeking to resist threats from other states, omnibalancing explains Third World alignments as a consequence of leaders seeking to counter internal and external threats to their rule. The superiority of omnibalancing over balance of power in making Third World alignments understandable is related to the Third World in general and to the alignment decisions of two key Third World states in particular. The author concludes by discussing why an understanding of the Third World, including Third World alignment, is central to the study of international relations.

The Security Problematic of the Third World

By MOHAMMED AYOOB

This article reviews some recently published volumes on the subject of Third World security and, in the light of the analyses presented in these books, attempts to discuss a series

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of major issues in the field of Third World security studies. These include (1) the applicability of the concept of security as traditionally defined in the Western literature on international relations to Third World contexts; (2) the domestic variables affecting the security of Third World states; (3) the impact of international systemic factors on Third World security; (4) the effect of late-twentieth-century weapons technology on the security of Third World states; and (5) the relationship between the security and developmental concerns of Third World states. The author concludes that while international and technological factors have important effects on the security of Third World states, the major variables determining the degree of security enjoyed by such states at both the intrastate and interstate levels are related to the twin processes of state making and nation building that are at work simultaneously within Third World polities.

Reform and the Redefinition of the Social Contract under Gorbachev

By JANINE LUDLAM

The concept of "social contract" is useful in understanding the process of reform currently under way in the Soviet Union. The social contract "concluded" by Khrushchev and Brezhnev provided the population with economic guarantees but deprived it of any political power. Their contract was geared primarily toward less educated, blue-collar workers. During the past seventy years Soviet society has become industrialized, urbanized, and educated. Gorbachev has understood that the well-being of the Soviet economy will in the future rest on the labor and know-how of skilled and educated professionals. He must therefore conclude a new contract that will be advantageous to this sector of society in order to ensure its participation in his efforts to reform the economy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COUNTERFACTUALS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

By JAMES D. FEARON*

> Without the prior democratic modernization of England, the reactionary methods adopted in Germany and Japan would scarcely have been possible. Without both the capitalist and reactionary experiences, the communist method would have been something entirely different, if it had come into existence at all.
>
> —*Barrington Moore*

> Nuclear weapons did not cause the condition of bipolarity. . . . Had the atom never been split, [the U.S. and the Soviet Union] would far surpass the others in military strength.
>
> —*Kenneth Waltz*

THE epigraphs[1] provide examples of counterfactual conditionals, or propositions that take the generic form "If it had been the case that C (or not C), it would have been the case that E (or not E)." Counterfactuals make claims about events that did not actually occur. It is argued in this paper that such propositions play a necessary and fundamental, if often implicit and underdeveloped, role in the efforts of political scientists to assess their hypotheses about the causes of the phenomena they study. Particularly in small-N research designs, scholars in comparative politics and international relations routinely evaluate causal hypotheses by discussing or simply referring to *counterfactual cases* in which a hypothesized causal factor is supposed to have been absent. Though this procedure is quite common, its methodological status and its viability are unclear and are worth exploring. How does the strategy of counterfactual argument relate, if at all, to methods of hypothesis testing based on the comparison of actual cases, such as regression analysis or J. S. Mill's Method of Difference? Are counterfactual "thought experiments" a vi-

* Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30–September 2, 1990. For helpful comments and advice I wish to thank Chris Achen, Robert M. Adams, David Collier, Russ Faeges, Don Green, Marcus Kurtz, Jim Mahon, Merrill Shanks, Laura Stoker, Arun Swamy, and an anonymous referee. I am particularly indebted to David Collier for his encouragement and close reading of several drafts. None mentioned (or unmentioned) are responsible for my mistakes.

[1] Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 414; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 180.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able means of assessing hypotheses about national and international outcomes, or are they methodologically invalid in principle?

The article has three principal aims. First, I seek to support the claim made above, that counterfactual propositions and arguments play a central role in the efforts of political scientists to assess their causal hypotheses. Support is drawn from methodological argument and from examples showing the counterfactual strategy at work in research in the areas of comparative politics and international relations. I discuss examples from the literature on the causes of World War I, the nonoccurrence of World War III, social revolutions, the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America, and the origins of fascist and corporatist regimes in interwar Europe.

Second, the paper examines how the strategy of counterfactual argument is related to but also differs from methods of hypothesis testing based on the comparison of actual cases. The two approaches are found to be closely related: analysts with few cases and many variables are compelled to resort to counterfactual argument by a *statistical* principle; and counterfactuals also appear to play a key role in the assumptions that justify large-N regression analysis, when the data employed is quasi-, or nonexperimental.[2] The difference between regression and the counterfactual strategy is not that one relies on counterfactuals while the other does not. Rather, the strategies differ in the way that each employs counterfactuals and in the way that each evaluates support for a causal hypothesis.

Finally, the paper addresses the question posed above: Is counterfactual argument a viable means of assessing causal hypotheses in nonexperimental research settings? I give no firm answer here but instead introduce some of the problems and issues involved. My purpose is neither to advocate the use of counterfactual argument in preference to comparisons with other actual cases nor to suggest that the counterfactual strategy is fundamentally invalid or has no value in principle. Since political scientists often use counterfactual argument when assessing or justifying causal hypotheses, particularly in small-N research settings, it seems important simply to understand what the strategy entails. If the paper carries a methodological prescription, it is that researchers who use counterfactual argument to support causal hypotheses should be methodologically aware of what they are doing and should make their counterfactual arguments as explicit and defensible as they can.

These general aims are pursued in three sections. The first distin-

[2] Data not generated by random assignment to control and treatment groups is referred to as quasi-, or nonexperimental.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guishes between two strategies of hypothesis testing—the comparison of actual cases and counterfactual argument—and examines key methodological similarities and differences between them. The second section shows how the counterfactual strategy appears in practice by considering examples from work in international relations and comparative politics. The examples make clear that counterfactuals matter both when the researcher is focusing on one actual case (for example, the outbreak of World War I or the Brazilian military takeover in 1964) and when the researcher considers several actual cases (for example, social revolutions or interwar European regime types). The third section returns to some theoretical issues concerning the link between causal arguments and counterfactual propositions, issues that bear on the question of whether the counterfactual strategy is a viable one. Two logical problems related to the use of counterfactuals are discussed briefly: (1) Is any event C that appears to satisfy "if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred" to be called a "cause" or E? And (2) Are some counterfactual comparisons more "legitimate" or appropriate than others?

Counterfactuals, Actual Case Comparisons, and the Logic of Inference

Suppose it is hypothesized that C was a cause of event E. I would argue that when experimental control and replication are not possible, analysts have available a choice between two and only two strategies for "empirically" assessing this hypothesis. Either they can imagine that C had been absent and ask whether E would have (or might have) occurred *in that counterfactual case*; or they can search for other *actual* cases that resemble the case in question in significant respects,[3] except that in some of these cases C is absent (or had a different value). In the latter procedure, the analyst then checks the association between the occurrence of C and E in the set of actual cases.[4] If successful (from the analyst's point of view), both strategies would tend to support the hypothesis that the proposed cause in fact produces (or produced) the effect.

As an illustration, consider the hypothesis that international structural rather than domestic political factors have been the principal causes of

[3] The sense of "significant respects" is discussed below.

[4] These summary statements of the two strategies are not complete. Qualifications and elaborations for each are discussed in the rest of the paper, with more attention paid to the counterfactual case strategy. The potential difficulties with the method of comparing actual cases, which is formally known as regression analysis though informally practiced in such works as Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), are extensively discussed in the econometrics and statistics literatures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

major aspects of Soviet foreign policy. The analyst applying the counterfactual strategy would evaluate the hypothesis by examining arguments that *any* regime in Russia, Soviet or not, *would have* made essentially the same foreign policy choices. The analyst using the actual case strategy would search for cases of states in both similar and dissimilar structural positions as Soviet Russia and then would check the sample for a relationship between structural position and foreign policies.[5]

Both methodological strategies aim to solve *the same statistical problem*. Our analyst begins with one case and at least one explanatory variable, which means negative degrees of freedom.[6] Legitimate causal imputations cannot be made on the basis of negative degrees of freedom, so the analyst wishing to assess a causal hypothesis or to assess the relative weights of different causes has no choice but to add or create more cases: either a counterfactual case (or cases) that never actually existed or actual cases.

Put otherwise, the analyst, in explaining why some particular event E occurred, cannot help but explain why E occurred *rather than* some other possible outcome or outcomes. These other possible outcomes define the range of variation that the analyst accounts for, and this range is treated differently in different research traditions. For example, much historical analysis leaves implicit the other things that might have been had the historian's favored causes varied. In more methodologically self-aware small-N work, analysts tend to be more explicit about what might have happened.[7] Finally, in the actual case strategy, analysts take their cues about what might have happened from other actual cases. Thus, an elections specialist may explain why a respondent voted Republican rather than Democratic (as did other actual respondents); students of international conflict may explain why deterrence failed in one actual case but not in other cases; experts in comparative politics may explain why interwar Germany became a fascist dictatorship rather than a liberal de-

[5] "Structural position" here would entail the number of great powers and the basic geopolitical circumstances of the Soviet Union. Waltz (fn. 1); and idem, "Another Gap?" in Robert Osgood et al., *Containment, Soviet Behavior, and Grand Strategy*, Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 16 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981). On structural versus domestic political or ideological explanations of Soviet foreign policy, see also Barry R. Posen, "Competing Images of the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 39 (July 1987), 579–97.

[6] Degrees of freedom are the number of cases minus the number of explanatory variables minus one.

[7] For example, Barrington Moore, *The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (London: Macmillan, 1978); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 58–107. Of course, historians can be quite careful about their counterfactual arguments. For examples, see McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival* (New York: Random House, 1988); and George Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little Brown, 1960), 29–32.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mocracy like England or (taking a larger range of other actual cases) a social democracy like Sweden or a traditional dictatorship like Austria in the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg period.[8]

Not only do counterfactual and actual case strategies both attempt to solve the same statistical problem, but both also run important methodological risks. Less obvious is that in each of the strategies, the principal risks are closely connected to the role played by counterfactuals.

The main risk in the first strategy is obvious and serious—how can we know what would have happened with any degree of confidence? Historians, when confronted with the suggestion that the validity of their causal inferences *necessarily* depends on counterfactual argument, have often dismissed out of hand or ignored the idea in favor of the view that their job is to deal with *reality*.[9] Political scientists and sociologists, too, with the exception of a neglected methodological piece by Max Weber and some recent work by Jon Elster, have also tended to avoid explicit discussion or open embrace of the counterfactual strategy, probably because it is felt that an empirical political science must deal only with actual cases. This belief would seem to be reflected in the title of a recent book of essays by political scientists working with counterfactual premises: *What If?: Essays in Social Science Fiction*. The play on "science fiction" is no accident here.[10]

The risks of the second methodological strategy—that of increasing the degrees of freedom by considering other actual cases—are also well known. Whereas in the counterfactual approach one tries to imagine another (not actual) case in which the presumed causal agent is absent but everything else that is relevant is identical, in the second strategy the analyst adding actual cases may not know if the additional cases are appropriately identical. If there are other causes of the phenomenon in

[8] On deterrence, see Paul Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); on fascism versus liberalism in Germany, see Moore (fn. 1); on fascism versus liberalism, corporatism, or traditional dictatorship, see Gregory M. Luebbert, "Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe," *World Politics* 39 (July 1987), 449–78.

[9] For example, according to A. J. P. Taylor, "a historian should never deal in speculations about what did not happen"; Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 513. Or, in M. M. Postan's words, "The might-have-beens of history are not a profitable subject of discussion"; quoted in J. D. Gould, "Hypothetical History," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 22 (August 1969), 195–207. See also David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1970), 15–21; and examples given in Peter McClelland, *Causal Explanation and Model-Building in History, Economics, and the New Economic History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975).

[10] Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation," in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1949); Elster, *Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds* (New York: Wiley, 1978); citations below (fn. 56); and Nelson Polsby, ed., *What If?: Essays in Social Science Fiction* (Lexington, Mass.: Lewis Publishing, 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question that are not considered explicitly in the analysis, and if any of these are in fact systematically related to the causes explicitly considered, then effects of the other causes will be wrongly attributed to those of the causes that are being evaluated. Simply put, estimates of the effects of the proposed causes will be biased. In statistics this is the familiar problem of whether any independent variables are correlated with the contents of the error term (which contains the effect of all unspecified, unmeasured "other causes"). Such correlation may occur due to failure to include relevant independent variables, errors in measuring the independent variables, or unrecognized reciprocal causation. In the comparative politics literature it is often posed as the question of whether a researcher's several cases are comparable, or if the ceteris paribus assumption is adequately satisfied.[11] Because of the severity of this risk, some analysts tend to be skeptical of large-N or comparative historical work; they prefer case studies in which the risks of (an often implicit) counterfactual strategy may seem intuitively less serious.

Less well understood is the link between this central risk run by the actual case strategy and counterfactuals. While the paper focuses primarily on the role of counterfactuals in small-N research, a few words on their role in quasi-experimental regression analysis are useful as a prelude to making clearer exactly how the two strategies differ.

To support a causal interpretation of estimated regression coefficients, the large-N analyst using nonexperimental data needs to make a number of theory-driven assumptions.[12] As noted, chief among these is the as-

[11] The notion of comparability plays a major role in the methodological and applied writings of specialists in comparative politics. My impression is that nonetheless the notion remains a deeply vague one. It seems to include, at various times, the idea that the other causes should be uncorrelated with the independent variables ($E(X'e) = 0$); that everything else should have as little influence as possible ($E(e'e)$ should be close to zero); that measures will not be as valid or reliable across countries and cultures; and other meanings. (Throughout, $E(\cdot)$ is the expectations operator; X is an $n \times k$ matrix of n observations on k independent variables; e is an $n \times 1$ vector of error terms.)

Posing the main risk for analysis across sets of actual cases in terms of the regression validity of the ceteris paribus assumption also bears qualification. For regression estimates to be unbiased, we do not need the other things to be literally equal, though it is true that the more equal they are, the greater the precision of our estimated effects. For unbiased estimates of causal effects we need only require that the other things not be systematically related to the prospective causes and the dependent variable that we are evaluating. This point appears not to have been fully clear to Mill (working before statistics was well developed), who sometimes writes in his *System of Logic* (London: John W. Parker, 1851) as though everything else has to be literally identical in order for the Method of Difference to work. The same confusion seems to carry over today in the work of some specialists in comparative politics who take Mill as a principal methodological guide (e.g., Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 [April 1980], 174–97). That said, I should also note that those who conduct large-N research often do refer to this assumption as the "ceteris paribus assumption" simply for convenience, and I will follow this usage here.

[12] This is true as well of actual experiments in which cases are assigned at random to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sumption that explanatory variables and the errors (the other causes) are uncorrelated. Formally, the argument that estimated coefficients are unbiased depends on the assumption that $E(X'e) = 0$. It is easy to show that this assumption is credible *if and only if* a counterfactual proposition is credible; namely, the proposition

(P1) If the cases in the sample had assumed different values on the independent variables, the contents of the error term would not have differed systematically.

If P1 is false, then $E(X'e)$ does not equal zero. If $E(X'e)$ does not equal zero, P1 cannot be true (Q.E.D.).

This argument says that assuming that $E(X'e) = 0$ in a quasi experiment is *equivalent* to assuming the truth of a counterfactual proposition about what would have happened if we could have altered a variable's value for any case in the sample. Although one may not think about the ceteris paribus assumption in terms of a counterfactual proposition, a counterfactual proposition is necessarily involved nonetheless. In actual experiments random assignment guarantees the truth of P1 (within the limits of sampling variance). In quasi experiments, a causal interpretation of estimated coefficients requires belief in the credibility of the counterfactual P1 for justification. If we believe the results of a regression analysis, we must be willing to believe that, say, if Joe Respondent had been a Republican as opposed to a Democrat, he would have been roughly "so much" more likely to have voted for Reagan in 1984; or that if Israel had not moved troops quickly to its northeastern border in September 1970, then Syria would have been much less likely to have been deterred from advancing on the Jordanian capital.[13]

If both strategies of confirmation are means of solving the same statistical problem, and if both depend in some measure on counterfactuals, then how do they differ? The answer is that each strategy provides its "empirical" confirmation for a causal hypothesis in a different way.

In the actual case strategy support for a hypothesized causal connection comes principally in the form of a frequency or magnitude of association across actual cases. Of course, theory-driven assumptions—among them a counterfactual one—are needed to support or justify any regression result. But the result *one looks for* in regression analysis is an

treatment and control groups. See Leland Neuberg, *Conceptual Anomalies in Economics and Statistics: Lessons from the Social Experiment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Among other things, Neuberg shows that a counterfactual assumption is needed to justify estimates of sampling variance in actual experiments. I suggest below, however, that counterfactuals play a key role in quasi-experimental hypothesis testing that they do *not* play in actual experiments.

[13] The later example comes from Huth (fn. 8), 97, who often uses counterfactual argument about particular cases to make more plausible the results of his regression analysis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

estimated coefficient significantly different from the null hypothesis, and this difference derives from a frequency of association in the sample.

In the counterfactual case strategy, by contrast, frequencies of association cannot be meaningfully assessed. They are arguably irrelevant in any event, since the researcher is attempting to perform the perfect experiment, in which everything but the test factor is equal. Instead, support for a causal hypothesis in the counterfactual strategy comes from *arguments* about what would have happened. These arguments are made credible (1) by invoking general principles, theories, laws, or regularities distinct from the hypothesis being tested; and (2) by drawing on knowledge of historical facts relevant to a counterfactual scenario.[14]

An example will help make this point concrete. It has been proposed that a "cult of the offensive"—the widespread conviction held by European civilian and military leaders that there were enormous strategic advantages to striking first—was an important cause of World War I.[15] According to the analysis above, there are two means of empirically checking this hypothesis. Following the actual case strategy, we could assemble a set of international disputes, some of which escalated to war and some of which did not. We could then construct a measure of military and civilian beliefs about the advantages of a first strike, presumably from military writings and from statements of politicians and generals about their expectations for war. Finally, after thinking hard about what other independent variables required statistical control, we could test for the strength of association between commitment to offensive doctrines and escalation. To assess the contribution of this cause to the likelihood of World War I in particular, we would check the value of the several independent variables for this case, comparing their various contributions with that of belief in first strike advantages.[16]

Alternatively, we might employ the counterfactual case strategy,

[14] I am relying here on what David Lewis calls "metalinguistic" theories of counterfactuals. These hold that "a counterfactual is true, or assertable, if and only if its antecedent, together with suitable further premises, implies its consequent"; Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 65. The "further premises" may include both facts and causal laws, or "lawlike generalizations." For example, the counterfactual "If that match had been struck, it would have lit" is true given the existence of certain laws concerning sulfur, oxygen, friction, and heat, plus certain factual conditions, including a dry match, presence of oxygen, etc. A counterfactual is thus a "condensed or incomplete argument" (J. L. Mackie, "Counterfactuals and Causal Laws," in R. J. Butler, ed., *Analytical Philosophy* [Blackwell: Oxford, 1962], 68). There are other accounts of what makes a counterfactual true (or assertable), based on notions of distance between "possible worlds"; see Lewis.

[15] Van Evera (fn. 7); Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 108–46.

[16] Of course, each step of this process—from identifying a sample to interpreting relative importance—is fraught with methodological peril. *Both* strategies, it should be emphasized, are risky.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which often goes under the name "case study."[17] In this instance, careful researchers would make an explicit effort to imagine the prewar world without a cult of the offensive but otherwise similar. They would then construct an argument showing that the outbreak of a general war would have been much less likely in the counterfactual case. Such an argument would depend for its credibility on the principles and historical knowledge used to draw the picture of what would have happened. Stephen Van Evera adopts precisely this strategy to support his cult of the offensive hypothesis, relying at bottom on general principles of rationality.[18] He asks, in essence: How would statesmen have behaved if they had believed that defense rather than offense had the advantage? A reconstruction of what rational actions would have followed from these beliefs yields the conclusion that escalation would have been much less likely in a crisis like that of July 1914 (that is, in the counterfactual case).

The difference between the two means of hypothesis testing would thus appear to be quite stark, and on one level it is. In the counterfactual strategy the analyst supports one causal hypothesis by *invoking others*—laws, regularities, or principles that are taken as having some independent credibility. In the actual case strategy no other principles need to be invoked directly to support the causal hypothesis: only a strength of association across actual cases matters. Indeed, from this vantage point the counterfactual strategy for "empirically" checking a causal hypothesis seems only indirectly empirical, since the confirmation it provides depends principally on other *theories*, which are presumably themselves supported by empirical evidence from actual case comparisons.

On what may be a deeper level, this apparently central difference between the two strategies seems less sharply drawn. As noted, when the actual case strategy is employed in a nonexperimental setting, the validity of a causal interpretation of the results in contingent on the truth of a counterfactual assumption about the other unspecified, unmeasured causes. We must be ready to accept the proposition that had variable X taken values different from those in the sample, no such other causes of the dependent variable would have been systematically different as well. Our confidence that the other causes would not vary with the independent variables depends on our confidence in our theory about what the

[17] I want to suggest that counterfactual reasoning must underlie efforts to infer or assess the relative weights of causes in case studies where the analyst's degrees of freedom in the actual world are negative. In practice, those who use case studies often resort as well to casual comparisons with other actual cases (e.g., "Whereas in many other African countries . . . , in Kenya . . .") and testing multiple implications of a theory; see Donald Campbell, " 'Degrees of Freedom' and the Case Study," *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (July 1975), 178–93.

[18] Van Evera (fn. 7).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other causes are and about how they might be related to the variables being tested explicitly.

Two other contrasts between the counterfactual and actual case strategies should be noted. The first concerns the appraisal of relative causal weight. In the actual case strategy, such appraisals can be carried out in several ways, essentially by contrasting our estimates of the effects of different independent variables.[19] Ultimately, we can do this because we have a sample from which relevant frequencies and magnitudes can be extracted. In the counterfactual strategy, by contrast, we have no concrete frequencies or magnitudes, and the degrees of freedom problem will bite every time we introduce a new variable that may have influenced the particular event to be explained. Explicit justification of claims about relative effects will require *a proliferation of counterfactual cases*.

Suppose, for example, a historian or political scientist wishes to argue that both A and B were causes of event E, but that A was more important than B. The above analysis would suggest that we now need not one but at least two counterfactual scenarios to support this claim. We would need to contrast a counterfactual case where A is present but B absent with one where B is present but A absent, and then invoke general principles and relevant facts to argue that E would have been more likely to have occurred in the first instance.[20]

One might well object that such arguments about what would have happened in multiple counterfactual scenarios will be very imprecise and uncertain. The second contrast between the two strategies relates to this issue of "precision of estimates." In the actual case strategy when N is large, frequencies and magnitudes allow the researcher to get an idea of how much risk attaches to the belief that the true causal effect of a variable is as distinct from the null hypothesis as the results show. In the counterfactual strategy there is no such formal criterion for gauging the risk of error associated with some independent variable. All depends instead on the plausibility of arguments about what would have happened. As will be seen in the example of the debate on the origins of World War I, *arguments about the relative importance of possible causes become arguments about the relative plausibility of different counterfactual scenarios.*

[19] There is, however, more than one meaningful sense to the idea of causal importance in a regression model. See J. Merrill Shanks, "The Importance of Importance" (Working paper, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, 1982); Christopher Achen, *Interpreting and Using Regression* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982).

[20] Some philosophers of history working on the problem of how historians can and should attribute causal weightings have proposed similar criteria. See Raymond Martin, "Causes, Conditions, and Causal Importance," *History and Theory* 21 (1982), 53–74, and citations therein.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The analysis in this section bears on current methodological issues in the field in at least two ways. First, scholars in comparative politics and international relations often argue that because statistical methods are inapplicable when we have few cases and many variables, other methods need to be developed to enable sound explanations; these include, among others, the comparative method, structured, focused comparisons, process tracing, and what are sometimes called "qualitative methods." Following the analysis here, we would emphasize that statistical methods are inapplicable in these circumstances for a good reason, namely, the lack of enough cases to support a causal claim. Further, statistical logic implies that assessing a causal claim would require the addition of counterfactual or actual cases. Statistical principles do not simply cease to operate when the number of actual cases dips below twenty or fifteen or ten, creating room for alternative ways of testing causal hypotheses.

Second, researchers should choose between the two strategies of confirmation on the basis of the types of risks they are willing to run. Sometimes the counterfactual claims needed to support a causal inference seem entirely unproblematic. For example, we do not require a formal survey and regression analysis to support the claim that a gunshot through the heart caused the death. Less trivially, a researcher might be skeptical of regression analysis showing no clear relation between domestic political trouble and the initiation of war if it seemed clear from counterfactual reasoning that in a number of cases, domestic problems were a factor impelling the leadership to start a war.[21] Where there are serious problems in identifying a sample, operationalizing and measuring variables, and conceiving of relevant controls, counterfactual argument about one or several cases may be more compelling than a statistical effort.

Indeed, understanding that one can try to explain counterfactual variation in single cases, as well as actual variation across actual cases, may help resolve some of the puzzle over how case studies function methodologically to assess theories and hypotheses.[22] There is a substantial amount of work in political science where the analyst declares an interest in explaining phenomenon X (for example, war, revolution, democracy), chooses a set of cases where X actually occurred, and ends up drawing conclusions about the causes of phenomenon X. Those who engage in large-N analysis tend to view this procedure as totally invalid. Such analysts "sample on their dependent variables"; if they fail to include cases

[21] Cf. Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988), 653–73.

[22] Another tack on this puzzle is taken by Campbell (fn. 17).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where X does not occur, how can they find causes that differentiate between outcomes? But if we see that each case study proposes causes that selected the actual outcome from a range of possible *counterfactual* outcomes in that case, we see the source of the "not Xs" and the variance such analysts account for. This does not justify the approach—particularly since it is usually performed unconsciously—but it does make some methodological sense of it.

Counterfactual Argument in Practice

The most controversial point made above is probably that concerning the *necessity* of counterfactual argument for justifying causal claims in small-N settings. The approach is not put forward as simply another option on the menu for small-N practitioners. Rather, I have argued, the point is that when degrees of freedom in the actual world are negative, a causal claim *requires* argument about counterfactual cases for its justification (or addition of other actual cases). This section will consider some examples of how this logical constraint makes itself felt in practice.

One does not find counterfactuals playing central roles in *all* small-N political science research. My impression, after reviewing literature for examples and evidence, is that counterfactuals are most likely to be found performing confirmatory work in case studies where the analyst is explicitly concerned with giving a causal explanation for some event or phenomenon.[23] Of course, case studies may be used for other purposes, such as evaluating the performance of rival theories or simply giving information relevant to various theoretical concerns.[24] In addition, even in what is nominally a case study analysts often employ both strategies of confirmation.

I will first discuss the use of counterfactuals in three examples of N = 1 case studies.[25] Here counterfactual scenarios *must* be developed to support explicit causal claims and to support assertions about relative causal weight. Second, I will consider the role of counterfactuals in sev-

[23] E.g., Youssef Cohen, "Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military Dictatorship in Brazil," *World Politics* 40 (October 1987), 30–54; Hyug Baeg Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," *World Politics* 39 (January 1987), 231–57; Joanne Gowa, "Hegemons, IOs, and Markets: The Case of the Substitution Account," *International Organization* 38 (Autumn 1984), 661–83.

[24] For examples, see articles in Frederic Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[25] As the preceding discussion should suggest, an N = 1 case study in which causal inferences are drawn is, strictly speaking, impossible, since other counterfactual cases must be invoked to support causal claims. I use N here to refer to the number of cases in the actual world. On the idea of actual versus possible worlds, see Michael Loux, ed., *The Possible and Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eral N > 1 examples from comparative politics. Here analysts often make primary use of the actual case strategy when grounding causal assertions, but even then counterfactuals may be needed to justify inferences fully.

N = 1 Examples

Some of the clearest examples of the importance of counterfactual argument come from research on the causes of World War I. Over the years political scientists and historians have identified an enormous collection of possible factors,[26] which are typically argued to be causes on the following grounds: If cause X had not been present, the war either would not have occurred or would have been much less likely to have occurred. Thus, in arguing the causal importance of misperceptions in 1914, Robert Jervis writes, "Had the participants realized not only that the first offensive would not end the war, but also that the fighting would last for four punishing years, they might well have held back."[27] Note that Jervis relies on a rationality principle (sensitivity to war costs) to make credible the causal inference drawn from the counterfactual proposition.

On similar grounds, Van Evera has developed the thesis that a cult of the offensive was a major cause of World War I.[28] Further, he argues that military and civilian tendencies to glorify the offensive had the effect of "feeding or magnifying a wide range of secondary dangers" that other analysts thought were independent or unrelated causes. To establish this, Van Evera discusses the secondary dangers one by one, arguing in each case that had the cult of the offensive not been present, the secondary cause *would not have* operated with as much (or any) force. His conclusion nicely summarizes these counterfactual arguments. Throughout, Van Evera relies primarily on implicit rationality principles: he supposes leaders had different beliefs and then draws conclusions about appropriate or rational behavior given such beliefs.[29]

[26] These include, but are not limited to, nationalism, imperialism, capitalism, social Darwinism, a fatalistic intellectual mood, the balance of power system, population growth, differential industrialization, a power transition, long cycles, tight alliances, multipolarity, misperceptions, psychological pathologies, leader personalities, essentially aggressive German intent, military doctrine (i.e., the cult of the offensive), military organization, diplomatic errors, the Russian mobilization, the archduke's assassination, and the outcomes of recent crises.

[27] Jervis, "War and Misperception," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988), 684.

[28] Van Evera (fn. 7).

[29] I should note that rationality principles are not the only ones that might be used to limn counterfactual scenarios. One might argue, for example, that had some independent variable been different, a key actor would have ignored it due to cognitive dissonance or wishful thinking.

Even so, the frequent use of rationality principles to sketch counterfactual scenarios should not be surprising. The counterfactual strategy is often used by analysts explaining an outcome

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The consequences of the cult of the offensive are illuminated by imagining the politics of 1914 *had* European leaders recognized the actual power of the defense.... All European states *would have been* less tempted to mobilize first, and each *could have* tolerated more preparations by adversaries before mobilizing themselves, so the spiral of mobilization and counter-mobilization *would have* operated more slowly, if at all. If armies mobilized, they *might have* rushed to defend their own trenches and fortifications, instead of crossing frontiers, divorcing mobilization from war. Mobilizations *could more easily have been* confined to single frontiers, localizing the crisis. Britain *could more easily have* warned the Germans and restrained the Russians, and all statesmen *could more easily have* recovered and reversed mistakes made in haste or on false information. Thus the logic that led Germany to provoke the 1914 crisis *would have been* undermined, and the chain reaction by which the war spread outward from the Balkans *would have been* very improbable. In all likelihood, the Austro-Serbian conflict *would have been* a minor and soon-forgotten disturbance on the periphery of European politics.[30]

The use of counterfactuals is explicit and clear in Van Evera's analysis because he is methodologically self-conscious about providing a causal explanation. This is less true of much historical scholarship on the causes of World War I, where the key counterfactual propositions are often left implicit or underdeveloped.

Explicit treatment of counterfactual cases may in turn have the advantage of sharpening substantive debates. In the example at hand Scott Sagan has offered some important qualifications to the arguments advanced by Van Evera and Jack Snyder. He argues, among other things, that Van Evera and Snyder "have overlooked the negative consequences that *would have resulted* if the great powers had adopted purely defensive military doctrines."[31] He takes issue, in other words, with Van Evera's counterfactual scenario. Sagan holds that the offensive doctrines of the major European powers were rationally chosen to provide extended deterrence to key strategic allies and were not simply or solely the result of the biases of military organizations. He suggests that defensive doctrines might have left states unable to offer credible threats on behalf of their allies, possibly increasing the chances for smaller wars that would have

---

as the result of human choices. This entails saying why other possible choices were not seen as desirable by the actors. In game-theoretic terms, analysts using the counterfactual strategy are often describing why some particular set of choices was an equilibrium (or, at least, rationalizable) strategy in the "game" faced by the actors. On Nash equilibrium versus rationalizability as game-theoretic solution concepts, see B. Douglas Bernheim, "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," *Econometrica* 52 (1984), 1007–28.

[30] Van Evera (fn. 7), 105 (emphasis added).

[31] Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited," *International Security* 2 (Fall 1986), 151–75, at 159 (emphasis added).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

altered the balance of power against them (for example, Germany loses Austria to Russia, or Russia loses France to Germany). Sagan's argument contains excellent examples of the use of general principles and specific historical knowledge to support counterfactual scenarios, as well as some clever uses of the actual case strategy to refute counterfactual claims with which he disagrees.[32]

Another good example of counterfactual analysis in international relations research focuses on the *non*occurrence of an important phenomenon, namely, that there has not been a war among major powers since 1945. This outcome might be explained by any of the following causes, according to different theories: bipolarity, the presence of nuclear weapons, successful balance of power politics, or the obsolescence of major war due to the "Hollandization" of the great powers.[33] If either nuclear weapons or Hollandization were in fact the true or major cause of postwar military stability, then we cannot hope to employ the actual case strategy to check this, since neither variable varied much before 1945.[34] With John Mueller, who has recently argued the case for Hollandization against the more widely accepted nuclear weapons thesis, we would be compelled to argue about what would have happened had nuclear weapons not been invented and amassed in this period.[35] As Mueller puts it:

> The postwar world *might well have* turned out much the same even in the absence of nuclear weapons. Without them, world war *would have been* discouraged by the memory of World War II, by superpower contentment with the postwar status quo, by the nature of Soviet ideology, and by the fear of escalation [to conventional war].[36]

Mueller proceeds to argue the counterfactual case for each of these "independent variables" favoring postwar stability. Though he does not deny that nuclear weapons may have had some damping effect on poten-

[32] See also Snyder's response to Sagan's critique and Sagan's reply, *International Security* 9 (Winter 1986–87), 187–98. Their discussion is carried out largely in the realm of the counterfactual (e.g., what was the *probability* that the Schlieffen plan would work).

[33] The Hollandization thesis is developed by John Mueller in *Retreat from Doomsday* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), where he argues that gradual changes in the government and societies of advanced industrial states have made them more peaceable in their external affairs. For a review of arguments on the causes of the long peace, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chap. 8.

[34] Depending on how one counts the "poles," neither does bipolarity; see Waltz (fn. 1).

[35] To assess the question of *relative* importance, we would also need to ask about what would have happened if nuclear weapons existed but Hollandization did not. Mueller does not explore this second counterfactual scenario explicitly. To hold that Hollandization has been the more important cause, he would need to argue that postwar states lacking the key Hollandization attributes might not have been deterred from fighting a major war, despite nuclear weapons.

[36] Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988), 55–79, at 56 (emphasis added).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tial escalation, he holds that their causal effect has been redundant, due to the combined impact of the other variables. The claim about the counterfactual case—the postwar world with no nuclear weapons and no major war—is supported by some specific historical detail (for example, characteristics of Soviet ideology) and by at least one general principle: "Wars are not begun out of casual caprice or idle fancy, but because one country or another decides that it can profit from (not simply win) the war—the combination of risk, gain, and cost appears preferable to peace."[37] Taking this as either a theoretically plausible or an empirically confirmed regularity, Mueller suggests that even disregarding the added costs posed by nuclear weapons, the costs of conventional war in these years would have been enough to deter the U.S. and Soviets from a hot war.[38]

A final example of the counterfactual strategy as used in an N = 1 case study comes from work on the breakdown of democratic regimes.[39] Alfred Stepan's explanation for the 1964 military takeover in Brazil illustrates a fairly common way that counterfactuals are employed in comparative politics and international relations case studies.[40] Stepan proposes that the actual outcome—the military coup—was made possible by the operation of certain social, economic, and ideological "macropolitical" factors but that these did not make the coup "inevitable." "There remained a small margin of maneuverability within which the process of increasing democratization and participation could have been expanded."[41] Stepan is here defining the *range of counterfactual variation* that he wishes to explain. Brazil in 1964 could have seen a democratic outcome but did not. The micropolitical factors that reduced the "margin of maneuverability" and selected the authoritarian outcome from the range of possibilities are then assigned causal status above that of the

[37] Ibid., 68–69.

[38] The fortunate absence of actual cases of nuclear conflict has led a number of historians and political scientists to reflect on the role of counterfactuals in nuclear history. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Nuclear Weapons and International Systemic Stability," American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper No. 2 (Cambridge: AAAS, 1990). This paper was prepared for an AAAS workshop entitled "Nuclear History and the Use of Counterfactuals." In a different vein, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein ("Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 43 [Winter 1987], 3–71) have briefly discussed the role of counterfactuals in defining a sample of cases of successful deterrence.

[39] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[40] Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," ibid. For other examples, see Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), and citations in fn. 23.

[41] Stepan (fn. 40), 134, and see also 120.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

macropolitical factors, which, in Stepan's view, were not "sufficient" themselves to determine the result.[42]

In his historical treatment of the events leading up to the coup, Stepan identifies political strategy choices by the incumbent president, João Goulart, as the key micropolitical causes of the breakdown of the democratic regime. In an atmosphere of political stalemate, Goulart lost important military and middle-class allies by proposing major economic and constitutional reforms and bidding for the support of the left to back them. But still, "as late as twelve days after [the declaration of these reforms] no 'winning coalition' existed to overthrow Goulart." A naval mutiny by lower-level officers and sailors then occurred, forcing Goulart to choose between alienating either the mutineers or the higher-level officers, who saw the mutiny as a major "threat to the principle of military discipline."[43] His decision to be lenient with the mutineers had the unforeseen effect of galvanizing high-level military support for a coup.

These two key political choices are posed as causes of the breakdown of the regime on counterfactual grounds: had Goulart chosen different strategies, the analysis suggests, a coup might not have occurred. The counterfactual contrasting case is justified by reference to specific historical detail (evidence that the military was divided and generally not supportive of direct military rule before the choices were made) and to general principles (for example, the proposition that plotters do not act unless they expect sufficient support, or lack of resistance, from other key actors).

Though Stepan is much more careful and explicit about his counterfactual comparison than is often the case, I would argue that his analysis only goes part of the way to justify his causal claims, essentially because he does not spell out the counterfactual scenario in quite enough detail. Goulart's *reasons* for choosing the left-oriented, constitutional reform strategy, and thus in a sense the deeper causes of the takeover, are left unclear. Stepan seems to suggest that Goulart's destabilizing move leftward was more a function of his personality and aspirations than it was of the untenability of other alternatives. But we need more careful speculation about what would have happened had he instead stayed with his divided and indecisive coalition. If in the longer run his position was simply impossible—that is, if no civilian leader could govern given the political stalemate under existing institutional arrangements—then the

[42] The distinction is similar to that between underlying causes and specific or proximate causes—a framework often used by historians.

[43] Stepan (fn. 40), 129 and 130.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

macropolitical factors would seem to gain in importance as causal factors.[44]

N > 1 but Still Small-N Examples

Researchers with more than one actual case are not logically compelled to use the counterfactual strategy to justify a causal claim, as long as they do not have more independent variables than cases (less one), or two or more independent variables that vary together (perfect multicollinearity). Roughly speaking, these conditions ensure that regression estimates can be derived, and they are usually met with ease in large-N research projects. Quite often, however, researchers in comparative politics and international relations work with few cases and many variables.[45] There are sometimes opportunities in this intermediate range to employ the actual case strategy, but the application of statistical methods either would fail to yield estimates of causal effects or would yield wildly imprecise estimates. In these circumstances, I would argue, one typically finds a mixing of the actual and counterfactual case strategies, with each used to make the other more credible. In good large-N research, the credibility of causal effect estimates derives in the first instance from ample degrees of freedom. Given the theoretical assumptions supporting a causal interpretation, causal claims are empirically supported by regularities of association, in Humean fashion. With an N between 2 and (say) 15, however, the regularity justification is weaker and may need support from more detailed treatments of individual cases. Readers may want to know not only that the proposed causes correctly partition outcomes across the few actual cases, but that in each case the proposed causes indeed *produced* the effects attributed to them. In such efforts one can find examples where researchers resort implicitly or explicitly to the counterfactual strategy and examples where they would have to use it to defend their causal claims.

One common methodological practice in comparative politics and international relations work could be called the "loading up of explanatory factors." The researcher lists several causes for the phenomenon being explained, all of which were present in the cases where the phenomenon occurred. In formal terms, the researcher has a multicollinearity problem. In such instances, counterfactual arguments would be necessary to

[44] In a current project, Stepan uses explicit counterfactual analysis to assess the impact of presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems on democratic regime breakdown in South America and Southern Europe.

[45] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65 (September 1971), 682–93.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

support the claim that *any one* of the proposed conditions has a causal effect.

Consider, for example, one of Stepan's arguments in his work on Peru.[46] His goal is to explain the success or failure of attempts to install corporatist political arrangements in Latin American states. He identifies five independent variables and gives general hypotheses linking each to the likelihood of success or failure. These five variables are then shown to discriminate between actual cases of success and failure in the following sense: where they were all basically favorable to corporatist installation, installation succeeded; where they were basically unfavorable, it did not. The difficulty here is that without counterfactual argument, we cannot decide which of these variables mattered—whether at all or how much. It could be, for example, that only one or two of these variables is really critical and that the rest are totally irrelevant. There are only two ways to decide: (1) find new actual cases where one explanatory factor is present but others are not, or (2) argue counterfactually that the removal of any one of the variables would have damaged chances for corporatist success in the actual cases we have. The tendency to "load up" explanatory factors is quite common. For instance, Barrington Moore's landmark work contains many examples of this practice, such as the list of five "main conditions that have apparently been most important for the development of democracy.[47]

Counterfactuals may also come into play in what is nominally actual case work when analysts use historical treatments of particular cases to make credible claims based on actual case associations. For example, Theda Skocpol identifies three key variables that differentiate her "positive cases" of social revolution (1789 France, 1917 Russia, and 1911–49 China) from actual cases in which social revolutions did not occur (for example, Meiji Japan, seventeenth-century England, 1807 and 1848 Prussia, Russia after the Crimean War and in 1905, early-eighteenth-century France).[48] Rather than simply stating the values of the independent variables for the different cases and showing that they differentiate between outcomes, Skocpol undertakes moderately extensive historical treatments of each positive case, detailing how the independent variables she identifies produced social revolution in each one. Though Skocpol makes

[46] Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[47] Moore (fn. 1), 430. See also Alexander L. George et al., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 227.

[48] Skocpol (fn. 4). Only four of these "negative cases" are treated explicitly and at length, though Skocpol is well aware that others mentioned are used in the same fashion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

frequent use of the actual case strategy within historical treatments,[49] her approach is broadly similar to that of Stepan in the Brazil example, in that the independent variables are shown to select out certain historical actualities from a range of possibilities.

Gregory Luebbert's exemplary use of the actual case approach in a small-N setting and provides some final examples of how the counterfactual strategy may be employed in such analyses. Luebbert first identifies two independent variables that perfectly partition his fourteen actual cases of European interwar regime types. "Pluralist democracies" occurred only in countries where liberal parties gained dominance before World War I. Regime type elsewhere was determined by which party successfully formed a coalition with the rural "middle peasants": if it was socialists, then "corporatist democracy" resulted; if liberals, then "traditional dictatorship"; if neither, then fascism. Luebbert does not dwell on the causal links between coalition membership and regime type. In justifying the causal argument that the effects of World War I made pluralist democracy along the lines of Britain and France improbable elsewhere, he *does* explore the following counterfactual: "In . . . Italy, Norway, and Sweden, another generation of peace *might have resulted* in pluralist democratic regimes."[50] But on the whole he is content to let the perfect association and the intuitively acceptable idea that coalition members determine the policy regime support the causal claim.

Instead, Luebbert turns his analytic attention to identifying "the conditions that produced each of these coalitions."[51] By implication, these will be the final or deeper causes of regime type. This effort is marked by both actual case comparisons and implicit counterfactual arguments. For examples of the latter, consider Luebbert's explanation of why socialist parties allied with middle peasants rather than with the agricultural proletariat in Norway and Denmark (thus yielding corporatist democracy). In Norway, he notes, there were few landless laborers, so they were not a tempting group for socialists to mobilize. Rather than correlating size of rural worker populations with socialist mobilization efforts across several actual cases, Luebbert simply appeals to a rationality principle that would support the appropriate counterfactual argument.[52] In Denmark the socialists could not mobilize what was a much larger ag-

[49] Ibid., e.g., 63.

[50] Luebbert (fn. 8), 457–58 (emphasis added).

[51] Ibid., 452.

[52] The rationality principle is: Parties desirous of electoral success will seek partners that can carry many votes with them. The implicit counterfactual argument is: If there had been many landless laborers in Norway, the socialists might have sought to form a coalition with them, and fascism might have resulted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ricultural labor force because "this population had already been heavily mobilized by another party."[53] Instead, they mobilized the middle peasants, leading to the corporatist coalition. The implicit counterfactual is: If the agricultural labor force had not already been mobilized, then it might have been mobilized by the socialists, and fascism rather than corporatism would have resulted. Thus, a particular fact about Danish prewar politics becomes an ultimate cause of corporatism rather than dictatorship or fascism in that country.

Counterfactuals and Causation: Two Theoretical Issues with Practical Implications

The proposition that a cause of a particular historical event may be established by imagining the effect of its (counterfactual) absence has been made before. In what remains one of the best essays on the topic, Weber argued vigorously for recognition of the link between causal explanation and counterfactuals in historical research.

> [The question of] what might have happened if, for example, Bismarck had not decided to make war [in 1866] is by no means an "idle" one [contrary to the view of historian Eduard Meyer]. It does indeed bear on something decisive for the historical moulding of reality, namely, on what causal *significance* is properly attributed to this individual decision in the context of the totality of infinitely numerous "factors" . . .[54]

Since Weber has been a methodological guru for generations of sociologists and political scientists, it is somewhat surprising that this particular essay has been so little discussed and explicitly applied. In recent years the only serious and sustained debate on the role of counterfactuals outside of philosophy took place among historians (and without reference to Weber), in their discussions of the use of counterfactuals by some practitioners of the "new economic history."[55] The only political scientist I know of who has examined the topic at length is Elster, particularly in his *Logic and Society*.[56] He presents a novel "branching worlds" theory

[53] Luebbert (fn. 8), 466.

[54] Weber (fn. 10), 164 (emphasis in original).

[55] Robert Fogel, *Railroads and American Economic Growth* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964); McClelland (fn. 9); Gould (fn. 9); Fritz Redlich, " 'New' and Traditional Approaches to Economic History and Their Interdependence," *Journal of Economic History* 25 (1965), 480–95; and T. A. Climo and P. G. A Howells, "Possible Worlds in Historical Explanation," *History and Theory* 15 (1976), 1–20. Fischer (fn. 9) lists further references.

[56] Elster (fn. 10). See also Elster, *Explaining Technical Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), chap. 1; idem, "Reply to Comments," *Inquiry* 23 (June 1980), 213–32; Steven Lukes, "Elster on Counterfactuals," *Inquiry* 23 (June 1980), 145–55; Brian Barry,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for assessing the validity of counterfactual propositions and uses it to analyze some examples in economic history. Outside the social sciences, of course, analytic philosophers have been writing about counterfactuals and causation for years.[57] While much of this literature (for example, that concerned with the metaphysics of modality)[58] would seem largely irrelevant to social scientists, some recent work on counterfactuals and explanation by philosophers of history has practical value and probably deserves greater attention.[59]

Scholars who have dealt with counterfactuals have often expressed dismay, doubt, and bewilderment at the sorts of logical and philosophical problems such propositions seem to entail. This section briefly introduces two problems that seem particularly bothersome to social scientists and historians.

The first is sometimes referred to as the "Cleopatra's Nose Problem."[60] According to Pascal, if Cleopatra's nose had been shorter, Antony might not have been so infatuated, and the course of Western history might have been different. Does this imply that the gene controlling the length of Cleopatra's nose was a cause of World War I? More generally, if we believe that an event A satisfies

(P2) If A had not occurred, B would not have occurred,

then are we committed to saying that A was a cause of B?

This is not just an idle question. As we have seen, social scientists often argue that A was a cause of B on precisely these grounds—that had A not occurred, B might not have occurred. How do we distinguish be-

---

"Superfox," *Political Studies* 28 (1980), 139–43. Political scientists have broached issues raised by counterfactuals in a variety of places. See, for example, Alexander George and Timothy McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in Robert Coulam and Richard Smith, eds.: *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 2:33–34; Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 39; Donald Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives," in Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 1:131–228.

[57] Nelson Goodman, "The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals," *Journal of Philosophy* 44 (1947), 113–38, reprinted in his *Fact Fiction and Forecast* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Lewis (fn. 14); Ernest Sosa, ed., *Causation and Conditionals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Part of the philosophical interest in counterfactuals arises from their bearing on key issues in the philosophy of science. See Frederick Suppes, "The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories," in Suppes, ed., *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 3–232, at 36–45, and references cited there; Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961). Nagel (chap. 15) also saw that counterfactuals play a key role in historical explanation.

[58] Loux (fn. 25).

[59] Martin (fn. 20). See also Martin, "Beyond Positivism: A Research Program for Philosophy of History," *Philosophy of Science* 48 (1981), 112–21; and idem, "Singular Causal Explanation," *Theory and Decision* 2 (1972), 221–37.

[60] Edward Hallet Carr, *What Is History?* (New York: Knopf, 1962); Gaddis (fn. 38).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween the infinity of particular factors that would have precluded or reduced the likelihood of some interesting event had they *not* taken place?

One approach would be to hold that causality should not be defined in terms of counterfactuals like P2, that "A satisfies P2" does not imply that A is a cause of B. Consider the view that a cause is something that *produces* its effect whenever (or usually when) it occurs. The cult of the offensive can be understood to have produced World War I in this sense, but Cleopatra's nose really cannot. This strategy amounts to accepting a regularity theory of causation.[61] Accidental happenings that help lead to specific events are not "causes" but only "conditions"; conditions of particular events that generalize or could regularly produce the effect are labeled causes. The distinction between causes and conditions could conceivably be a useful one for political scientists engaged in small-N work, and particularly for case studies.[62] The distinction can do violence to common sense and ordinary usage, however, as in the following: the unlucky person's death was not "caused" by the falling shingle, it was caused by skull fracture; the shingle was only a "condition."

Another approach would be more lenient with certain accidental happenings. We could argue that the length of Cleopatra's nose did not make World War I any more likely than myriad other possible worlds that could have followed, whereas the presence of the cult of the offensive did significantly "select out" the particular outcome that was World War I. That is, the same theoretical argument holding that the probability of World War I conditional on Cleopatra's nose being shorter was zero implies as well that the probability of World War I conditional on her nose being as it was must have been *almost* zero. On this account, an accidental (or "random") happening—say, a monkey bite leads to the death of a king, whose replacement begins a war[63]—could qualify as a "cause" of a particular event. The important point is that in both accounts events that satisfy P2 are not necessarily causes of the phenomenon being explained. Though counterfactuals like P2 might be explored to lend credence to a causal claim, a cause does more than just satisfy P2.[64] Both suggestions could have practical value for political scientists arguing causality on counterfactual grounds.

[61] On these, see Tom Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg, *Hume and the Problem of Causation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[62] For example, Luebbert (fn. 8) might have distinguished more carefully between the *conditions* prevailing in particular countries that allowed the *causes* of regime type—coalition membership—to operate as they did. On related philosophical distinctions between causes and conditions, see J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions," in Sosa (fn. 57), 15–38; and Martin (fn. 59, 1981, 1972).

[63] Carr (fn. 60), citing Churchill.

[64] A third suggestion for resolving this problem would be to add a condition of temporal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second vexing problem for scholars concerns what Elster calls the "legitimacy" of a counterfactual proposition.[65] Elster argues that a counterfactual thought experiment undertaken to assess a causal hypothesis is not legitimate if we have a theory saying that the counterfactual antecedent could not have happened. Suppose we wish to learn the effect of the railroad on the growth of GNP in nineteenth-century America and that we attempt to do so by imagining the last century without the railroad.[66] Elster thinks it nonsensical to speculate whether the internal combustion engine would have been invented earlier than it was (in the counterfactual nineteenth-century America without railroads), since an answer would require a theory of technical change strong enough to make the original counterfactual proposition implausible. If we could predict whether the gas engine would have been invented earlier, surely we would also have a theory showing that the railroads "had to be" invented when they were. Elster calls this "the scissors problem,"[67] or "the unimportance of inevitable":[68] the better our theories, the more things we know "had to occur" as they did, and thus the fewer counterfactuals we can legitimately assert.

In social science practice this problem often appears in the following guise. On the basis of actual case comparisons, a comparativist claims that C caused E in country X, suggesting that if C had been different, the outcome in country X might have been more like the outcome in country Y. A specialist on country X criticizes this as absurd, arguing that due to a complex of historical and cultural factors particular to country X, C could not have been different.

The insistence that counterfactual propositions be "legitimate" may confound, or at least obscure, two distinct problems.[69] The real issue is not legitimacy, if this means that in our counterfactuals we cannot legitimately vary causes that had to occur as they did. Whether event C had to occur has no direct bearing on its causal status with respect to E. A variable may help explain one outcome and still itself be explained by the action of other variables. In large-N work this pattern is commonly found in structural equations models, in which a dependent variable in one equation may be an independent variable in another equation.

---

or causal proximity to P2; that is, A is a cause of B if P2 is true and A precedes B by a relatively short time period, or if the causal chain is not too long. But this raises the problem of how long?

[65] Elster (fn. 10).

[66] Fogel (fn. 55).

[67] Elster (fn. 56, 1983), 38.

[68] Elster (fn. 10), 185.

[69] For related criticisms of Elster's notion of counterfactual legitimacy, see Barry (fn. 56); and Lukes (fn. 56).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The key issue, it seems to me, is what philosopher Nelson Goodman called "cotenability." In Goodman's account, a counterfactual assertion is judged true if (1) the counterfactual antecedent, when joined with appropriate theories and facts, implies the consequent; and (2) the counterfactual antecedent is "cotenable" with the facts or "initial conditions" used to draw the inference, meaning that if the antecedent had actually occurred, the initial conditions could also have occurred.[70] Thus, in his critique of the cult-of-the-offensive hypothesis, Sagan in effect argues that supposing the absence of the cult is not cotenable with supposing a 1914 otherwise identical to the actual 1914. As noted, he suggests that beliefs in defensive superiority would have created a different strategic problem for state leaders, one that could also have produced war.

The question, then, is not whether a factor had to occur but whether varying the factor implies changing other factors that *also* would have materially affected the outcome.[71] It is not appropriate to criticize a counterfactual argument by saying that the antecedent could not have occurred. Rather, we need an explicit argument saying that if the antecedent had been the case, other changes would be required in the counterfactual scenario that would have affected the outcome in a different way.

An obvious methodological prescription follows: analysts using the strategy of counterfactual argument should pay close attention to whether their counterfactual suppositions are cotenable with the facts and theories used to draw the causal inferences they make. This is perhaps a more precise statement of what it means to make a counterfactual argument plausible. I expect that in practice, the cotenability requirement will be more plausibly satisfied for small causes, such as specific policy decisions, than for big causes, such as nationalism, imperialism, or a cult of the offensive. History often provides evidence that leaders considered several possible choices at certain junctures, and in some instances it may be feasible to imagine a different choice without changing other major influences on the outcome in question. The fewer the

[70] Goodman (fn. 57, 1983), 15–17. See also references in fn. 14. Goodman points out that it is quite problematic to use a counterfactual to define general truth conditions for counterfactuals. See Mackie (fn. 14) for a possible way around this problem (which at any rate may be of greater interest to philosophers than to political scientists).

I should note that Elster (fn. 10) is well aware of the issue of cotenability, which he refers to as "compossibility" (p. 177) and also "compatibility" (p. 183). Indeed, his "branching worlds" theory for assessing the truth of counterfactuals can be seen as a suggestion for assessing cotenability.

[71] Note the similarity of the cotenability condition to P1, the key assumption justifying a causal interpretation of regression coefficients derived from quasi-experimental data. The likeness underscores the point that quasi experiments and the counterfactual strategy share reliance on counterfactual suppositions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changes from the actual world required by a counterfactual supposition, the easier it will be to draw and support causal inferences, and the more defensible they will be.[72]

Conclusion

Counterfactuals and the counterfactual strategy of hypothesis testing play an important but often unacknowledged and underdeveloped role in the efforts of political scientists to assess causal hypotheses. I have tried to show that any *non*experimental research that makes causal claims, be it of the large-N or small-N variety, must confront counterfactuals in the form of key assumptions or in the use of hypothetical comparison cases. Particularly in small-N research, the common condition of too many variables and too few cases makes counterfactual thought experiments a necessary means for serious justification of causal claims. I close with two simple suggestions for analysts evaluating causal claims via counterfactual argument rather than via regularities of association in a sample of actual cases.

First, small-N analysts could strengthen (or simply specify) their causal arguments by being *explicit* about the counterfactual scenarios needed to support their hypotheses. Quite commonly, researchers in comparative politics and international relations assert that their dependent variable is X, where X is some *particular* event or phenomenon. X might be the failure of the U.S. to play the role of international hegemon between the world wars, a change in the nuclear proliferation regime, the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, or the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Analysts explaining such events need to understand that *none* of these are variables. They become *values* of variables if alternative, counterfactual scenarios are identified or if actual cases, some of which differ in outcome, are added to the analysis.[73] If, for whatever reason, one is reluctant to add actual cases, then it is essential to make explicit what might have happened if a possible cause had varied. Counterfactual comparison cases need not be exhaustively detailed—just specified—so the reader knows what variation the theory or hypothesis proposes to explain.

The second key step is making inferences drawn from a counterfactual comparison *defensible*. Sometimes the argument implied by a coun-

[72] This suggestion is influenced by examples provided by McGeorge Bundy (fn. 7), and by Gaddis's discussion of them (fn. 38).

[73] The point that a variable is distinct from any particular realization of it should be obvious but is sometimes missed. The point that the variance explained might be defined across actual *or* counterfactual cases is rarely seen.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terfactual proposition is quite obvious and requires little or no unpacking.[74] Other times, particularly when the hypothesis is evaluated against other hypotheses, analysts should make clear what arguments support it and how they do so. The analyst needs to ask whether the causal inference does indeed follow from the theories and historical facts used to sketch the comparison case and then, whether the counterfactual proposition is cotenable with the counterfactual scenario. Cotenability requires that if the counterfactual assertion had been true (for example, if there had been no cult of the offensive), nothing else would also have been different in a way that would have materially affected the outcome.

Of course, we can never be certain about what else would have been different if C had been different. But perhaps we can venture arguments that can be judged more credible or less credible, depending on our use of historical detail and theories about the way people behave. I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that there can be a special methodology for determining precisely what would have happened. Nor am I advocating a new methodology to rival established approaches to hypothesis testing. Rather, the intent has been, first, to show that counterfactuals cannot be avoided in nonexperimental hypothesis testing, then, to explicate their roles, and finally, to recommend that when political scientists use counterfactuals, they do so explicitly and carefully.

[74] For example, "if that match had been struck, it probably would have lit" will not be controversial in most circumstances. Neither are the counterfactual arguments implied by Luebbert (fn. 8) on why the fascist coalition did not develop in Norway and Denmark.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

By PHILIP G. ROEDER*

A CENTRAL element of the Soviet developmental strategy was the creation of political institutions that expanded the control of the regime over the processes of social mobilization associated with modernization. This strategy was noteworthy for providing a considerable measure of interethnic peace as the Soviet regime began the process of industrialization. And yet seven decades after the Soviet regime assumed power, with the industrialization of the economy and urbanization of society well under way, this developmental strategy instead fuels a divisive and destructive ethnopolitics.

The Soviet developmental strategy seems to turn around a pattern familiar in the Western developmental experience. As Ernest Gellner notes: "The age of transition to industrialism was bound" also to be "an age of nationalism."[1] But the Soviet strategy delayed the political reckoning with the "age of nationalism" to a much later stage of industrialization. In the short term this was a prudent means to avoid the simultaneous crises that can overtax the capabilities of a new polity: the Soviet regime did not confront a crisis of identity as it sought to build the foundations of Soviet power and initiate the economic transformation of society.[2] This strategy nonetheless contained the roots of its own longer-term dysfunction and in the past three and a half decades has given rise to new ethnic assertiveness and protest.[3]

The Western experience with peripheral nationalism has differed more significantly from the Soviet pattern in a second respect. In the West—regardless of macroeconomic conditions that occasion the rise of peripheral nationalisms—it has been most pronounced among the less

* For their comments on earlier drafts, I thank my colleagues and good friends—Deborah Avant, Anthony Brunello, Ellen Comisso, Patrick Drinan, Arend Lijphart, Richard Little, Debra Rosenthal, Gershon Shafir, Susan Shirk, Tracy Strong, and Michael Tierney.

[1] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 40.

[2] Sidney Verba, "Sequences and Development," in Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 283–316; Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1967), 120–32.

[3] I make a parallel argument concerning the relationship between the Soviet developmental strategy and political participation; see Philip G. Roeder, "Modernization and Participation in the Leninist Developmental Strategy," *American Political Science Review* 83 (September 1989), 859–84.

World Politics 43 (January 1991), 196–232

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advantaged. In nineteenth-century Western Europe, according to Joseph Rudolph and Robert Thompson, "the most common causal element giving rise to the urge for autonomy" was the aggravation of a peripheral ethnic group's "marginality in, or exploitation by, the state system to which it belongs."[4] During periods of economic prosperity in the more recent rise of peripheral nationalisms, Peter Gourevitch has found that those most likely to support ethnic political movements are disadvantaged ethnic groups drawn by the opportunity or promise of expanded resources.[5]

In the Soviet Union the rise of ethnopolitics has been most significant in the Caucasian and Baltic republics. It is there that local leaders have pressed the most ambitious legislative agendas for change (see Table 1) and that citizens have mounted the largest and most frequent demonstrations (Table 2). Yet, as Figure 1 shows, these nationalities—particularly the Armenians, Georgians, and Estonians—are among the most successful ethnic groups in terms of educational and occupational attainment, in many instances reporting rates even higher than those for the numerically predominant Russian population. Even in the area of Party membership, Georgians report far higher rates among the adult population than do the Russians, and the Armenians report rates above the average for all nationalities. Far less inclined to mount this form of political action in recent years have been the least advantaged nationalities, such as those in Central Asia. Thus, it is the nationalities with the highest levels of educational, occupational, and often political attainment, rather than the disadvantaged or marginal ones, that have advanced the most ambitious agendas for change and engaged in the most extensive protest.

The new Soviet ethnopolitics is structured by the federalism of nominally autonomous ethnic homelands. Appreciating the strategic value of organizational weapons, political entrepreneurship, and mobilizational resources, the architects of the Soviet regime came to understand that federal institutions could expand their control over the politicization of ethnicity. Within each homeland the regime created a cadre of party and state officials drawn from the indigenous ethnic group but dependent

[4] Rudolph and Thompson, "Ethnoterritorial Movements and the Policy Process: Accommodating Nationalist Demands in the Developed World," *Comparative Politics* 17 (April 1985), 292. See also Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 147–78; Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

[5] Gourevitch, "The Reemergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms': Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (July 1979), 303–22, at 319–21. See also Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23 (1981), 165–95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

MAJOR UNION-REPUBLIC LEGISLATION ON ETHNIC RELATIONS

(SEPTEMBER 1, 1985–DECEMBER 31, 1989)

Republic	*Sovereignty*[a]	*Language*[b]	*Other Legislation*[c]
Estonian SSR	Constitutional amendment (11/16/88)[d]	Law (1/18/89)	Republican economic accountability (5/18/89)
			Voting residence requirement (8/8/89)[d]
			Deputy residence requirement (11/17/89)
Lithuanian SSR	Constitutional amendment (5/18/89)[d]	Law (11/18/88)	Republican economic independence (5/18/89)
		Presidium decree (1/26/89)	Law on citizenship (11/3/89)[d]
		Supreme Soviet decree (5/18/89)	Military service (9/29/89)[d]
Latvian SSR	Constitutional amendment (7/29/89)[d]	Supreme Soviet resolution (10/6/88)	In-migration restrictions (2/14/89)
		Law (5/5/89)	Voting residence requirement (7/29/89)[d]
Azerbaidjan SSR	Constitutional amendment (9/23/89)[d]	[Article 73][e]	
Georgian SSR	Constitutional amendment (11/19/89)	[Article 75][e]	
Armenian SSR		[Article 73][e]	Annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh (12/1/89)
Tadjik SSR		Law (7/22/89)	
Moldavian SSR		Law (9/1/89)	
Uzbek SSR		Constitutional amendment (10/21/89)	

SOURCES: *Izvestiia*, January 20, 1989, July 23, 1989, November 5, 1989, November 13, 1989, November 20, 1989; *Kommunist* [Erevan], December 3, 1989; *Pravda*, October 7, 1988, November 28, 1988, May 6, 1989, May 20, 1989, July 30, 1989, August 10, 1989, August 17, 1989, September 1, 1989, September 3, 1989, October 6, 1989; *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, November 19, 1988; *Sovetskaia Litva*, November 19, 1988, January 27, 1989; *Sovetskaia Latviia*, February 17, 1989.

[a] Declarations of sovereignty and right of nullification. In parentheses: date of adoption.

[b] Declaration of state language. In parentheses: date of adoption.

[c] Language provision previously adopted with 1978 union-republic constitution.

[d] Portions subsequently declared unconstitutional by all-union Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

[e] In parentheses: date of adoption.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
MAJOR PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS
(SEPTEMBER 1, 1985–AUGUST 31, 1989)

	Estimated Number of Demonstrations	
Ethnic Group	*Over 100,000 Participants*	*Over 10,000 Participants*[a]
Armenians	25	30
Azeris	9	19
Lithuanians	4	9
Latvians	3	7
Georgians	2	4
Estonians	2	4
Moldavians	1	6
Uzbeks	1	1
"Exclave" Russians	0	3
Belorussians	0	1
Ukrainians	0	0
Kazakhs	0	0
Kirgizes	0	0
Tadjiks	0	0
Turkmen	0	0

SOURCES: *New York Times; Radio Liberty Research Bulletin; Report on the USSR.*
[a] Number includes those over 100,000.

upon Moscow for its members' positions. As this cadre was assigned a monopoly over the mobilizational resources within the ethnic community, it determined when the ethnic group would be mobilized to action. It was a strategy that achieved interethnic peace not so much by removing the root causes of ethnic grievances as by eliminating mobilizational opportunities for independent ethnic protest.

It is therefore an ironic twist that after the transition to industrialism these federal institutions and indigenous cadres became instruments of the new ethnic assertiveness. Institutions that were designed to expand Moscow's control over ethnic groups (and that were generally thought in the West to be moribund as federal guarantees of ethnic rights) have taken on a new life. Autonomous homelands provide essential resources for the collective mobilization of ethnic communities, and both federal institutions and indigenous cadres shape ethnic agendas.

Central to what we have witnessed in the Soviet Union is an expanding and increasingly public politics of *ethnofederalism*. This is not a new phenomenon initiated by the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev but the continuation of a trend that began to unfold as early as the rule of Nikita

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



(a) Completed Higher Education, 1970
(Proportion of 10+ Age Group)



(b) Enrollment in Higher Education, 1970
(Proportion of 17-29 Age Group)



FIGURE 1
EDUCATIONAL, OCCUPATIONAL, AND POLITICAL ATTAINMENT
BY ETHNIC GROUP[a]

SOURCES: Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Moscow: Statistika, 1972–73), 2:12–75, 4:360–82, 393–433; *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka, i kul'tura v SSSR* (Moscow: Statistika, 1971), 196; *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka, i kul'tura v SSSR* (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), 296; *Partiinaia zhizn'*, no. 10 (1976), 16.

[a] These figures show the most recent data available for ethnic groups with a population over one million.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Khrushchev. As examples below will show, demands for expanded autonomy, protests over language policy, pressures to reduce Russian migration, and intercommunal violence have surfaced in every decade since the mid-1950s. Gorbachev's policies are clearly not sufficient explanation for a pattern that predates Gorbachev and the introduction of his reforms.

The key to three questions raised by the present ethnic crisis lies within the Soviet developmental strategy that created those homelands and cadres. First, *origins*: Why have institutions that fostered interethnic peace during the transition to industrialization later become the vehicles of protest? Second, *incidence*: Why have the relatively advantaged ethnic groups been the most assertive, whereas ethnic groups near the lower end of most comparative measures of socioeconomic and political success have been relatively quiescent? And third, *agendas*: Why have the most important issues of contention between center and periphery focused to such a large degree upon the details of the Soviet developmental strategy and upon federalism in particular? As is argued in the conclusion, the answers to these questions point up the centrality of Soviet political institutions to the politicization of ethnicity.

The Soviet Developmental Strategy and Ethnicity

Political entrepreneurs play a critical role in the mobilization of protest, the politicization of ethnicity, and in many cases even the creation of ethnic identities.[6] In the European experience, for example, regional intellectuals who felt their aspirations to elite status frustrated by the status quo were often the pioneers of ethnic revival. Anthony Smith contends that these intellectuals sought to create a separate, ethnically distinct system of stratification within which the "professional and bureaucratic apparatus would naturally satisfy the career aspirations of a multitude of hitherto excluded diploma-holders."[7] These regionally oriented intellectuals were a necessary, although not sufficient, ingredient in the rise of peripheral nationalisms.

Political entrepreneurs in ethnic communities have available to them two mobilizational strategies: *primordial* and *instrumental*. The primor-

[6] William Bernard, "New Directions in Integration and Ethnicity," *International Migration Review* 5 (Winter 1971), 464–73; Michael Hechter, Debra Friedman, and Malka Appelbaum, "A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action," *International Migration Review* 16 (Summer 1982), 412–34; Phillip M. Rawkins, "An Approach to the Political Sociology of the Welsh Nationalist Movement," *Political Studies* 27 (September 1979), 440–57; Joseph Rothchild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 27.

[7] Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 87, 126.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dial strategy focuses on ethnic revival—in Smith's words, "communal regeneration through self-discovery and self-realization."[8] The mobilization of the ethnic community for political action often centers on an assertion of the ethnic group's identity, usually in the context of issues of culture, identity, or belief and in reaction to threats to the identity from assimilative policies. The instrumental strategy focuses on the pursuit of social and economic interests. The mobilization of ethnicity, according to Rothchild, is "a highly conscious, political, and new mode of interest articulation."[9] The ethnic group itself, in the words of Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, is "defined in terms of interest, *as* an interest group."[10] Political entrepreneurs may also seek to mix these strategies.

The Soviet developmental strategy sought to control ethnopolitics by prohibiting all but sanctioned political entrepreneurs from mobilizing their communities and by deterring these entrepreneurs from pursuing any but the regime's instrumental strategies of plan fulfillment and social transformation. The Soviet strategy achieved this control through a threefold policy of (1) creating within each ethnic homeland an indigenous cadre assigned a monopoly over the mobilizational resources of the community, (2) constraining the behavior of this new ethnic cadre by creating an incentive structure that deterred the expression of unsanctioned, particularly primordial ethnic agendas, and (3) assigning the cadre the responsibility for creating an ethnically distinct stratification system within official institutions and for impeding the emergence of alternative ethnic entrepreneurs outside these institutions. Let us examine each in turn.

Creating an Ethnic Cadre

The Soviets have labeled the structural foundations of their "nationalities policies" socialist federalism and indigenization (*korenizatsiia*). The socialist federation, in the formulation of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, "differs radically from the bourgeois federation," for the former is "the state form for solving the *national question* . . . [and] is based on the national-territorial principle."[11] Thus, at present fifty-three of the territorial administrations of the Soviet Union are based on designated ethnic homelands—fifteen as union republics, twenty as autonomous republics,

[8] Ibid., 105; James McKay, "An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationalist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5 (October 1982), 395–420, at 399.

[9] Rothchild (fn. 6), 30.

[10] Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 7.

[11] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1977), 27:255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eight as autonomous oblasts, and ten as autonomous *okrugs*.[12] Indigenization has sought to tie the minorities to the Soviet regime by drawing national cadres into the political and administrative posts of Party and state in these territories. In 1920 then People's Commissar of Nationality Affairs Joseph Stalin explained that to make Soviet power "near and dear" to the minorities would require

> that all Soviet organs in the border regions . . . should as far as possible be recruited from the local people acquainted with the manner of life, habits, customs, and language of the native population; [and] that all the best people from the local masses should be drawn into these institutions.[13]

Federalism and indigenization came at the expense of simple economic rationality and assimilation. The national-territorial principle has not always led to optimal administrative units. In some instances, particularly among less modernized groups, it perpetuated or strengthened ethnic differences that might otherwise have disappeared. In the case of the Ukraine, Alexander Motyl can ask, "Why . . . did the Soviet state . . . discourage Little Russianization [i.e., assimilation] by pursuing *korenizatsiia*?"[14] The answer would appear to be the primacy the Soviet regime placed on checking the mobilizational sources of ethnopolitics and the critical role it assigned the ethnic cadres in this strategy.

These policies provided opportunities for nationalities representing over 93 percent of the non-Russian population to create ethnically distinct political elites within formally autonomous homelands. Grey Hodnett's extensive data show that by the early post-Stalinist period (1955–72), indigenization in eleven of the fourteen non-Russian republics led to proportionate overrepresentation of the titular nationality in Party and state leadership posts at the republic level. By the 1980s indigenization extended well beyond the most visible posts, such as each republic's Party first secretary, chairmen of its Presidium and Council of Ministers, first secretary of its Union of Writers, president of its Academy of Sciences, rectors of its principal universities, and chair of its council of trade unions. The data compiled by Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp show that it also reached such sensitive and less visible areas as internal security, including each republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs, Committee on

[12] A new (eleventh) autonomous *okrug* was created for the Even-Batagai district in Yakutia in October 1989; *Pravda*, October 30, 1989. Other changes are likely to follow.

[13] Stalin, "The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia," in *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 4:370–71.

[14] Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 104. See also Grey Hodnett, "The Debate over Soviet Federalism," *Soviet Studies* 18 (April 1967), 458–81; Daniel C. Matuszewski, "Nationalities in the Soviet Future: Trends under Gorbachev," in Lawrence C. Lerner and Donald W. Treadgold, eds., *Gorbachev and the Soviet Future* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), 95–96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

State Security, and the Party's Administrative Organs Department. It also touched lower levels of administration. In 1988, for example, in each union republic with oblasts the indigenous nationality held a greater proportion of oblast Party committee first secretaryships than its proportion of the republic's population.[15]

The indigenous cadre was given an institutionalized monopoly on the public expression of ethnic identity, that is, it defined the ethnic markers that distinguish the nationality. These markers were then central to communicating the socialist message in national cultural forms and propagandizing populations being brought into the modern sector. For many Soviet citizens undergoing social mobilization the first sustained contact with the great traditions of their own ethnic group was in the form of this national-Soviet hybrid. In the extreme, the markers identified by these elites defined new ethnic groups, such as the Tadjiks, that had not previously been communities with which elites and the masses had identified. Yet, as the recent political activism by Tadjiks attests, even these markers became the basis for the mobilization of the population in political action.[16]

More importantly, within each republic this cadre was assigned the role of gatekeeper, to determine when the ethnic group would be mobilized politically. Insofar as anyone within the homeland had access, this cadre monopolized the mobilizational resources essential to sustained, large-scale political action. The means of communications, particularly the indigenous-language press and broadcast media, were monopolized through the republican institutions controlled by this cadre.[17] Access to meeting places, such as auditoriums and public squares within the re-

[15] Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978), 101–3, 377–78; Jones and Grupp, "Modernisation and Ethnic Equalisation in the USSR," *Soviet Studies* 36 (April 1984), 159–84, at 174; *Deputaty verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, odinadtsatyi sozyv* [Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, eleventh convocation] (Moscow: Izvestiia, 1984); Gavin Helf, comp., *A Biographical Directory of Soviet Regional Party Leaders*, 2d ed. (Munich: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1988). For long-term trends in indigenization within specific republics, see John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York: Praeger, 1959), 15–17; Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 209–318; Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institutions Press, 1987), 199–246. See also Steven L. Burg, "Russians, Natives, and Jews in the Soviet Scientific Elite: Cadre Competition in Central Asia," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 20 (January–March 1979), 43–59; Nancy Lubin, "Assimilation and Retention of Ethnic Identity in Uzbekistan," *Asian Affairs* 12 (October 1981), 277–85, at 283; J. W. R. Parsons, "National Integration in Soviet Georgia," *Soviet Studies* 34 (October 1982), 547–69, at 554.

[16] Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 76; *Izvestiia*, July 14, 1989; *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 28, 1989; *Pravda*, June 25, 1988.

[17] Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950); Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public, was at the discretion of this cadre. And public protests could avoid violent suppression only with the cadre's approval.

The Deterrence of Primordial Strategies

These cadres were encouraged to pursue the regime's instrumental strategies and deterred from primordial strategies by the offer of material rewards and status, which were tightly tied to the regime's goals.[18] Particularly after Stalin's purge of traditional native elites and the sovietization of indigenous institutions, the cadres enjoyed access to these rewards only by virtue of Soviet institutions. Their privileged positions would not be improved in alternative (even independent) institutions. Indeed, the collapse of Soviet power within their homeland would mean their own fall from power—or perhaps worse. Cadres thus had a strong incentive to resist the articulation of agendas that might be subversive of existing federal institutions.

Rewards were tightly tied to the norms and goals of the Soviet developmental strategy. Soviet federalism embedded these cadres within the all-union Soviet administrative hierarchy. Cadres could only succeed within an incentive system that defined individual and collective success in instrumental terms of quota fulfillment and socioeconomic growth. By integrating the cadres into Party and state hierarchies, Soviet federalism made the "normal" politics of competitive appeals for resources the norm among ethnic elites as well. Much of the politics between Moscow and the nationality-based territorial units came to involve the petitioning for funds from above; beginning with the last years under Khrushchev speeches by leaders of the republics appealing for funds and projects to benefit their people came to be an increasingly prominent feature of meetings of the Party Congress, the Central Committee, and the Supreme Soviet.[19]

Those who engaged in unsanctioned mobilizational strategies could be punished with total deprivation of these rewards by being removed from their positions of authority. The monopoly of official institutions meant that a purge at the very least threatened one's access to these rewards; cadres could not return to a prosperous private life. Purges of ethnic leaders charged with articulating particularistic, primordial agendas also deterred others from making such appeals. Since 1960 over a dozen first secretaries of union republics have been removed under cir-

[18] Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1980), 216. See also Motyl (fn. 14), 104–5, 119–22.

[19] Donna Bahry, *Outside Moscow: Power, Politics and Budgetary Policy in Soviet Republics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1–5; Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 510–17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cumstances that suggest the cause was either their own endorsement of primordial agendas or their unwillingness to silence others who articulated such agendas. For example, after an official reception in 1962 the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Republic was apparently removed for making unguarded comments while intoxicated—comments that were just too nationalistic. In 1966 the first secretary of the Armenian Party was removed for failure to curb anti-Turkic protests on the fiftieth anniversary of the massacre of the Armenians. And in 1972 the Ukrainian and Georgian secretaries were both removed for "national narrow-mindedness" and overzealous promotion of local interests.[20]

Creating an Official Indigenous Elite

A major responsibility assigned this new cadre by Moscow's all-union authorities was to block the emergence within the ethnic community of counterelites that might challenge Soviet institutions. Within their autonomous homelands the cadres implemented policies that extended the institutional and personnel strategies of the center. These policies sought to (1) create a new, open indigenous elite of professionals and intelligentsia within official institutions, (2) tie professional and material rewards to membership in this elite, while denying these rewards to those outside the elite, and (3) limit access to the mobilizational resources of the community to these official institutions.

The ethnic cadres enacted affirmative action policies during a period of rapid economic growth and modernization in order to expand opportunities for mobility for those aspiring to positions within the professional strata and intelligentsia. Extension of the policy of indigenization opened career opportunities throughout the administrative apparatus of the homeland. Programs of collectivization and industrialization offered opportunities for mobility in management. And the creation of universities and academies of sciences in the republics dramatically expanded the number of professional positions reserved for the minorities.

These affirmative action policies in the institutional context of Soviet federalism elevated titular nationalities to privileged positions in higher education and professional employment within their homelands. For example, whereas Georgians constituted 67 percent of their republic's population in 1970 (and approximately the same proportion of the college-age cohort), they constituted 83 percent of the student body of the republic's institutions of higher education.[21] Similarly, although Mol-

[20] Robert Conquest, *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1967); Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 23 (May–June 1974), 1–22, at 13.

[21] Parsons (fn. 15), 558–59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

davians constituted under two-thirds of the total population of their republic in the mid-1980s, they were at least 80 percent of the student body in the law and business schools of Kishinev State University, the republic's leading educational institution. Commenting on the rapid upward mobility of the Uzbek population within their republic, Nancy Lubin contends that the Central Asians "tend to hire 'their own' first."[22]

It is probably true—as critics have charged—that these opportunities have been opened by crudely implemented quota systems. These have apparently lowered standards in higher education and employment and discriminated against "minority" ethnic groups living within the homelands of other ethnic groups. Mark Popovsky alleges that in the universities of Uzbekistan, for example,

> young men and women from primitive villages with scarcely any education . . . are given scholarships and free lodging, and are assured passing marks whether they study or not. The philosophy behind this strange proceeding is that all nations in the brotherly family of the USSR are equal, and that all of them therefore can and must have their own intelligentsia, their own doctors, engineers, writers, and scholars.[23]

And Soviet officials themselves have warned that favoritism in appointments toward the titular nationality of a republic often discriminates against other nationalities. In 1986, for example, the all-union Party leadership chastised Kirgiz leaders for favoring Kirgiz candidates among new recruits to the republic's Party organizations and for discriminating against other nationalities (notably Uzbeks) residing within the republic.[24]

Nonetheless, these policies, to expand the opportunity for mobility, represent a particularly astute accommodation with ethnicity. From 1950 to 1975, for example, among the fourteen titular nationalities of union republics (other than Russians) the annual growth in scientific workers with either a candidate of science or a doctor of science degree was 9.6 percent—a rate 54 percent higher than among Russians.[25] While demanding political loyalty to the Soviet regime, the mobility opportunities did not require denial of ethnic identities. Indeed, ethnicity became a condition for success, since the positions of status within homelands were often reserved for specific minorities. Soviet federalism offered minori-

[22] Lubin (fn. 15), 283.

[23] Mark Popovsky, *Manipulated Science* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), 118.

[24] John Soper, "Nationality Issues under Review in Kirgizia," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* RL 49/88 (January 29, 1988).

[25] USSR Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie. *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR* [Popular education, science, and culture in the USSR] (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), 308–39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties the opportunity to realize their aspirations to create separate stratification systems—but within the Soviet Union.

To block the emergence of counterelites *within* this official elite, the cadres presided over a dense network of parallel institutions that controlled all aspects of professional life.[26] Research of significance to the ethnic group and its homeland was controlled by indigenous academies of sciences and universities. Creative professionals such as writers, artists, or architects who sought to disseminate their work under the cultural monopoly of the regime were required to join the official unions of the homeland for their respective professions. Members of the new scientific and creative elite were dependent upon the official institutions, and most could not hope to improve their lot in an alternative ethnic elite created outside and in opposition to these institutions. This was particularly true for those in positions of power such as leaders of professional unions, those with academic positions in fields heavily encumbered by ideology, and creative artists who depended upon the hegemony of socialist realism for their success. The purge threatened deprivation of both rewards and the means to practice one's profession.

To block the emergence of counterelites *outside* the new professional elite and intelligentsia, the cadre denied those outside official institutions access to mobilizational resources. The ethnic cadre prohibited independent association, severed unofficial lines of communication between the intelligentsia and the populace, and deprived incipient dissident movements of their leadership by "decapitating" them—that is, threatening, imprisoning, or executing exemplary figures. Those outside were limited to the inefficient means of illegal associations, samizdat, and underground dissemination. Muslims opposed to the official religious hierarchy in the mid-1980s, for example, still had to rely upon religious tracts—many of them handwritten—smuggled across the borders from Afghan resistance groups. And Muslims of the Sufi underground borrowed a technique from dissidents in the European parts of the Soviet Union: they distributed their religious texts by chain letters.[27] Soviet policies punished severely those who attempted to articulate primordial agendas outside the official institutions. For example, in an attack on what *Kommunist Ukrainy* labeled the "belching of debilitated national-

[26] See, for example, Dietrich A. Loeber, "Administration of Culture in Soviet Latvia," in Adolf Sprudz and Armin Rusis, eds., *Res Baltica* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968), 133–45; Nicholas P. Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 150–51.

[27] Timur Kocaoglu, "Muslim Chain Letters in Central Asia," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* RL 313/83 (August 18, 1983); Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims," *Problems of Communism* 33 (November–December 1984), 28–41, at 36–37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ism," the KGB in August–September 1965 arrested over twenty intellectuals who had attempted to lead a Ukrainian cultural renaissance.[28] In order to crack down on nonofficial Muslim preaching, a 1982 decree of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet Presidium authorized sentences of up to two years imprisonment and corrective labor for the crime of "social vagabondage."[29] And in Armenia arrests in late 1988 and early 1989 sought to decapitate the protest movement by targeting its leaders (such as the Karabakh Committee).[30]

Consequences for Ethnic Political Action

As a consequence of the monopoly over mobilizational resources held by the official institutions, in most circumstances only instrumental political action behind the objectives of the cadre could muster the mobilizational requisites for sustained large-scale action. There were, of course, spontaneous incidents of primordial ethnic protest. In Tashkent in September 1969, for example, an Uzbek crowd assaulted Russian bystanders after a match between the local "Pakhtar" soccer team and visitors from the Russian Republic.[31] And many individual participants in officially sponsored political action harbored private primordial agendas. Nevertheless, aspiring counterelites were handicapped in their attempts to form and mobilize effective political action in support of primordial agendas; and when it occurred, primordial protest was more likely to be expressed in isolated, ineffective, small-scale events.

Even in the period of perestroika, in republics where these cadres exercise decisive control over mobilizational resources, they can determine whether protest will be on a sustained large scale or simply sporadic. This is illustrated by the differing fortunes of popular fronts in the Ukraine and the Baltic republics during 1988 and 1989. In the Ukraine, according to an American correspondent, "the hard line of the [union-republic] Communist leadership here is one reason the rise of Ukrainian self-consciousness has been slower than the surge of nationalism in the Baltic republics."[32] In the Baltic republics, by contrast, the cadre made

[28] Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 31.

[29] Bennigsen (fn. 27), 40.

[30] *New York Times*, November 25, 1988, November 26, 1988, December 22, 1988, January 2, 1989. See also *Pravda*, January 26, 1990.

[31] Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1982), 121; B. Brown, "Kazkhstan in 1987: The Year after Alma Ata," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* RL 5/88 (December 23, 1987), 2. See also Ronald Grigor Suny, *Armenia in the Twentieth Century* (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983), 78–80.

[32] *New York Times*, March 9, 1989; see also June 20, 1988, August 24, 1988, August 25, 1988, October 10, 1988, November 30, 1988, December 2, 1988, December 7, 1988, February 5, 1989, April 9, 1989, April 14, 1989, April 22, 1989; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Baltic Echoes in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

available to the popular fronts the mobilizational resources of the Party and state. Thus, the founding of the Latvian Popular Front was attended by the republic's Party leadership, which applauded its call for autonomy. Statements by the national fronts were published by the official press. Their newspapers were printed by the official publishing houses. Their programs appeared on state-run television, including two full days of live coverage of the Sajudis Conference in 1988. Their meetings were sanctioned, including the assembly of the three Baltic popular fronts held at the Estonian Central Committee's House of Political Enlightenment. Their demonstrations received permits. As the chairman of the Sajudis Assembly, Vytautus Landsbergis, stressed in a 1989 interview with *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the ability of his movement to conduct its activities depended upon its close relationship with the republic's Party authorities.[33] The importance of these cadres is further illustrated by the republic's elections of 1990: the cadres in the Baltic republics permitted a choice among candidates with alternative ethnic agendas, whereas in other republics, such as Belorussia, cadres blocked this.[34]

The ethnic cadres have actually instigated many of the protests of the past few years. In the Baltic republics demonstrations have been orchestrated to support legislative initiatives on state languages and republican sovereignty. In November 1988 the Estonian Party leadership reportedly pressed members of the republic's Supreme Soviet for a unanimous vote and then orchestrated demonstrations on behalf of legislation to grant itself the power of nullification over all-union legislation. Similarly, in May 1989 Lithuanian Party leaders mobilized demonstrations in Vilnius to support legislation giving the republic power of nullification and then claiming exemption from the new all-union highway tax.[35] In Nagornyi Karabakh and Armenia demonstrations on behalf of Armenian annexation of the Karabakh began in early 1988 with the support of the local Party and state leadership—including formal legislative endorsement of their cause by local soviets. And apparently even much of the violence to force Azeris from Armenia (and Armenians from Azerbaidjan) that began in late November 1988 took place with the support of local Party and state officials.[36] Where leaders of a republic take decisive action to

Ukraine," *Report on the USSR* 1 (January 13, 1989), 18–20; idem, "Confrontation over Creation of Ukrainian 'Popular Front,' " *Report on the USSR* 1 (March 3, 1989), 13–17.

[33] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, February 5, 1989. See also *Izvestiia*, May 15, 1989; Saulius Girnius, "Unofficial Groups in the Baltic Republics and Access to the Mass Media," *Report on the USSR* 1 (May 5, 1989), 16–19.

[34] *New York Times*, March 5, 1990, March 6, 1990, March 31, 1990.

[35] Moscow TASS, November 20, 1988, reported in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, November 21, 1988, pp. 42–43; *New York Times*, November 17, 1988, November 27, 1988, December 8, 1988, May 19, 1989, May 25, 1989.

[36] *Kommunist* (Baku), October 14, 1988; *Izvestiia*, January 5, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

block protests (as in the Ukraine until mid-1989) or to silence them (as in Georgia after five days of protest in April 1989), future political action is usually sporadic and small-scale.

The ability of different ethnic groups to mount large-scale, sustained political action has thus been closely tied to the resources controlled by their cadres. The mobilizational opportunities are greatest among those cadres in control of a union republic or even an autonomous republic or oblast. At the other extreme, ethnic groups without an autonomous homeland or living outside it suffer a major handicap, though they may still find local mobilizing cadres and elites, as the Gagauz found among town and village authorities in southern Moldavia. "Exclave" Russians in Estonia and Moldavia have found these cadres among factory managers and subordinate Party officials in those republics.[37] Nationalities lacking even these resources suffer the greatest handicap in attempting to express their protest in any sort of sustained large-scale manner. Thus, the protests by Jews have been sporadic and small-scale: in 1988 and 1989, for example, the largest demonstrations by Jews drew only several hundred, and most demonstrations, only two to three dozen.[38]

Origins: The Rise of Ethnofederalism

Over the past three decades three changes have transformed Soviet developmental strategy into a source of ethnofederalism. First, with the trimming of the terror apparatus under Khrushchev and the policy of "respect for cadres" under Brezhnev, that is, the relaxation of Moscow's deterrent threat, these cadres had greater leeway in pressing their particularistic agendas.[39] Second, as the cadres built institutional and even popular support within their ethnic communities, their dependence upon the center declined. These new power bases enabled the cadres to take more assertive policy stands against Moscow. Third, these cadres encountered mounting difficulties in securing resources to continue the expansion of mobility opportunities within their homelands. In response, they often resorted to a strategy of mobilizing their elites behind legislative agendas

[37] *New York Times*, March 15, 1989; Vladimir Socor, "Politics of the Language Question Heating Up in Soviet Moldavia," *Report on the USSR* 1 (September 8, 1989), 33–36; *Pravda* July 29, 1989.

[38] See, for example, *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* RL 43/88 (January 29, 1988), 5, RL 167/88 (April 15, 1988), 9, RL 177/88 (April 22, 1988), 10, RL 258/88 (June 17, 1988), 7; *Report on the USSR* 1 (May 19, 1989), 33.

[39] H. Gordon Skilling, "Group Conflict in Soviet Politics: Some Conclusions," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklin Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 399–405; Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era," *Problems of Communism* 28 (March–April 1979), 29–42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and their populations in ethnic protest in order to secure additional resources from Moscow and to maintain their hegemony within their homelands. Ironically, the last two of these factors are natural consequences of the very means by which these cadres had previously controlled their ethnic communities on behalf of the center.

Policies of affirmative action permitted these cadres to build more secure political bases within their ethnic communities, for these polices created a loyal clientele. The creation of this clientele was also fostered by the post-Stalinist decentralization. As many administrative tasks were transferred from all-union to union-republic or republican ministries and as the cadres' discretion in personnel matters was expanded, the cadres' control of patronage opportunities was enlarged. Efforts to cement loyalties with the indigenous elite were aided—particularly during the Brezhnev years—by the lengthening term of office of these elites and by the reduction in the amount of rotation of personnel among homelands.[40] These power bases blunted the deterrent threat of the purge, for they made removal of a republic's first secretary more costly for Moscow. The removal of Dinmukhamed Kunaev brought two days of riots to Kazakhstan, for example. The ethnic constituencies developed by these ethnic elites became resources in showdowns with the all-union leadership over key policy choices.[41]

The cadres' motivation to mobilize their ethnic constituencies rose in recent decades as their monopolistic leadership within the ethnic community came under increasing threat. One threat has been the indigenous professional elite and intelligentsia itself. The very success of previous affirmative action policies created a large group with the skills to constitute themselves as independent political entrepreneurs. A second threat has come from the disparity between the increasing demands for rewards and mobility opportunities and the diminished capability to meet those demands. Given the large size of this elite and its already

[40] For example, the average term of union-republic first secretaries nearly doubled from 4.5 years on January 1, 1960, to 8.7 years ten years later, it then rose again to 12.0 years ten years after that. Grey Hodnett, *Leaders of the Soviet Republics, 1955–1972* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1973); Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Soviet Officials: Republic Organizations* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1980); Hodnett (fn. 15), 63–65.

[41] Mark Beissinger, "Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-Imperial Integration: Ukrainian and R.S.F.S.R. Provincial Party Officials Compared," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 21 (Spring 1988), 71–85; Patrick Cockburn, "Dateline USSR: Ethnic Tremors," *Foreign Policy* 74 (Spring 1989), 174–75; Suny (fn. 15), 301–5; Suny (fn. 31), 73–75; Joel Moses, "Regionalism in Soviet Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change, 1953–82," *Soviet Studies* 37 (April 1985), 184–211; Martha Brill Olcott, "Gorbachev's Nationalities Policy and Soviet Central Asia," in Rajan Menon and Daniel N. Nelson, eds., *Limits to Soviet Power* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), 77–81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

high levels of material rewards, it has become more difficult to provide the still larger material rewards necessary to ensure their continuing loyalty. And a third threat has resulted from the increasing difficulty encountered in further expanding the ethnic elite to accommodate new aspirants to this elite. The rapid growth of a large professional elite and intelligentsia has virtually saturated some ethnic communities with elite positions. Declining economic growth has compounded these problems over the past two decades. This threatened, first, the cadres' capacity to continue expanding the rewards of the elite and the mobility opportunities for new aspirants to elite positions and, second, their ability to offer the improved living standards necessary to keep the population tied to themselves rather than to alternative leaders. In short, the last three decades brought increasing threats to some of the very means by which the cadre had previously blocked the growth of counterelites and prevented the mobilization of the population behind primordial agendas. It is an irony of the Soviet developmental strategy that some of these threats are products of the very success of the means previously used to control ethnic assertiveness.

A crisis developed over the past decade as the number of ethnic groups experiencing this threat increased. Ethnic cadres were forced to intensify their pressure on Moscow to gain additional resources, and consequently, competition for the same scarce resources grew among ethnic communities. But declining growth rates left Moscow with even fewer resources to respond to rising demands. Faced with this crisis, ethnic cadres have found they must press Moscow still harder for investments and must devise strategies that are more clever yet to underscore the urgency of their agendas. For example, in pressing Moscow for expanded autonomy, Baltic Party leaders have turned to legislative showdowns and have mobilized popular demonstrations to support the position of the republics' elites.[42] Ethnic cadres have found enthusiastic allies in these strategies among their dependent elites and among aspirants to elite positions. Even aspiring independent political entrepreneurs pursuing primordial strategies often joined the political action mobilized by the cadres, viewing it as the best or only vehicle to press their own agendas in public. The cadres often have a strong incentive to make common cause with members of potential counterelites such as popular fronts in order to increase the pressure on Moscow. Thus, the late 1980s witnessed both

[42] See Bahry (fn. 19), 2–3, 25–31, 77–85; Steven L. Burg, "Muslim Cadres and Soviet Political Development: Reflections from a Comparative Perspective," *World Politics* 37 (October 1984), 24–47, at 33, 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dominant elites and potential counterelites making common cause to mobilize the ethnic community.

Incidence: Flash Points of Ethnofederalism

The pattern of ethnofederalism in the Soviet Union contains yet a further ironic twist: the incentive to mobilize their ethnic constituency is greatest for those ethnic cadres that have previously been most successful at the Soviet developmental strategy—notably in the Caucasus and the Baltic republics. The pressure of potential counterelites, the difficulties of further expanding elite positions and material rewards, and so the threat to their positions are greatest for those cadres that were previously most successful at engineering affirmative action and creating an indigenous elite.

This pressure on the cadres of the more developed ethnic communities has been piqued by the redistributive consequences of these affirmative action policies. With declining growth rates, the redistributive consequences of these policies have been transformed: policies that had once involved transfers between titular nationalities and minorities within ethnic homelands came to involve instead transfers between the principal titular nationalities of union republics. These transfers are now adversely affecting the more modernized ethnic communities

In building an indigenous cadre and intelligentsia within each ethnic group, the Soviet developmental strategy had a powerful leveling impact on ethnic groups. The growth of mobility opportunities has been highest among the nationalities with the lowest levels of socioeconomic attainment.[43] Thus, as Figure 2 shows, in the post-Stalinist years differences among nationalities in levels of elite occupational status (measured by per capita employment as specialists with higher education) narrowed.[44]

This redistribution has in part been a consequence of Moscow's allocation of resources among republics. For example, the Unified State Budget, which includes the budgets for each union republic, transfers funds from more developed to less developed republics. In the 1989 bud-

[43] USSR (fn. 25), 308–9.

[44] Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp, "Measuring Nationality Trends in the Soviet Union: A Research Note," *Slavic Review* 41 (Spring 1982), 112–22. This is not to say that equalization has brought equality or status reversal, see Rakowska-Harmstone (fn. 20), 12; Peter R. Zwick, "Soviet Nationality Policy: Social, Economic, and Political Aspects," in Gordon B. Smith, ed., *Public Policy and Administration in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 159. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, the slowdown in economic growth has slowed (but not stopped) this leveling process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 2
EQUALIZATION AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS, 1959–75:[a]
EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIALISTS WITH HIGHER EDUCATION PER 1,000 ADULTS
(AVERAGE FOR 15 NATIONALITIES = 100)

SOURCE: Calculated from data in Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp, "Modernization and Ethnic Equalization in the USSR," *Soviet Studies* 36 (April 1984), 159–84.

[a] This figure tracks elite employment in the Soviet economy in those years for which data are available for all titular nationalities of union republics.

get only the five Central Asian republics were permitted to retain 100 percent of both the turnover and income taxes collected within their borders; they were to receive, in addition, subsidies ranging from 321 million rubles for the Tadjik Republic to 2.7 billion rubles for the Kazakh Republic. Conversely, the Latvian Republic was to retain the lowest proportion of its turnover tax (56.8 percent), and both the Armenian Republic (with 76.7 percent) and the Estonian Republic (with 79.4 percent) were to retain only slightly over three-quarters.[45] Although these official statistics appear to overstate the extent of this phenomenon, less developed republics have received higher rates of investment than their level

[45] *Pravda*, October 29, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of economic development would predict. And per capita expenditures on health and educational programs have been relatively equal among republics even though revenues have been far lower in the less developed republics.[46]

It is, indeed, inherent to a policy of promoting the growth of indigenous elites and engineering equality under circumstances of tighter constraints on resources that some previously advantaged groups will suffer relative stagnation in their life chances. One of the most visible examples of this restriction on life chances for a previously advantaged group has been the imposition of quotas on Jewish admissions to Soviet universities. Although in 1970 Jews represented 2.3 percent of the students in institutions of higher education (a proportion that is above their official proportion of the population—0.89 percent in 1970), this, nonetheless, represents a significant decline since 1935, when the figure stood at 13.3 percent of these students. Against the general trend toward higher rates of educational attainment in the Soviet population, the proportion of Soviet Jews aged eighteen to twenty-three who attend college full-time remained constant at 30 percent or at most increased only marginally to 36 percent between 1935 and 1965. Thus, many have been blocked in their aspirations for higher education and the elite employment it would make possible.[47] And as economic growth has slowed, more ethnic groups have felt this pinch in life chances. In Central Asia, according to Lubin, "Russians are beginning to sense they are being denied access to jobs for which they are equally if not more qualified than their Asian counterparts."[48] And Popovsky complains that in Uzbekistan "it is almost impossible for non-Uzbeks with a higher education to get jobs."[49]

In the geographically segmented multiethnic society of Soviet federalism the redistributive consequences of these policies remained a less

[46] Martin Spechler, "Regional Development in the USSR, 1958–1978," in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), 145. See also Donna Bahry and Carol Nechemias, "Half Full or Half Empty? The Debate over Soviet Regional Inequality," *Slavic Review* 40 (Fall 1981), 96; Elizabeth Clayton, "Regional Consumption Expenditure in the Soviet Union," *ACES Bulletin* 17 (Winter 1975), 35–43; James W. Gillula, "The Economic Interdependence of Soviet Republics," in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, 629; Gertrude Schroeder, "Soviet Regional Policies in Perspective," in *The USSR in the 1980's* (Brussels: NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs, 1978), 131; Brian Silver, "Levels of Sociocultural Development among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of the Equalization Hypothesis," *American Political Science Review* 68 (December 1974), 1637.

[47] William Korey, "The Legal Position of Soviet Jewry: A Historical Enquiry," in Lionel Kochan, ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 94–95; Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, "The Jewish Population: Demographic Trends and Occupational Patterns," in Kochan, 147.

[48] Lubin (fn. 15), 228, 283–84.

[49] Popovsky (fn. 23), 138.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contentious issue in federal politics as long as economic growth permitted the continued expansion of mobility opportunities for all titular nationalities within their homelands. With their high growth rates the titular nationalities of union republics could escape the consequence of interrepublic transfers by shifting the brunt of their impact to their minority populations—that is, by discriminating against them. Under these circumstances the minorities within the homelands of other nationalities (including the "exclave" minorities, such as Jews or Russians) were the greatest losers from interrepublic redistribution. The economic slowdown, however, made it more difficult for the titular nationalities to escape the effects of interrepublic transfers, which made redistribution a highly contentious issue among the cadres. The effect of the Soviet developmental strategy in a period of tight constraints on resources has been to limit the growth of mobility opportunities in the more developed ethnic communities in order to permit continued expansion in those that are less developed.

As a consequence, cadres of ethnic communities with higher levels of socioeconomic attainment (particularly in the Baltic and Caucasus) have led the way in pressing their ethnic legislative agendas, while cadres in less advanced communities (notably in Central Asia) have been less inclined to do so (see Table 1). As continuing beneficiaries of the developmental strategy enforced by the center, the latter cadres have often been harsh critics of the decentralization proposed by their peers in the more developed communities; for example, at the meeting of the all-union Supreme Soviet Presidium to veto Estonia's act of nullification, the chairmen of the Presidia of Uzbekistan (Khabibullaev) and Tadjikistan (Pallaev) voiced strong criticism of the Estonian move and support for centrist policies.[50] Also as a consequence, protest has been more common in the more developed communities. The rank-order correlation between number of demonstrations (Table 2) and levels of educational attainment (Figure 1a) is 0.67.[51]

Agendas: The Federal Politics of Resources and Life Chances

The policy concerns of the ethnic cadres shape the public agendas of ethnofederalism by controlling the way dominant themes will be framed in legislation and by determining which issues are to be supported by sustained large-scale political pressure. Cadres must define the agendas

[50] Moscow Television, November 26, 1988, reported in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, November 28, 1988, p. 50. See also James Critchlow, "How Solid is Uzbekistan's Support for Moscow?" *Report on the USSR* 1 (February 10, 1989), 7.

[51] See also Philip G. Roeder, "Electoral Avoidance in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* 41 (July 1989), 478–80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of ethnopolitics so as to permit as many as possible in their ethnic communities to join the "official" ethnic bandwagon. Often this requires redefining the dominant popular concerns, particularly where they are primordial. The cadres must deny these constituents and issues to potential counterelites, even as they use them to put pressure on Moscow. A test of the success of the entrepreneurship of the cadres is the extent to which they can insert the most important material and symbolic concerns of their constituents into the public agendas in ways that protect or promote their own power base. The dominant themes on the cadres' agendas reflect the threats that confront them within their own communities: these themes concern resources and life chances. Specifically, this politics of mobility opportunities is expressed in a number of recurring policy issues that go to the very foundations of the Soviet developmental strategy that created and sustain these cadres: federalism, indigenization, language, economic development, and migration.

Federalism

The most volatile issue of federalism has been the balance of power between center and periphery, since at stake are the resources controlled by the cadres and the mobility opportunities within their communities. Party leaders have used this issue to co-opt primordial concerns for independence to instrumental demands for expanded republican autonomy within Soviet federalism.[52] Expanded autonomy is one way for ethnic cadres to enlarge the resources within their control. Autonomy increases their discretion in the allocation of positions of power within the republic and in the administration of educational and occupational policies. And for cadres within the more developed republics that have felt most severely pinched by affirmative action, autonomy is a way to retain resources at home.

The cadres in the more developed union republics have been particularly quick to raise the banners of autonomy and sovereignty in order to blunt the redistributive consequences of all-union policies. Thus, for example, in 1989 Lithuanian leaders sought exemption from the all-union highway tax since the tax was levied on vehicles (which are more common in the relatively wealthy Baltic region) but spent disproportionately to build and repair roads in the less developed republics.[53] In all three Baltic republics calls for "regional economic accountability," "territorial

[52] *New York Times*, September 24, 1989; see also March 25, 1988; *Pravda*, November 2, 1988; *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, November 29, 1988.

[53] Moscow TASS, November 20, 1988, reported in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, November 21, 1988, pp. 42–43; *New York Times*, November 17, 1988, November 27, 1988, December 8, 1988, May 19, 1989, May 25, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cost accounting," and "self-financing" have supported the attempts on the part of republican cadres to wrest control of industries from the centralized ministries. These plans envision the isolation of their markets from the larger economy of scarcity by such mechanisms as *export* barriers to other union republics, identity cards to limit purchases by visitors from other republics, prices determined at the republic level to improve the terms of exchange among republics, and even separate currencies for some republics.[54]

For ethnic cadres of "minorities" subordinate to the union republic of another nationality, the issue of autonomy has often taken the form of demands over the "status" of their homelands within the federal hierarchy—that is, whether a homeland is a union republic, an autonomous republic, an oblast, or an *okrug*. The control of resources by the cadres of a nationality increases with this hierarchy. Thus, in a 1988 report on the mounting pressure and public rallies on behalf of the elevation of the Tatar Autonomous Republic to union-republic status, the writer Rafail Mustafin asked in the pages of *Pravda*:

> After all, what prompted the proposals for the creation of a new union republic? The existing inequality in social, political, and economic rights between union and autonomous formations. Tataria surpasses some union republics in both population and industrial potential. Yet, we don't have a feature-film studio of our own, we have only one publishing house (which is not very big), and there is an acute shortage of paper for publishing books, newspapers, and magazines.[55]

With similar objectives the Party leadership in Abkhazia has sought elevation of their autonomous republic to union-republic status, leaders of Moldavia's Gagauz minority have demanded creation of their own autonomous republic, and Polish leaders in the Shalchinin district of Lithuania have asked for autonomous status. In the last case, according to *Izvestiia*, "perhaps the sorest point was the impossibility for Poles to obtain higher education in their native language" within Lithuania.[56]

Taking a different tack, the cadres of other "subordinate" minorities

[54] *Izvestiia*, September 11, 1988, August 3, 1989, August 15, 1989; *Sovetskaia Industriia*, March 2, 1989; *Sovetskaia Litva*, October 7, 1988. See also *Izvestiia*, May 19, 1989; *Sovetskaia Litva*, May 19, 1989; *Pravda*, July 30, 1989; Dzintra Bungs, "A Comparison of the Baltic Declarations of Sovereignty," *Report on the USSR* 1 (September 15, 1989), 13–16; Kestutis Girnius, "The Lithuanian Communist Party and Calls for Sovereignty," *Report on the USSR* 1 (February 17, 1989), 18–20.

[55] *Pravda*, January 25, 1989.

[56] *Izvestiia*, September 7, 1989, November 14, 1989; *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, March 9, 1988. See also *New York Times*, April 8, 1989, April 9, 1989, April 16, 1989, August 7, 1989; and the interview with G. A. Pogosyan of the Nagornyi Karabakh, ArmenPress International Service, August 16, 1988, reported in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, August 23, 1988, p. 43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have mobilized their populations to demand changes in the lines of authority among homelands. A nationality subordinate to the republic of a different titular nationality may find its resources and life chances limited. In Nagornyi Karabakh, Armenians protested that even though their autonomous oblast had the second-highest industrial production per capita within the republic, the leadership of the Azerbaidjan Republic allocated it lower than average per capita investments. G. A. Pogosyan, the first secretary of the autonomous oblast, is reported to have told the all-union Supreme Soviet Presidium that as a consequence, "even today, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast does not have its own flour mill, nor its own concentrate-feed plant, nor its own reinforced-concrete structures plant, nor its own housing-construction combine." These investments lagged particularly in the social sphere. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians complained that inadequate investment in institutions of higher education within the oblast and Baku's opposition to letting Armenians attend institutions in the Armenian Republic meant that the Armenians within the oblast were denied access to higher education and career advancement.[57] Reassigning the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to the Armenian Republic would put an end to the discrimination by Azeris and also open up union-republic mobility opportunities to its Armenian majority.[58] (Similar complaints and demands for removal from the jurisdiction of the Georgian Republic have come from the leaders of the Adzhar Autonomous Republic and the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast.)[59]

Indigenization

Cadres of titular nationalities have also mobilized political action in order to preserve the results of indigenization. Cadres have found that this issue harnesses both the instrumental interests of those in their ethnic community who aspire to elite positions and the primordial sentiments of those who see ethnic similarity as a requisite of legitimate authority. At stake for union-republic cadres are the very means by which they

[57] *Pravda*, July 20, 1988.

[58] On December 1, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic and the National Council of Nagornyi Karabakh jointly passed a resolution annexing the autonomous oblast to Armenia; *Kommunist* [Erevan], December 3, 1989.

[59] *Bakinskii Rabochii*, March 11, 1988: *Izvestiia*, March 25, 1988; *Krasnaia Zvezda*, February 28, 1989; *Moskovskie Novosti*, March 20, 1988; Roman Solchanyk and Ann Sheehy, "Kapitonov on Nationality Problems in Georgia," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* RL 125/78 (June 1, 1978), 1–5; Elizabeth Fuller, "How Serious are Inter-Nationality Tensions in Georgia?" *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* RL 444/83 (November 25, 1983), 1-9; idem, "Abkhaz-Georgian Relations Remain Strained," *Report on the USSR* 1 (March 10, 1989), 25–27; Rasma Karklins, "Ethnic Politics and Access to Higher Education: The Soviet Case," *Comparative Politics* 16 (April 1984), 277–94, at 278.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have built their supporting clientele and popular constituencies. In Kazakhstan the removal of First Secretary Kunaev and the purge of the republic party apparatus in 1986 threatened the clientele network drawn disproportionately from the first secretary's own tribal group; it threatened the career prospects of the indigenous nationals who had tied their careers to the local leadership; and it brought a wave of violent protest.[60] More recently, Georgian leaders have mobilized protesters to challenge Moscow's intrusion in the republic's personnel policy—particularly the efforts to challenge discrimination by the Georgians against minorities.

"Minority" cadres within the national territories of others have mobilized their constituencies for the opposite end—to criticize abuses of indigenization by the titular nationalities and to call for Moscow's intervention against the practice. The creation of an ethnic elite and intelligentsia by the titular nationality often denies minorities within its national territory comparable opportunities. In a recent roundtable held under the auspices of the Research Council on Nationality Problems of the Academy of Science, E. V. Tadevosian complained that indigenization in some national republics has "often led to an artificial overrepresentation of the indigenous nationalities at the expense of other nationalities residing in those areas in the state organs, the administrative apparatus, the students and faculties of higher educational institutions, etc."[61] Gagauz in Moldavia and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaidjan have demonstrated to protest discrimination in political appointments and career opportunities. The chairman of the presidium of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet claims that such grievances led to violent disturbances in his republic not only in 1989, but also in 1957, 1967, and 1978.[62]

Language

To preserve the foundation on which ethnic affirmative action was built, cadres have mobilized political action to raise or preserve the status of the language of their respective communities. Mobility opportunities are inextricably tied up with the status of indigenous languages. At stake for the constituents is their instrumental interest in privileged access to economic, social, and political power. For example, the language used in

[60] Brown (fn. 31), 1–4.

[61] I. D. Koval'chenko et al., "Natsional'nye protsessy v SSSR—itogi, tendentsii, problemy" [National processes in the USSR: Results, tendencies, problems], *Istoriia SSSR* (November–December 1987), 5–120, at 63, 73, 74, 79–80. See also Erwin H. Epstein, "Ideological Factors in Soviet Educational Policy towards Jews," *Education and Urban Society* 10 (February 1978), 227–28; Rasma Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 142, 146, 219.

[62] V. Kobakhia, Pis'mo [Letter], *Argumenty i fakty* (October 7–13, 1989), 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

universities influences the admissions as well as later career opportunities of different ethnic groups within a republic. But language is also one of the most important primordial markers defining an ethnic community.

Through legislation that their languages supplant Russian as the language of communication within their republics, ethnic leaders in the union republics have sought to strengthen indigenous control over political and economic institutions. An article declaring the language of the titular nationality to be the state language of the republic was included in the 1978 constitutions of Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Georgia. On April 14, 1978, an estimated five thousand Georgian demonstrators took to the streets to protest Moscow's attempt to amend this article in their republic's constitution. Indigenous cultural, educational, and scientific elites were particularly eager to maintain Georgian as the language of discourse in their professions. Georgian students joined the protests, as Ronald Suny notes, since the language clause ensured that "higher education in Georgia had become the prerogative of Georgians, and other nationalities found it difficult to enter schools of higher learning."[63] In 1988 and 1989 six other republics adopted legislation establishing a state language.

Minority cadres within national territories of others have mobilized political action to protest exactly this form of preference for the language of the titular nationality. At stake for the leaders of these minority communities is often the control of mobility opportunities, the future of the constituency on which they have built their power, or even their own positions. Protests against new language laws that would place them at a disadvantage have come from the Abkhazians in Georgia, "exclave" Russians and Poles in Lithuania, and both the Turkic Gagauz and the "exclave" Russians in Moldavia. Non-Estonian cadres in Estonia have called strikes to protest a law requiring that those who do not learn the language of the republic within four years be dismissed from their jobs: on March 14, 1989, as many as sixty thousand Russians and other "minorities" (according to *Izvestiia*'s count) took to the streets of Tallinn to protest "creeping counterrevolution endangering socialism in Estonia." Russian Party officials and factory managers within the republic reportedly mobilized their constituencies because they feared that the law of January 18, 1989, would cost them their positions.[64]

[63] Suny, "Geogia and Soviet Nationality Policy," in Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitz, and Robert Sharlet, eds., *The Soviet Union since Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 213, 219. See also *Izvestiia*, February 25, 1989; Charles E. Ziegler, "Nationalism, Religion and Equality among Ethnic Minorities: Some Observations on the Soviet Case," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 13 (Summer 1985), 9–32, at 27.

[64] *Izvestiia*, March 17, 1989. See also *Izvestiia*, March 10, 1989, August 31, 1989; *Pravda*,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Development and Migration

To preserve the ethnically exclusive institutions on which their power rests, ethnic cadres have mobilized political action to oppose all-union economic development and migration policies. Although two different issues, they have become closely connected in public discussions since rapid industrialization has become the principal magnet for workers of other nationalities. For the population this threatens dissolution of the ethnic community, heightened competition for the leading political and economic positions in the republic, and loss of their affirmative action advantage in life chances. For the cadres this migration threatens the ethnic community on which their political power is based. It increases the pressure on the cadres to incorporate these other ethnic groups into the elite of the republic—pressure, that is, to dilute the ethnic homogeneity of the elites on which the cadres base their power. Failure of a titular nationality to maintain its numerical predominance within a republic might lead to the replacement of the ethnically exclusive cadre by one of more diverse ethnic composition; it might bring demotion to the status of an autonomous republic (as happened to the Karelo-Finnish Republic) or even outright dissolution of its autonomous homeland. Thus, in the early 1960s Georgian and Latvian officials opposed Khrushchev's plans for further expansion of heavy industry in the republics precisely because they feared it would bring still more Russian workers.[65] Armenian officials reportedly excluded Russian workers from permanent housing during the construction of the Erevan subway in order to prevent them from remaining. In the late 1980s protesters in the Baltic republics and Armenia demanded that their republics be given control of industrial and agricultural policy in order to slow the influx of outsiders. And Estonian cadres have attempted to blunt the effect of migration on their ethnic constituencies in future elections: legislation of the Estonian Republic disenfranchised those not resident in a district for two years (or in the republic for five years) and barred from office those not resident in a district for five years (or in the republic for ten years).[66]

August 17, 1989; *Sovetskaia Litva*, February 14, 1989; Karklins (fn. 59), 290–91; Roman Solchanyk, "Russian Language and Soviet Politics," *Soviet Studies* 34 (January 1982), 23–42; *New York Times*, June 21, 1988, June 22, 1988, July 23, 1988, September 2, 1988, January 19, 1989, July 27, 1989, July 28, 1989, August 7, 1989.

[65] Suny (fn. 63), 213; Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Demands and Group Consciousness since 1959," in George Simmonds, ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977), 136–56; Jaan Pennar, "Nationalism in the Soviet Baltics," in Erich Goldhagen, ed., *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 206. See also *Pravda*, March 1, 1989.

[66] *Pravda*, July 29, 1989, August 10, 1989. See also *New York Times*, June 21, 1988, June 22,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Risks of Assertive Federalism under Perestroika

With perestroika the homeland cadres press their agendas of ethnofederalism in a more complex environment. Within their homelands they are increasingly called upon to control and balance three very different forms of political action that draw together different sets of actors behind three often diverging agendas. Alongside the assertive federalism of the cadres is a second arena—the organizing activity and popular demonstrations of the popular fronts. Drawing particularly upon students, the intelligentsia, and the professional elite, the programs of the fronts often give expression to many of the primordial concerns of these ethnic communities. In a third arena communal violence draws heavily from the unemployed and from displaced refugees. Intercommunal violence has pitted Armenians against Azeris, Georgians against Abkhazians, and Georgians against Osetians in the Caucasus; young Uzbeks have attacked Meskhetis in the Fergana region, and Kazakh youths have attacked immigrants in the Novyi Uzen region of Central Asia (see Table 3).[67] The ethnic cadres in a number of republics have sought to use the political pressure of the second set of actors to support its showdowns with Moscow. Even without endorsing all the particulars of the fronts' agendas, the cadres have found that the fronts strengthen their own

Table 3
Deaths from Communal Violence
(September 1, 1985–August 31, 1989)

Ethnic Groups	*Estimated Total Dead*
Armenian-Azeri	>110
Uzbek-Meskheti	>100
Georgian-Abkhazian	14
Kazakh–Non-Kazakh	5
Tadjik-Meskheti	2

Source: *New York Times*, June 21, 1989, June 25, 1989, June 26, 1989, July 17, 1989, September 5, 1989, September 17, 1989.

1988, June 23, 1988. After this was nullified by the All-Union Supreme Soviet Presidium, Estonia adopted new legislation requiring that candidates for republic positions must have been residents of Estonia for at least ten years; *Pravda*, November 18, 1989.

[67] *Izvestiia*, June 9, 1989, June 10, 1989, June 20, 1989, June 23, 1989, December 1, 1989; *Pravda*, June 5, 1989, June 6, 1989, June 7, 1989, June 10, 1989, June 12, 1989, June 20, 1989, June 25, 1989, January 17, 1990; Annette Bohr, "Violence Erupts in Uzbekistan," *Report on the USSR* 1 (June 16, 1989), 23–25; Ann Sheehy, "Interethnic Disturbances in Western Kazakhstan," *Report on the USSR* 1 (July 7, 1989), 11–14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hands in negotiations with Moscow by permitting them to argue convincingly that their hands are tied at home. In some instances cadres have even encouraged the third form of political action in order to solidify their hold within the homeland and to press Moscow. In Azerbaidjan, for example, local Party leaders reportedly encouraged the growth of the popular front and helped found the more militant and violence-prone National Defense Committee.[68]

The ethnic cadres run immense risks, for these strategies may undermine their positions or even unleash forces they cannot control. Moscow, for example, could respond with coercion, as it did in 1988 and 1989, when the all-union leadership removed over twenty-five hundred officials (including the union-republic first secretaries) accused of abetting the intercommunal violence in Armenia and Azerbaidjan.[69] Cadres with strong ethnic constituencies may gamble that Moscow will be unable to remove them or will hesitate to pay the costs associated with such actions. The extensive power base of Vladimir Shcherbitskii in the Ukraine made his removal in 1989 a slow and complicated process requiring elaborate institutional maneuvering by Gorbachev. The protests in Kazakhstan were the costly consequence of Kunaev's removal. Nonetheless, Moscow has been willing to pay these costs in many instances; in 1988 and 1989 the first secretaries in ten of the fourteen union-republic parties were replaced. And in at least eight of these instances the secretaries were removed because of displeasure with republic policies.[70]

The cadres run a second risk: that those threatened by assertive federalism will initiate counteraction. Indeed, it was Moldavian pressures for new language legislation that ignited protests by the republic's Gagauz minority; but the agenda of the Gagauz went beyond language to include complaints of discrimination in economics and politics. The mobilization of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Moldavians brought the countermobilization of their "exclave" Russians behind *Interdvizhenie*, the Committee for Defense of Soviet Power in Lithuania, and *Edinstvo* (Unity). In the future, similar counterprotests may be mobilized by cadres of the less developed republics of Central Asia in order to blunt the political impact of mass demonstrations in the Baltic and Caucasus against the allocation decisions made in Moscow.[71]

[68] This is not to say, as some have alleged, that the motive of the Party leaders was to instigate violence as a pretext for a military crackdown; *New York Times*, February 19, 1990. See also *Izvestiia*, January 15, 1990, January 16, 1990.

[69] *Report on the USSR* 1 (January 27, 1989), 29.

[70] *Pravda*, January 13, 1988, May 21, 1988, June 17, 1988, October 5, 1988, October 21, 1988, April 15, 1989, June 23, 1989, June 24, 1989, September 29, 1989, November 17, 1989.

[71] *Izvestiia*, March 17 1989, May 25, 1989, August 23, 1989; *Pravda*, July 29, 1989, August

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A third risk to cadres is that political action mobilized by them may actually facilitate the creation of counterelites and their mobilizational activities. Much of the apparent "bandwagoning" the cadres seek to promote may actually be used as opportunities for "piggybacking" by potential counterelites; that is, aspiring independent political entrepreneurs maintain their particular agendas while using "official" political action as a cover for their own mobilizational activities and as an opportunity to publicize their agendas.[72] Rather than depriving these potential counterelites of support, the cadres' gambit may provide their opponents with the opportunity to expand it. In some republics the political action mobilized by the cadres has become self-sustaining and has slipped from their control, only then to provide counterelites with a ready-made movement. In Armenia the cadres appear to have lost control over the Karabakh protest by the late summer of 1988. According to a TASS report: "Taking advantage of the fact that the former leaders of the central committee of the Communist Party of Armenia let the initiative slip from their hands and retreated step-by-step, members of the [Karabakh] committee created ramified organizational and political structures."[73] In 1989 the initiative in Azeri protests over the status of Nagornyi Karabakh apparently passed from the cadres to counterelites within the popular front. By early 1990 the Azeri popular front was complaining that the initiative in the communal violence had even slipped from its control and passed to radicals in the National Defense Committee.[74] In Lithuania, Party First Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas was reportedly surprised when Sajudis deputies he had helped elect to the republic's Supreme Soviet rejected him as the republic's chief of state and elected their own leader, Landsbergis.[75]

Finally, the cadres' gambit may encourage unwanted primordial violence. The mass demonstrations in Erevan and Baku in 1988, 1989, and 1990 were catalysts for waves of violence across the republics. Small groups of Armenians and Azeris attacked minorities in their republics by intimidating many into emigration and by simply killing others.

10, 1989, August 11, 1989, August 23, 1989, August 25, 1989, September 5, 1989; *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, March 1, 1989, March 7, 1989.

[72] *Izvestiia*, July 13, 1989; *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, March 3, 1989; *Sovetskaia Litva*, February 25, 1989.

[73] Quoted in Cockburn (fn. 41), 178.

[74] See *Pravda*, April 9, 1989, August 23, 1989, August 24, 1989, September 10, 1989, February 2, 1990; *Zaria Vostoka*, April 12, 1989, April 14, 1989; *New York Times*, August 28, 1989, August 29, 1989, August 30, 1989, September 1, 1989, September 17, 1989; Saulius Girnius, "Sajudis' Parliament Statement on Independence," *Report on the USSR* 1 (September 15, 1989), 17–18.

[75] *New York Times*, March 13, 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Institutions and Politicized Ethnicity

The rise of assertive ethnofederalism in the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s points up how political institutions shape the mobilization of ethnic communities. On the one hand, Soviet federalism delayed the *origins* of politicized ethnicty, but on the other hand, it distributed mobilizational resources such as entrepreneurial skills and means of communications in a manner that eventually shaped its *incidence* and *agendas*.

This emphasis on institutions offers an amendment to those studies that explain the rise of politicized ethnicity by emphasizing attitudes rather than the resources needed to mobilize an ethnic community. These studies have introduced at least two alternative paradigms for the study of ethnopolitics, which are distinguished from one another by alternative views of the nature of ethnic identity, the sources of cohesion, and the objectives of politicized ethnicity and protest. The *primordialist* paradigm sees ethnic identities as one of the givens of social existence, shaped by historic memory, language, religion, and geographic compactness. The politicization of ethnicity is communal self-discovery; protest, often an expressive act affirming communal solidarity.[76] The *instrumentalist* paradigm sees ethnic identities as contingent and changing self-ascribed roles. The politicization of ethnicity and protest are goal-oriented behaviors—often focused on the pursuit of socioeconomic gain. According to the instrumentalist paradigm, an ethnic identity becomes a basis for collective action when there are comparative advantages to be gained from that specific ethnic identity over alternative ethnic, class, or other identities.[77]

The prevailing paradigm in Sovietology has been primordialist. In explaining the *origins* of Soviet ethnopolitics, it focuses our attention on attitudes such as assimilation rather than on incentives and constraints on action.[78] Certainly these attitudes are important ingredients of the

[76] Smith (fn. 7), 105. See also Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* 24 (April 1972), 319–55; Milton Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963), 105–57; Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology* 8 (June 1957), 130–45.

[77] Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 43. See also Frederick Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); Glazer and Moynihan (fn. 10); Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, *Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, "Causes and Varieties of Nationalism: A Rationalist Account," in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 87–108.

[78] Arend Lijphart, "Political Theories and the Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the Western World," in Esman (fn. 76), 46–64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

current crisis. Yet there is little indication that these alone can account for the rise of ethnopolitics—little indication that assimilation has become any less advanced, assimilative pressures any more intense, or national consciousness any higher in the decades since 1955 than in those before. The failure of Soviet policies of ethnic fusion (*sblizhenie*) to reduce cultural barriers among ethnic groups and to bring about the merger (*sliianie*) of nations cannot account for the *rise* of ethnic assertiveness over the past three decades.

In predicting the *incidence* of ethnic assertiveness, the primordial paradigm argued that the most extensive resistance to the policies of the Soviet regime would be mounted by those minorities that were culturally remote from the Russian majority.[79] In particular, it focused our attention on Islam, arguing that this provides a cultural bond among Soviet Muslims and, in the words of Kemal Karpat, "creates an invisible barrier separating them from the ruling Slavs."[80] Moreover, as Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush argue, "the critical issue determining the extent and degree of long-term commitment of Soviet Muslims to the Soviet Russian state is not 'socio-economics' but identity."[81] Contrary to these expectations, however, those nationalities most remote in culture from the Slavs have been among the most quiescent. There is little evidence to suggest that it is the relative strength of their primordial sentiments that distinguishes the minorities that have engaged in sustained, effective political action from the more quiescent minorities. The primordial paradigm had not predicted the pattern of *flash points*.[82]

The primordial paradigm had also predicted that protest would mobilize behind *agendas* of cultural expression. Yet Soviet ethnofederalism has raised many issues that are poorly explained by this paradigm. For example, the recommendation by leaders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Abkhazians, and South Osetians to transfer jurisdiction over their homelands to the Russian Republic evinces an acceptance rather than rejection of Soviet federalism and of its institutional protections for minority interests. The terms in which they have cast their legislative

[79] Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Soviet Union," in Robert G. Wirsing, ed., *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 127. For a fine critical discussion of this approach, see Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984), 555–80.

[80] Karpat, "Moscow and the 'Muslim Question,' " *Problems of Communism* 32 (November–December 1983), 79.

[81] Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire* (London: C. Hurst, 1985), 3, 31.

[82] The paradigm might be "saved" by claiming that assertiveness of ethnic leaders in the Baltic, followed by such assertiveness in the Caucasus, is evidence of the relative levels of ethnic awareness in these lands. But in this sense the concept of relative levels of national consciousness is not a predictor of politicized ethnicity or part of a causal relationship; it is, rather, a description or definition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agendas concerning autonomy, indigenization, language, development, and migration suggest that the public agenda for most ethnic cadres is less a primordial assertion of cultural identity than an instrumental pursuit of other interests. Thus, the predictions of the prevailing paradigm concerning the *agendas* of ethnopolitics were inaccurate.

Alternatively, an analysis that draws solely upon the instrumentalist paradigm would lead to significant misprediction as well. It would miss the constraint of primordialist sentiments in the population that must be co-opted into the agendas of Soviet ethnic entrepreneurs. It would dismiss the possibility that cadres might switch to primordial agendas as incentives and institutional constraints change. It would be unable to explain the willingness of some counterelites such as Landsbergis to sacrifice socioeconomic benefits for symbolic issues of self-expression.

These mispredictions point up the narrow or incomplete nature of a paradigm, such as the primordialist or instrumentalist, that focuses on attitudes. These paradigms fail to take two facts into consideration. First, the attitudes that sustain either primordial or instrumental agendas exist side by side in many Soviet ethnic communities and often within the same individual.[83] They coexist among Soviet cadres as well as in the general population. Second, the politicization of either primordial sentiments or instrumental interests and the mobilization of ethnic communities in sustained, large-scale action has required the conjunction of these attitudes with resources that can mobilize an ethnic community. The attitudes cited by one or the other paradigm are necessary, but not sufficient, for the explanation of ethnopolitics.

Political institutions like Soviet federalism play a critical role in this conjunction and so in shaping ethnic communities, politicizing ethnicity, and mobilizing protest. They empower entrepreneurs and constrain their choice of either primordial or instrumental strategies.[84] The politi-

[83] Suny (fn. 63), 220. This may also be true in many Western societies; see Anthony Mughan, "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict in Belgium," *Political Studies* 27 (March 1979), 21–37; Rogowski, "Conclusion," in Tiryakian and Rogowski (fn. 77), 374–76.

[84] Karl W. Deutsch has noted that political systems also differ in the degree to which their institutions influence ethnic attitudes (particularly assimilation); see Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), 33, 39–40. The "new institutionalism" argues a more general case for the "endogeneity" of preferences; for example, James P. March and Johan P. Olsen argue that traditionally "political theory has treated political institutions as determining, ordering, or modifying individual motives"; see March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 4–7, 154–56. For additional motives that incline ethnic elites toward intercommunity conflict regulation, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cization of ethnicity has been the work of political entrepreneurs created by Soviet federalism.[85] In the three decades before 1990 the most significant pressure on Moscow for ethnic interests was orchestrated by the Party and state leadership of ethnic homelands. By assigning a monopoly over mobilizational resources, Soviet federalism delayed the rise of ethnofederalism but at the same time made it likely and possible that ethnic cadres of more developed ethnic communities would later mobilize their constituents. By constraining their choice of strategies, Soviet federalism made it likely that cadres would mobilize their constituents behind instrumental rather than primordial agendas. Since January 1990 the magnitude, patterns, and agendas of ethnic assertiveness have evolved most in those areas in which institutional changes have transformed the incentive structures of cadres or empowered new elites (notably in the Baltic republics).[86]

Where political institutions neither establish monopolistic ethnic entrepreneurs nor constrain their choice of strategies in this way, political institutions distribute mobilizational resources and shape ethnic strategies differently.[87] This is illustrated poignantly by the changes in Soviet political institutions. In some republics the cadres' control over their communities has been weakened by the loss of their monopoly over the mobilizational resources of the ethnic community. The policies of *demokratizatsiia* and *glasnost* have undermined the ability of cadres to contain the protest they have mobilized as well as to suppress autonomous ethnopolitics. Where threats to their control have grown, their strategies have often changed. Cadres in some republics now engage in competitive efforts to mobilize different segments of elite and popular constituencies behind competing agendas reflecting different balances of primordial and instrumental concerns.[88] By early 1990 competition had led to an outright split in the Communist parties of the republics of Latvia and

[85] Illustrations of this approach include Edward Allworth, "Restating the Soviet Nationality Question," in Allworth, ed., *Soviet Nationality Problems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1978); Rakowska-Harmstone (fn. 79).

[86] Gorbachev's initial reponse to new elites such as Landsbergis and his Sajudis government has been consistent with the Soviet ethnic strategy that has emphasized institutional constraints to shape ethnic agendas. Using deterrent and compellent constraints, he has sought to induce the Lithuanian government to abandon its primordial agenda and pursue the instrumental objectives of *perestroika* within the context of Soviet federalism.

[87] Sidney Tarrow described how in democratic systems as well the strategies of regional leaders acting as brokers between center and periphery are shaped by bureaucratic institutions; see Tarrow, *Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politics in Italy and France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 7–8, 43–44.

[88] *Sovetskaia Latviia*, March 19, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lithuania. Alternative leaderships have articulated competing ethnic agendas, and Party assets including buildings have been divided.[89]

Lithuania before and after January 1990 provides an excellent diachronic study of how changes in the Soviet electoral system can empower new political entrepreneurs in the homeland and shift the emphasis in ethnic agendas from instrumental to primordial issues. The pragmatic leadership of Brazauskas was replaced by that of Landsbergis, which immediately emphasized symbolic issues of sovereignty even if they did not impart real autonomy. Pressed by Moscow, the new leadership quickly agreed that all instrumental issues were negotiable but not the primordial ones—that is, the symbolic declaration of independence.[90] Because Soviet institutions have not changed evenly in all republics, the contrast between Lithuania and certain other union republics after January 1990 offers a cross-sectional comparison of the consequences of changed institutions. In Belorussia, for example, the elections of early 1990 did not offer an open contest of elites and failed to empower alternative political entrepreneurs. The Belorussian political agenda remained much more instrumental and supportive of Moscow, so that in Moscow's confrontation with the Sajudis government, the Belorussian leadership announced it would demand renegotiation of its borders with Lithuania should the latter secede from the Soviet Union.[91]

The Soviet experience with ethnofederalism illustrates the importance of bringing institutions back into the analysis of ethnopolitics—for Sovietology, for comparisons of Leninist with non-Leninist polities, and possibly for comparisons of Soviet politics before and after 1990. Within the institutions of Soviet federalism may be keys to the future of the Soviet system. In particular, the direction the Soviet Union takes will depend on the ability of ethnic cadres to adapt to the role of entrepreneurs in a competitive arena as well as the ability of Soviet institutions to constrain the cadres' choice of strategies to those that do not threaten the unity of the Soviet polity.

[89] *Pravda*, February 8, 1990, February 9, 1990: *New York Times*, March 24, 1990. In Lithuania, sensing the consequences of these institutional changes for their power, members of the republic Politburo, such as the prime minister of the Sajudis government, have also begun to resign from the Communist Party.

[90] *New York Times*, March 30, 1990.

[91] *New York Times*, March 5, 1990, March 6, 1990, March 31, 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EXPLAINING THIRD WORLD ALIGNMENT

By STEVEN R. DAVID*

MOST of the earth's people and states are part of the Third World. Yet Third World foreign policy, especially why Third World states align as they do, is not well understood. Balance of power, the most widely used theory in international relations, is particularly inadequate as an explanation of Third World alignments because it does not take into account the distinctive characteristics of the Third World. The need for a theory that considers those characteristics is critical because understanding the Third World is and will remain central to understanding the course of international politics.

The theory of "omnibalancing" meets this need. It draws upon some of the key assumptions of balance of power while also correcting those elements of the theory that make it inapplicable to the Third World. Omnibalancing agrees with the central assumption of balance of power—that threats will be resisted. But it departs from balance of power in explaining Third World alignment decisions as a result of the Third World leadership's need to counter *all* threats. Thus, whereas balance of power focuses on the state's need to counter threats from other states, omnibalancing considers internal and external threats to the leadership, and, as a result, it fundamentally alters our understanding of why Third World leaders align as they do and also provides insights that explain a wide range of Third World behavior.

The argument is presented in four parts. First, the theories of balance of power and omnibalancing are reviewed, with special emphasis on the points of agreement and disagreement. Second, the characteristics that distinguish the Third World from the rest of the world and why these characteristics support the applicability of omnibalancing over balance of power are considered. Third, two specific cases are examined. These illustrate how omnibalancing explains and predicts Third World alignments in ways that balance of power (as well as other theories) do not. Finally, there is a discussion of the centrality of an understanding of the Third World, including Third World alignment, to the study of international politics.

* Of the many who offered advice, I would like to thank especially Aaron Friedberg and Stephen Van Evera for their detailed comments and suggestions.

World Politics 43 (January 1991), 233–56

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Balance of Power

Alignment occurs when a state brings its policies into close cooperation with another state in order to achieve mutual security goals.[1] Balance of power theory argues that states align to protect themselves against the power of or threats from other states.[2] The key concern of states is to align in such a way as to prevent (by balancing against) any other state or group of states from achieving preponderance. States behave this way because they recognize that the emergence of a hegemonic power will ultimately threaten their own survival. Balance of power theory emphasizes that the determinants of alignment come overwhelmingly from the structure of the international system, particularly the actual and potential *external* threats that states face.[3] Accordingly, the internal characteristics of the states are usually not considered relevant in influencing alignments.[4]

This view is reinforced by the recurring formation of balances made up of states that have little more than a threat in common. The alliance of democratic France with tsarist Russia against Germany prior to World War I illustrates this.[5] The apparent irrelevance of internal factors is reinforced by the fact that states with similar political systems that might otherwise be expected to maintain an alignment do not in the absence of a common external threat.[6] An example of this phenomenon

[1] For a comprehensive discussion of what connotes alignment, see George T. Duncan and Randolph M. Siverson, "Flexibility of Alliance Partner Choice in a Multipolar System," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (December 1982), 511–38, at 518.

[2] In my use of the term balance of power, I include the efforts of statesmen to counter both power and threats. For more on this point, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5, 21–26; and Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), 64–65.

[3] Kenneth Waltz and, to a lesser extent, Hans Morgenthau base their balance of power theory on the capabilities of states. Generally speaking, the greater the capability of a state, the greater the threat it poses to other states; see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), esp. chap. 6; and Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, *Politics among Nations*, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985), esp. chap. 11. George Liska also emphasizes the role of external threat, calling it the "primary source of alliances"; see *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 13.

[4] Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), 5. Based on an exhaustive survey of the literature, the authors concluded that most balance of power writings argue this.

[5] Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of International Relations," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science: International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 8:43.

[6] The notion is widespread that alliance cohesion weakens when there is no external threat. See, for example, Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 29; and Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 162.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is the failure of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to remain aligned despite their common allegiance to communism.

Although they base their work on the experience of states outside the Third World, many balance of power theorists argue that their theory holds for the states of the Third World as well.[7] One can expect the balance of power theory to prevail, it is argued, whenever states seeking to survive and expand their power interact in an anarchic order.[8] Since there is nothing in the nature of Third World states or in the international system they inhabit that would contradict these requirements, balance of power politics should apply equally to them.

Omnibalancing

Although the balance of power theory contains important insights, it does not adequately explain Third World alignment and realignment. Instead, the most powerful determinant of Third World alignment behavior is the rational calculation of Third World leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power. This is so because of the unstable, dangerous, and often fatal nature of the international and *domestic* political environment that characterizes the Third World. This deceptively simple observation changes our understanding of why Third World leaders align and realign, and it explains those decisions better than does balance of power. The uniquely dangerous context in which Third World politics takes place also explains why theories derived from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European experience (such as balance of power) are inadequate in explaining the alignment decisions of Third World leaders.

The essence of balance of power theory is correct: leaders of Third World states as well as leaders of other states align in ways that help them better resist the threats they face. But conditions in the Third World require, in addition, a theory of alignment that applies primarily to the Third World. To that end, three separate and distinct repairs of balance of power theory are offered. First, rather than just balance against threats or power, leaders of states will appease—that is, align with—secondary adversaries so that they can focus their resources on prime adversaries. Other states may be less threatening than the secondary threat, but it may be that they cannot be harnessed for the alignment

[7] This is a major argument made by Stephen Walt, who asserts that his theory is supported by the experiences of states in the Middle East. He does, however, modify balance of power theory to focus on threats (instead of power) from other states. See Walt (fn. 2), 13–14.

[8] Waltz (fn. 3), 121; and Morgenthau and Thompson (fn. 3), 228.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

either because they do not care about the dispute or because they are unable to resolve it. So the threatened leadership has no choice: it must align with one threat to address the other. The Soviet Union's alignment with the United States and Great Britain against Nazi Germany during World War II is an example of this type of behavior.

As with the leaders of great powers, Third World leaders, too, seek to appease secondary threats in order to counter those that are more pressing. But in the Third World, this often means appeasing other states (which often pose less pressing threats) in order to counter the more immediate and dangerous domestic threats. They seek to split the alignment against them and focus their energies on their most dangerous (domestic) opponents. To do this they appease the international allies of their domestic opponents. This superficially appears to be "bandwagoning," that is, a case of a state accommodating a threatening adversary in the hope of appeasing it or sharing in the spoils.[9] But it is better classified as balancing; the accommodation, made to conserve strength for the battle against the prime threat, is part of a general policy of resistance.

Finally, since the dominant goal of Third World leaders is to stay in power, they will sometimes protect themselves at the expense of the interests of the state. This form of balancing behavior—not covered by balance of power theory—must be addressed if the alignment decisions are to be understood.

Omnibalancing, the theory that emerges from these observations, applies largely to the Third World. It incorporates the need of leaders to appease secondary adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power. This theory rests on the assumptions that leaders are weak and illegitimate and that the stakes for domestic politics are very high—conditions that are much more common in the Third World than elsewhere. It assumes that the most powerful determinant of alignment is the drive of Third World leaders to ensure their political and physical survival.

Although omnibalancing is framed in opposition to balance of power, it also shares much of the latter's realist underpinnings. In accordance with realism, omnibalancing argues that international politics focuses on power, interests, and rationality.[10] Omnibalancing accepts the realist view that the world is characterized by international anarchy, that interests are bound to conflict, and that the use of force is always an option

[9] The first mention I have been able to find of "bandwagoning" in the sense used here is in Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 15. See also Walt (fn. 2), 19–21.

[10] See Morgenthau and Thompson (fn. 3), chaps. 1, 3, for a concise description of realism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for heads of state. Omnibalancing furthermore accepts the realist argument that there are clear hierarchies of issues, with survival being the most important. In addition, omnibalancing rests on the fundamental realist assumption that "politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature," namely, in this instance, the desire of Third World leaders to survive.[11]

Omnibalancing also acknowledges the central lesson of realism, that international politics can best be understood by asking an observer to imagine how she or he would rationally behave under given conditions.[12] A decision is elucidated, therefore, by showing how it was reasonable in light of the leader's objectives.[13] As Hans Morgenthau explains:

> In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose.[14]

Despite the overall realist approach, omnibalancing departs in fundamental ways from the understanding of realism put forth by scholars such as Morgenthau and Waltz.[15] The essence of the difference is that omnibalancing asserts that realism must be broadened to examine internal threats in addition to focusing on external threats and capabilities (that is, structural arguments), and that the leader of the state rather than the state itself should be used as the level of analysis. As such, omnibalancing challenges the core assumptions of Morgenthau and Waltz, that states are unitary actors pursuing the national interest. If omnibalancing is correct, then alignment decisions of Third World leaders cannot be understood without reference to the role of internal threats to their leadership.

This approach changes the way we go about explaining alignment

[11] Ibid., 4.

[12] This lesson comes from the two central works of realism, Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* (fn. 3) and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Penguin, 1985). See also Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 163, for elaboration of this point.

[13] This is in conformity with Graham Allison's Model I; see Allison, *The Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 5.

[14] Morgenthau and Thompson (fn. 3), 5.

[15] See, for example, Morgenthau (fn. 3), esp. chaps. 1, 3, as well as Waltz (fn. 3). Although differences exist between the two interpretations, they are treated together in that they both accept the view of realism that envisions a world of international anarchy in which the principal actors are states that seek to expand and survive.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decisions. Balance of power assumes that the decision maker asks, "How does this policy affect the power of the state?"[16] Omnibalancing assumes instead that the decision maker asks, "How does this policy affect the probability of *my* remaining in power?" And whereas balance of power assumes the state's leaders ask, "Which outside power is most likely to protect my state from the threats posed by other states?" omnibalancing assumes the decision maker asks, "Which outside power is most likely to protect *me* from the internal and external threats (as well as combinations of both) that I face." Just as the questions differ, so do the responses.

By taking internal threats into account, omnibalancing is less parsimonious than is balance of power in explaining Third World alignment and realignment. The loss in simplicity is more than compensated, however, by the increased explanatory and predictive power of the theory. Demonstrating this requires showing that one can generalize about the Third World and that these generalizations support the view that a broader conception of balance of power is needed in order to explain why Third World leaders make the alignment decisions they do.

Generalizing about the Third World

Despite the vast differences among the states considered as belonging to the Third World, there are also fundamental similarities that justify considering them together.[17] These similarities have created a situation in which internal threats (with or without external backing) are far more likely to challenge a Third World leader's hold on power than are threats from other states. Only a handful of Third World leaders (for example, Uganda's Idi Amin, Cambodia's Pol Pot, Panama's Manuel Noriega) have fallen to outside invasions. Hundreds of Third World leaders, however, have been overthrown by their internal enemies. In fact, most Third World states have experienced either a forceful overthrow of their government (from within) or a nearly successful attempt. Since 1945 wars within states have outnumbered wars between states, a gap that is especially pronounced in the Third World.[18] Coups d'état alone have

[16] Morgenthau and Thompson (fn. 3), 14.

[17] This study considers the Third World as including all countries *except* the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the European states, and the People's Republic of China. For an especially good description of the differences between Third World states, see Benjamin Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 145–52.

[18] J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), 92–95, 98–99, 229–32. For additional treatment of this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accounted for nearly two hundred regime changes in the Third World, making it the most common form of coercive regime change and perhaps the most common form of regime change in general in the Third World.[19] Third World leaders understandably have to pay special attention to retaining their hold on power, especially in the face of domestic challenges.

The reasons for the prevalence of internal threats in the Third World stem from the characteristics of most Third World states.[20] Unlike countries outside the Third World that evolved over centuries, the great majority of Third World states had been colonies out of which foreign powers created states where none had existed. Although the degree to which the newly formed boundaries coincide with the boundaries of indigenous societies varies in the Third World (for example, it is high in Southeast Asia and low in Africa), in all cases a formal division replaced what had been a flexible demarcation. Because of the arbitrariness of their borders, therefore, many Third World states began and remain more as an artificial construct than a coherent unit.[21]

The artificiality of the Third World state has created a situation in which subnational groups owe allegiance to and act on behalf of interests other than the national interest. Instead of identifying with the state, individuals identify with ethnic, religious, or regional groupings. This type of narrowly defined interest perpetuates itself by preventing the formation of a national consciousness. With anticolonial nationalism dissipating in the wake of decolonization, identification with the group over the state is getting stronger with time.[22] Rather than transcending the differences among these different groups, the state is often simply the representative of a group that holds power in the capital. In such a situ-

point, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 224.

[19] From 1945 to mid-1985 there were at least 183 successful coups and 174 unsuccessful coup attempts in the Third World. See Steven R. David, *Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 1–2. These numbers are just conservative estimates; the actual number of coups and coup attempts may be much higher. For a comprehensive examination of estimates of numbers of coups, see Milton Leitenberg, "Appendix 2: World-Wide Military Coups since 1945: A Short Note on Data Collection," in Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, eds., *Problems of Contemporary Militarism* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 378–85.

[20] For an excellent discussion of why internal threats are so common in the Third World, see Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm about to Turn?" *International Affairs* 60 (Winter 1983–84) 41–52.

[21] Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35 (October 1982), 1–24; Mutiah Alagappa, *The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand* (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1987), 4–6; Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 8.

[22] Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1987), 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ation, the leadership becomes just one other contender in a struggle for power that knows few constraints.[23]

Legitimacy is likely to be weaker for Third World leaders than for leaders elsewhere. Many regimes in the Third World are narrowly based, came to power through force, and use suppression to remain in power. Because they lack legitimacy, they face continual threats to their rule.[24] Threats are also likely to emerge because Third World leaders control much more wealth and power than do the other groups in the society. Gaining control of the state is therefore the only means by which the ambitious can meet their needs. Hence, the state is especially vulnerable because many different groups and individuals seek to control it. At the same time, those in power will mightily resist attempts to replace them because they do not want to relinquish their only opportunity to acquire and keep wealth and influence.[25] Equally important, since the consequence of loss of power in the Third World is often loss of life, Third World leaders are understandably more aggressive than other leaders in their efforts to maintain their positions.

Most Third World states are governed by authoritarian rule, which exacerbates and focuses the conflicts that do arise. Despite the rise of nationalism, meaningful political participation by the population at large in most Third World countries remains the exception. Decisions, especially in foreign policy, are usually made by a single individual or at most by a narrow elite. Although this elite does not have total flexibility in making policy, it typically needs to be far less responsive to national or institutional concerns than leaders elsewhere need to be. Public opinion in Third World states often carries little influence, and bureaucracies play only a minor role in foreign policy.[26] Moreover, due to the effects of colonialism and cultural factors, rulers see themselves and are seen as an alien imposition on the society.[27]

An interrelationship between internal and external threats also characterizes the Third World. Third World leaders and insurgents commonly seek outside support to advance their interests. Their requests for help either to threaten or to protect a state's leadership are often granted

[23] For an excellent discussion of the role of subnational groups in Third World states (in this case, West Africa), see I. William Zartman, *International Relations in the New Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 47–48.

[24] Alagappa (fn. 21), 9. The problems of weak legitimacy are as common to the "old" Third World states of Latin America as they are to the newer states of Africa and Southeast Asia.

[25] Clapham (fn. 21), 39–43.

[26] Joel S. Migdal, "Internal Structure and External Behaviour: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World States," *International Relations* 4 (May 1974), 519–20.

[27] Clapham (fn. 21), 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by outside states.[28] Internal threats, so prevalent in the Third World, are an ideal vehicle for advancing the interests of outside states. Since the leadership of Third World states is often determined by the outcome of internal threats, other countries with an interest in the Third World state may seek to determine that outcome. Moreover, the military weakness of most Third World states enhances their willingness to back or help suppress internal threats against their neighbors. Most Third World states simply lack the weapons and the logistical capability for direct, protracted conflict beyond their borders. Although wars between states do occur, and although troops may at times be sent far afield (as in the case of Cuba), these actions are relatively rare. At the same time, the experience of Third World states that have employed external attacks (for example, Egypt and Syria versus Israel in 1967 and 1973; the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88) confirms the prohibitive price and risks incurred by states that mount wars against formidable adversaries. Providing aid to or against insurgent groups, on the one hand, or backing or suppressing coups, on the other hand, is a relatively inexpensive and effective means of asserting one's power.[29]

Finally, one can categorize Third World states according to their self-identification. A country that considers itself to be a Third World country is likely to have a set of attitudes and goals that will be defined by its "Third Worldness." This is not a tautology. Third World states overwhelmingly supported the huge price increases in OPEC oil despite the devastating economic impact on them. Third World solidarity has also been displayed in the Non-aligned Movement and the Law of the Sea Conference. One can speak of a Third World, therefore, because member states do and because they act in some ways at least because of that self-identification.[30]

[28] On foreign involvement in internal conflicts, see James Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Asti Suhrke and Lela N. Garner, eds., *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1977); and Herbert K. Tillema, "Foreign Overt Intervention in the Nuclear Age," *Journal of Peace Research* 26 (1989), 179–85.

[29] Even threats such as coups d'état, which are thought of as strictly internal, frequently have a foreign dimension. From 1945 to mid-1985 foreign involvement played a significant role in the support of at least twenty-four successful and unsuccessful coup attempts and in efforts to suppress fourteen coups in the Third World. Foreign involvement was thus involved in slightly over 10% of the total of all coups and coup attempts. See David (fn. 19), 2.

[30] According to Stephen Krasner, Third World states behave alike in global negotiations, not out of a common desire for economic development, but rather out of a common need for regime security. This view supports the contentions that one can generalize about the Third World and that concerns over survival assume central importance in Third World decision making. See Krasner, "Third World Vulnerabilities and Global Negotiations," *Review of International Studies* 9 (October 1983), 235–51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These generalizations about the Third World are not intended to suggest that all Third World countries share these characteristics equally. Different states manifest different strengths and weaknesses. Nor do these generalizations apply only to the Third World. As clearly demonstrated by the toppling of Eastern European governments in 1989, states outside of the Third World also suffer from such problems as lack of consensus and weak legitimacy. What justifies considering the Third World as an analytic category is that whatever combination of factors may exist in a particular Third World state, the cumulative impact of those factors makes most Third World leaders more vulnerable to overthrow—particularly from internal threats—than leaders elsewhere. Thus, while the leaders of all states must be concerned about threats, in the Third World such concerns assume an urgency and priority that is rarely matched elsewhere.

Why the Nature of the Third World Supports the Theory of Omnibalancing

The characteristics of Third World states demonstrate why structural theories of alignment such as balance of power are inapplicable to the Third World. At the heart of balance of power theory is the distinction between the anarchy of the international system and the order of domestic politics. Adherents emphasize that international politics has no central government with the power and authority to resolve conflicts. The absence of a strong consensus in international politics, moreover, exacerbates the ensuing struggle for power. In such an environment, balancing plays a central role in ensuring the survival of states against the aggressive designs of other states. Within states, however, balance of power advocates argue that conflicts take place in an "integrated society, kept together by a strong consensus and the normally unchallengeable power of a central government."[31] Balance of power theory acknowledges that internal balancing takes place as groups combine (or balance) to advance their interests. Because the central government ensures that the survival of losers in domestic struggles is not threatened, however, supporters of balance of power assert that balancing is of much less importance in domestic politics than it is in international politics.[32]

The problem with this distinction is that central governments in the Third World often lack the power to resolve disputes within their bor-

[31] Morgenthau and Thompson (fn. 3), 190.

[32] See ibid., 189–92, for a concise description on why internal balancing is supposedly fundamentally different from balancing between states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ders. Thus, there is often no "strong consensus" or "integrated society" to inhibit conflict, and the Third World reproduces rather than provides a haven from the anarchy of international politics. Instead of sharply differentiating what occurs on the international scene from what occurs within states, it is more accurate to consider Third World domestic politics as a microcosm of international politics. As a result, balancing to ensure survival is as critical for groups within states as it is between states.[33]

Balance of power theory focuses on the state as the principal level of analysis; that is, for most of its adherents, the state, and not the individual ruler, is the main actor in international politics.[34] They view the state as a fully formed unit with clearly defined borders capable of operating autonomously because they perceive domestic politics as "hierarchically ordered"; that is, the central government can command the obedience of different groups under its authority and thereby control what goes on within its borders. According to the theory, this justifies a focus on the behavior of the state.[35]

These assumptions, however, are of little relevance to Third World states, with their arbitrary borders encompassing many groups that often successfully resist domination from the top. It is the leadership of the state and not the state itself that is the proper unit of analysis for understanding Third World foreign policy, particularly alignment. When we refer to Egypt or Ethiopia becoming pro-American or pro-Soviet, we are really referring to the orientation of a narrow authoritarian elite. The distinction is fundamental, because the interests of this elite need not be synonymous with the interests of the state. Understanding why leaders make the alignment decisions they do requires an understanding of what is in the best interests of the leaders and not of what is in the best interests of the state. This is especially true when the survival of the leadership is at stake. Very few Third world leaders need to worry about losing their country—the mortality rate of even Third World states is very low. It is reasonable to assume, however, that Third World leaders do worry about the much more common, but (from their perspective) equally consequential, prospect of being removed from power. It follows that when a leadership is confronted with a choice between aligning so as to benefit the state but endangering its hold on power or aligning in such a way that harms the state but preserves its power, it will choose the latter.

[33] For an intriguing argument that order is more common between Third World (in this case, African) states than within them, see Jackson and Rosberg (fn. 21).

[34] For an argument of why states should be considered the main actors in international politics, see Waltz (fn. 3), 93–95; and see also Keohane (fn. 12), 160.

[35] Waltz (fn. 3), 81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Balance of power theory assumes that states will seek to expand their power as much as they can to provide a "margin of safety" to ensure their survival.[36] In the Third World, however, the prevalence of threats against leaders places a premium, not on expanding power per se, but on surviving. In this respect, politics in the Third World supports some of the observations of neorealism, in particular, that elites have their own interests, the most important of which is to stay in power. Neorealism also recognizes that efforts to maximize power produce resistance that will ultimately jeopardize one's security. Consequently, leaders prefer to align with states that ensure their hold on power rather than with states that may increase their power, but at the risk of endangering their survival. Conditions in the Third World, however, call into question neorealism's emphasis on countering threats from other states as the prime determinant of alignment.[37]

Balance of power theory is flawed in its application to the Third World because it ignores internal threats; that is, it overlooks the most likely source of challenge to the leadership of Third World states. Balance of power theory therefore also cannot accurately assess the strength of external threats because such threats usually depend for their effectiveness on internal conditions that are susceptible to outside manipulation. In 1971, for example, the Pakistani leadership believed it had to counter a secessionist threat from the East Bengalis in order to remain in power. This meant confronting India, which supported the secessionist movement. India alone posed a considerable but manageable external threat to Pakistan. What made the Indian threat unmanageable and led to the decisive Pakistani defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War was Indian power *combined* with the massive internal threat mounted by the East Bengalis.[38] Even where there is a pressing external threat, therefore, a Third World leader's estimation of the need for outside support to counterbalance the threat often depends on internal factors that can affect the magnitude of the external threat.

In sum, in seeking to explain Third World alignment, the overall nature of the Third World supports omnibalancing while making the ap-

[36] Morgenthau and Thompson (fn. 3), 227–28.

[37] For a thorough examination of neorealism, see Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (fn. 12); see also Robert O. Keohane, "Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism," *International Security* 13 (Summer 1988), 169–76, at 173.

[38] Ayoob (fn. 20), 43. On the background of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War (including Indian support of the East Bengalis), see Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: A Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 War* (New York: Praeger, 1975); and Pran Chopra, *India's Second Liberation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974). On the need of the Pakistani leadership to prevent the secession of East Pakistan in order to survive in power, see Jackson, 26–27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plicability of balance of power highly suspect. For those cases in which the principal threats to the leadership are from other states, balance of power theory indeed applies. But it is only prudent to consider the impact of domestic challenges before assuming that external threats alone have determined an alignment, because in what appears to be the vast majority of Third World cases, internal threats play a major role. Omnibalancing therefore needs to be invoked. Omnibalancing also respects the complexity and multifaceted nature of the threats confronting Third World leaders; it recognizes that they typically face many threats from many sources and that lesser challenges must be appeased in order to resist the principal ones. Omnibalancing is thus not misled into concluding that bandwagoning to threatening states necessarily means that the leadership chose not to balance against the most pressing threats it faced.

Cases of Omnibalancing: Mengistu and Sadat

The superiority of omnibalancing for explaining Third World alignment can be seen in the decisions of Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam to align with the Soviet Union and of Egypt's Anwar Sadat to align with the United States. These examples, of course, do not confirm the overall applicability of omnibalancing to the Third World (only an in-depth analysis of all Third World alignment decisions could do that). Nevertheless, they are particularly valuable in showing how conditions that are prevalent in the Third World prevent balance of power theory from explaining or predicting the alignments of leaders in key Third World countries. Moreover, these cases illustrate how alternative explanations of alignment, such as bandwagoning and ideology, also fail to match the ability of omnibalancing to explain the alignment decisions of these leaders.

By the standards of balance of power, the military officers (subsequently labeled the Derg) who overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 should have made every effort to maintain Ethiopia's alignment with the United States.[39] For the twenty years prior to the Derg's takeover, the United States had been the principal supporter of Ethiopia, providing it with the largest amount of military and economic assistance sent to a sub-Saharan

[39] For background on why Mengistu aligned with the Soviet Union, see Marina Ottaway, *Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1983); David A. Korn, *Ethiopia, the United States, and the Soviet Union* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986); Colin Legum and Bill Lee, *The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis* (New York: Africana, 1979); and Paul B. Henze, *Russians and the Horn: Opportunism and the Long View*, European-American Institute for Security Research, The EAI Papers, No. 5 (Marina del Ray, Calif.: European American Institute, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

African country. Moreover, despite the radical rhetoric of the Derg, especially that of its emerging leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the United States emphasized its intention to support the new government. To that end, American assistance to Mengistu's regime dramatically *increased* from levels provided Haile Selassie. Fully one-third of all military equipment delivered to Ethiopia by the United States arrived in the two years after the Derg took power. American economic aid to Ethiopia both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions also showed marked increases.[40]

Any doubts about Mengistu's maintaining his alignment with the United States ought to have (by balance of power logic) been erased by the Soviet backing of Ethiopia's chief adversary, Somalia. Because of Soviet support, Somalia, which maintained irredentist aims against Ethiopia, had been transformed into one of the most powerful countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Beginning in 1962 and dramatically escalating after the Derg took power in Ethiopia, Moscow provided huge amounts of military equipment and hundreds of advisers to the Somali armed forces. America's increased assistance to the Mengistu government proved essential in maintaining a rough parity between the Ethiopian and Somali forces and deterring additional Soviet involvement. It would appear that Mengistu would do all that he could to keep American support to enable him to continue to resist (or balance against) his Soviet-backed adversary.

And yet the Derg under Mengistu chose not to intensify its alignment with the United States but instead attempted to realign with the Soviet Union—the backer of Ethiopia's primary external threat. From the time that Haile Selassie was overthrown, Mengistu and his colleagues on the Derg pressed the Soviet Union to replace the United States as Ethiopia's principal supporter. While still dependent on the United States for security assistance, Mengistu transformed Ethiopia along Marxist-Leninist lines and followed the Soviet lead in foreign policy. After three years the USSR finally acceded to Mengistu's requests: in 1977 the Soviet Union became Ethiopia's primary military supplier, and in 1978 a formal treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union replaced the mutual defense treaty Ethiopia had concluded with the United States.

Why did this take place, in violation of balance of power theory? Mengistu's ideological leanings may have made him more comfortable with

[40] Korn (fn. 39), 8, 13; Bereket Habte Selassie, *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), 138; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968–1977* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1979), 157; Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1979), 101.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union, but there is no evidence that it played an important role in his alignment. The Ethiopian leader never manifested pro-Communist sympathies before seizing power, did not hesitate to purge orthodox Communist groups ruthlessly, and bitterly resisted the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. Thus, none of Mengistu's major decisions can be explained as a consequence of ideology.[41] Bandwagoning may appear to have been a factor, with Mengistu seeking to appease Soviet aggression. But Mengistu at no point attempted to appease or align with his principal threat, Somalia, as bandwagoning would predict.

Only omnibalancing explains Mengistu's decision to align with the Soviet Union, by recognizing that the United States, contrary to balance of power assessments, was actually not providing adequate military support to the Ethiopian leadership. It supplied enough help for Ethiopia to deal with the external threat posed by Somalia, but it did not provide enough assistance for Ethiopia to deal with the myriad of internal threats as well. Foremost among these threats was the rebellion in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea, which involved far more Ethiopian troops than were stationed even along the Somali front.[42] Mengistu recognized that he could not survive in power without satisfactorily coping with the Eritrean revolt. Accordingly, gaining outside assistance to suppress the rebellion played a major role in his turn to the Soviet Union. The assumption of balance of power that the need to resist internal threats, such as the one posed by Eritrea, is irrelevant in determining alignment is clearly wrong in the case of Mengistu.[43]

Omnibalancing also recognizes that Mengistu's alignment to the Soviet Union was not bandwagoning but actually a form of balancing be-

[41] There is a widespread consensus among analysts across the ideological spectrum that Mengistu and the Derg were not driven by ideological factors but, rather, acted simply to survive in power. See, for example, Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* (New York: Africana, 1978), 149; Korn (fn. 39), 111; Fred Halliday and Maxine Moylneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution* (London: Unwin, 1981), 99; Paul B. Henze, "Beyond the Ethiopian Famine: Anatomy of a Revolution II," *Encounter* (London) (July 1986), 15–27, at 19; and Michael Chege, "The Revolution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974–1979," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (September 1979), 359–80. Mengistu's recent retreat from Marxism-Leninism (which not so coincidentally coincides with reduced Soviet support) and his reestablishment of military ties to Israel further support the view that ideological factors do not dominate his decision making.

[42] Some useful works on Eritrea include Hagai Erlich, *The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962–1978* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1983); G. H. K. Trevaskis, *Eritrea: A Colony in Transition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); and Richard Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1980). See also John Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 104–45.

[43] Many analysts make the point that Mengistu could not survive without a satisfactory settlement of the Eritrean conflict. See, for example, Legum and Lee (fn. 39), 39; Suzanne Kasikas, *The Arc of Socialist Revolutions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1982), 142; and Selassie (fn. 40), 37, 71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

havior not included in balance of power theory. By turning to the Soviet Union, Mengistu was not seeking to appease the principal threats arrayed against him (Ethiopia was far too unimportant to justify direct Soviet action). Rather, he was trying to resist them by appeasing the secondary threat posed by the Soviet Union. As the major supporter of Somalia and an indirect backer of the Eritrean rebellion, the Soviet Union clearly *contributed* to the threats that were most likely to topple Mengistu. But by backing the Somalis and the Eritreans, the USSR was also in the best position to undermine the threats they presented simply by withholding assistance and getting its allies to do the same. Balance of power may be correct that states will not normally appease threats because of fear of placing one's survival in the hands of an adversary. But, as demonstrated by Mengistu, leaders will appease secondary threats in order to defeat more pressing ones.

Anwar Sadat's alignment with the United States following the 1973 October War is another clear example of the limitations of balance of power theory.[44] After assuming power following Nasser's death in 1970, Sadat enhanced Egypt's alignment with the Soviet Union. A treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded, and Moscow provided Egypt with record levels of military assistance. Soviet support reached a peak during the 1973 October War with Israel, enabling Sadat to achieve a smashing political victory. Nevertheless, after the war Sadat decided to forsake his alignment with Moscow and turn to the United States—the backer of his chief external threat—for support.

As in the case of Mengistu, neither ideology nor bandwagoning explains Sadat's alignment with the United States. Ideological explanations for Sadat's realignment decision—that he underwent a fundamental change in his world view—are not very convincing. At the very least, that Sadat could profess being comfortable with the Soviet Union and then the United States demonstrates an ideological commitment too

[44] Some good background treatments of Anwar Sadat's Egypt, including his decision to reject his alignment with the Soviet Union and turn to the United States, include Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Raymond William Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Jr., *Egyptian Politics under Sadat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); A. I. Dawaisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1976); Mohammed Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World* (London: Collins, 1978); Shimon Shamir, "Egypt's Reorientation towards the U.S.: Factors and Conditions of Decision Making," in Haim Shaked and Itamar Rabinovich, eds., *The Middle East and the United States: Perceptions and Policies* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980); Mark Cooper, *The Transformation of Egypt* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); and Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weak to dictate the choice of alignment partners. Similarly, bandwagoning was not in evidence, as Sadat made no effort to appease or align with Israel.

Only omnibalancing's emphasis on internal threats explains Sadat's decision to align with the United States. Omnibalancing recognizes that Israel, the primary external threat faced by Egypt, did not directly threaten Sadat's hold on power. Since the end of the War of Attrition in 1970 (in which Israeli and Egyptian forces exchanged fire across the Suez Canal), Israel had had no offensive designs against Sadat's Egypt. The Israeli threat stemmed not from Israel itself but from the effect of the continuing Israeli occupation of Egyptian land (a result of the 1967 war) on various Egyptian groups. The Egyptian military, workers, intellectuals, and students had grown increasingly impatient with the continuing stalemate and sought to force the Egyptian leader to regain the territories from Israel. For Sadat to deal with the threats from the Egyptian groups, he had to force Israel to return the lands it had seized. The Soviet Union, however, fearing a confrontation with the United States and believing that Egypt would lose any war with Israel, would not provide Sadat with the capability to end the Israeli occupation. Moscow's unwillingness to do what was necessary to extricate Sadat from the continuing stalemate exacerbated the domestic threats he confronted and eventually led him to dissolve the Egyptian-Soviet alignment.[45]

Sadat subsequently aligned with the United States out of a recognition that that was the best means of balancing against his principal, domestic threats. The United States, by virtue of its support for Israel, was the only great power willing and able to force an end to the Israeli occupation of the Sinai. Thus, the reasons for Sadat's alignment with the United States only become clear when assessed in light of the domestic threats he faced and the impact of the Israeli occupation on those threats.

Both cases clearly show how omnibalancing offers the necessary correctives to balance of power to explain Third World alignments. Mengistu and Sadat both appeased an international threat (posed by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively) in order to defeat a more pressing domestic challenge. The notion that Third World leaders appease (or bandwagon with) an external threat in order to balance against a domestic threat is not as contradictory as it may appear. As Robert Jervis argues, politics in a complex environment results in unintended consequences. Instead of attempting to achieve a goal by heading straight for it, one is often better off adopting an indirect approach or even one

[45] Extensive accounts of the internal threats besetting Sadat can be found in Baker (fn. 44); Hinnebusch (fn. 44); and Cooper (fn. 44).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that heads in the opposite direction.[46] As seen by Mengistu and Sadat—Third World leaders confronting a great number of threats from many different sources—a simple balance of power approach would not have maximized the chances of survival. Instead, a Third World leadership often stands the best chance of defeating the threats it confronts by adopting a policy that is indirect and seemingly opposed to what it wishes to achieve.

The examples of Mengistu and Sadat also show how focusing on the interests of the leadership elite better explains alignment than does focusing on the interests of the state as a whole. It is unclear whether Mengistu's alignment with the Soviet Union or Sadat's alignment with the United States benefited their respective countries. Ethiopia, in particular, suffered as a result of its alignment with the Soviet Union.[47] But if the alignments did not benefit Ethiopia or possibly even Egypt, they unquestionably benefited the leaders of those counties by enhancing their hold on power. In comparison with other leaders, those in the Third World tend to face more threats and pay a higher price for failure; presumably, then, the concern for political survival that characterized Mengistu's and Sadat's alignment decisions exists throughout the Third World.

The two cases furthermore call into question the contention that Third World leaders will align with the outside state that provides them with the most benefits. Both leaders rejected patrons who gave them record assistance for others whose level of support could not be guaranteed. Mengistu had little reason to believe that Soviet economic assistance would ever approach the quantity and quality of that provided by the United States, and Sadat could not reply on a United States beholden to Israel to match the amount of weaponry supplied to Egypt by the Soviet Union. Both leaders did have reason to believe, however, that realigning would place them in a better position to defeat the principal threats confronting them. In deciding to change patrons, therefore, they behaved more consistently with omnibalancing's emphasis on aligning to resist threats rather than on aligning with the better provider.

Finally, both cases demonstrate how focusing exclusively on external threats—and ignoring internal threats—can fail to explain or predict Third World alignments. Internal threats, either alone or backed by outside states, played a central role in the alignments of Ethiopia and Egypt.

[46] Jervis, "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 218.

[47] For how aligning with the USSR exacerbated Ethiopia's problems, see Paul B. Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," *Problems of Communism* 30 (May–June 1981), 55–74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such threats continue to determine Third World alignments today. In Latin America, for example, requests for American security assistance have come from the leaders of Colombia and Bolivia (which face threats from well-armed drug dealers). In the Middle East domestic pressure from Palestinians has contributed to the decision on the part of Jordan's King Hussein to align his state more closely with Iraq, and in Southeast Asia, Cambodia's ultimate alignment will be determined by that country's civil war. The determinative role of internal threats in Third World alignments should not be surprising given the prevalence of such threats. What is surprising is the belief that balance of power can be applied generally to explain Third World alignment, despite its neglect of the kind of threats that are most likely to confront the leaders of the Third World.

The Defense of Balance of Power

Supporters of balance of power have responded to the prevalence of internal threats in the Third World generally and to their impact on specific countries by maintaining that it does not invalidate the balance of power theory. Some adherents of the theory, such as Waltz, recognize that violence and the use of force to deal with it occur as often (or more so) within states as between states. For Waltz, this means that neither the occurrence of violence nor the use of force per se can be used as a standard by which to distinguish domestic from international politics. Instead, he argues, the distinction is marked by government's monopoly on the *legitimate* use of force to deal with violence. Citizens, therefore, need not worry about protecting themselves; they can appeal to the government for assistance. In international politics, by contrast, states can only rely on themselves for defense. Thus, international politics is a system of self-help, whereas domestic politics is not.[48]

In a consideration of Third World alignment, however, this largely cogent analysis is problematic. First, the notion of a legitimate government protecting its citizens from private acts of violence often does not apply: for large groups of people in the Third World the government is neither legitimate nor a protector. Whether one is a southern Sudanese seeking autonomy in Nimeiri's Sudan, or an Eritrean seeking independence in Mengistu's Ethiopia, or an individual seeking just to survive in Pol Pot's Cambodia, the government is less of a guardian against threats than it is the chief threat. Second, Waltz's observations are largely irrel-

[48] Waltz (fn. 3), 103–4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evant in terms of the alignment decisions of Third World leaders. Even if it is granted that a government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, its leadership must still act to guard itself from all threats, including "illegitimate" ones and those that originate within their own countries. A Third World leadership struggling to survive bases its alignment decisions on how best to protect itself from the threats it faces, not on abstract considerations of whether the threat is "legitimate" or whether its source is domestic or international.

It has also been argued that it does not matter whether the assumptions of balance of power are true as long as the theory based on those assumptions accurately predicts what occurs. Assumptions are seen as simplifications of the truth, their role being not to describe what actually happens but to enable theories to be constructed. According to Waltz, "We can freely admit, then, that states are in fact not unitary, purposive actors." As such, the fact that Third World states do not conform to the ideal assumed by balance of power theory is irrelevant. So long as balance of power theory accurately predicts the behavior of Third World states, the thinking continues, it remains a valuable theory for the Third World.[49]

As this analysis has shown, however, it has not yet been demonstrated that Third World states do in fact conduct themselves in a manner predicted by the balance of power theory. Moreover, even if balance of power theory accurately predicts the behavior of most Third World states, it is worth knowing whether it is right for the wrong reasons. Especially where theory is used to guide policy (as balance of power does), it is critical to know which policies are likely to produce which outcomes. Basing one's policies on overall outcomes might prove catastrophic in a specific, vital case.

Most important, the pursuit of knowledge is worthy in its own right. If assumptions do not conform to reality, regardless of the value of the theories they underlie, they should be revised. This is especially the case when those assumptions grew out of the study of states the present nature and historical experiences of which are vastly different from what one finds in the Third World. At the very least, refining our assumptions in light of Third World realities holds out the prospect of an improved theory. This is particularly important for theories such as balance of power, whose explanatory and predictive value leaves much room for improvement.

Finally, some have argued that although many states in the Third

[49] Waltz (fn. 5), 37–38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World do not follow the dictates of balance of power when aligning, that does not detract from the value of the balance of power theory. As Waltz argues (in the context of defending the primacy of states over transnational actors), "So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them."[50] Since the major states are not Third World states, their behavior is apparently not sufficient to invalidate theories of international politics. Moreover, those states that are driven by internal threats (and thus do not follow balance of power dictates) are likely to be weak, in which case they will not affect the global balance of power anyway.[51]

Why then concern ourselves with these exceptions? First, it matters little that international politics may be defined by the major states if this definition does not help in the understanding of why Third World leaders make the alignment decisions they do. Second, any theory of international relations that is of questionable applicability for most of the world's states and people requires refinement. Finally, as discussed below, understanding the Third World is central to the understanding of some of the fundamental issues in international relations.

The Significance of the Third World

The importance of the Third World is most clearly seen when considering questions of war and peace. Understanding why states go to war has traditionally been at the heart of the study of international relations. Since World War II wars between and within non–Third World states have virtually ceased to exist. Many reasons are offered to explain this unprecedented phenomenon, including fear of nuclear war, economic entanglement, desire to avoid another World War II, and a growing acceptance of Western liberal democracy.[52] The disagreements about why war has ended outside the Third World should not, however, obscure the recognition that conflict continues unabated in the Third World. Such conflict persists in threatening both Third World and non–

[50] Waltz (fn. 3), 94.

[51] Walt makes this point in connection with bandwagoning; see Walt (fn. 2), 179.

[52] On the possible reasons for the absence of war among states outside the Third World, see Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer–Fall 1983), 205–35, 323–53; idem, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1151–69; Bruce Russett, "The Politics of an Alternative Security System: Toward a More Democratic and Therefore More Peaceful World," in Burns Weston, ed., *Alternatives to Nuclear Deterrence* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Gaddis (fn. 18), esp. chap. 8; John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988), 55–79; and Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third World states. Because war has become a virtual Third World monopoly, it is impossible to understand the causes and possible solutions of international conflict without understanding the Third World.

Present trends point to the increasing importance of the Third World in matters of international security. The proliferation of weapons and weapons-related technology has dramatically enhanced the strength of many Third World states. Approximately a dozen Third World countries have chemical or biological weapons, and roughly the same number maintain ballistic missiles.[53] Several Third World countries have or are very close to having nuclear weapons. Even without exotic weapons, Third World militaries have become formidable institutions. Many Third World countries (for example, Iraq, India, and Vietnam) have military forces larger and better equipped than those of most European countries. A dozen deploy a thousand or more battle tanks. In most cases, the increasing strength of Third World armies has not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in stability.

Ironically, the apparent lessened interest of the Soviet Union in the Third World, if continued, will enhance the Third World's role in issues of international security. A Soviet departure from the Third World would not end the threats to global security posed by Third World states. On the contrary, for some threats (for example, nuclear proliferation, regional conflict), a Soviet withdrawal could eliminate an important constraint. Most important, were the Soviets to abandon their efforts to expand their influence throughout the world, the Third World would be left as the principal threat to international stability. At the very least, therefore, the *relative* importance of the Third World to international security concerns would increase in the wake of overall Soviet retrenchment.

Many of the issues that are likely to dominate international relations for the foreseeable future have a critical Third World component. Economically, the exploding growth of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia and the steady development of major Third World powers such as India and Brazil will make them powerful forces in determining the shape and direction of the international economy.[54] And as the

[53] For a list of Third World countries with chemical arms, see *Newsweek*, September 19, 1988; for lists of Third World countries with ballistic missiles, see W. Seth Carus, "Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Policy Focus* 6 (June 1988), 1–9; and Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," *International Security* 9 (Winter 1984–85), 166–95. On nuclear proliferation, see Leonard S. Spector, with Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990).

[54] For more on the growing economic power of the Third World, see U.S. Department of Defense, *Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. 1988), 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world's dependence on petroleum increases in the coming years, the importance of the Persian Gulf will be enhanced.[55] The Third World also plays a major role in the global environment. There is increasing evidence that the burning of tropical forests contributes to the greenhouse effect, whereby the climate of the earth is substantially warmed. Dealing with this problem will require the cooperation of the Third World states in which the forests are located. In addition, problems such as overpopulation and drug trafficking are increasingly dependent on the Third World for resolution. Far from being marginal actors, the Third World is central to the course of international relations, and it will become even more so.

Omnibalancing and the Third World

Omnibalancing's explanation of why Third World leaders align as they do addresses the implications of the increasing importance of the Third World in two critical ways. First, understanding why Third World leaders make the alignment decisions they do enables other states to influence those decisions in order to encourage favorable alignments. Omnibalancing's emphasis on the need to meet the security concerns of Third World leaders in order to secure an alignment with them suggests approaches (for example, a greater emphasis on dealing with internal threats) that differ from those deriving from the focus of balance of power on protecting states from other states. If omnibalancing provides a better guide for policy than does balance of power, states that follow its precepts are more likely to secure the alignments they seek. And states that secure alignments with Third World leaders, at the very least, insulate themselves from the growing power and threats those leaders can pose.

The emphasis on the overriding need of Third World leaders to act in ways that will ensure their hold on power also has implications for a broad range of Third World behavior that goes beyond decisions on alignment. As seen in the cases of Egypt and Ethiopia, powerful forces are at work when Third World leaders take the risky and problematic step of breaking an alignment with one great power in order to align with another. This suggests that other decisions relating to both foreign and domestic policy should also be examined in terms of the Third World leader's drive to remain in power. Insights into questions concerning when Third World leaders will go to war or how to enlist their cooperation in solving global problems could well be gained by focusing

[55] United States Department of Energy, *Energy Security: A Report to the President of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the need of Third World leaders to ensure their survival in the face of both external and internal threats.[56]

The Third World is and will continue to be central to the study of international relations. For both theoretical and pragmatic reasons, understanding Third World foreign policies, including why Third World states align as they do, is essential for the broader understanding of world politics. In seeking such an understanding, it makes little sense to rely on a theory derived from a different historical experience that fails to address the reality of the Third World. That reality is dominated by the efforts of Third World leaders to do what they can, including seeking outside support, to survive in power. Ignorance of this simple truth prevents an understanding of the politics that determines the destiny of most of the world.

[56] For example, Richard Ned Lebow cites the political vulnerability of a leader as one of the key factors that can induce a policy of brinkmanship; Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 69–79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

THE SECURITY PROBLEMATIC OF THE THIRD WORLD

By MOHAMMED AYOOB

Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats*. College Park, Md.: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 1988, 308 pp.

Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, 432 pp.

Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds., *Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988, 295 pp.

Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1987, 228 pp.

I

TWO major events have shaped the political contours of the postwar world. The first is the awesome destructive capability of nuclear weaponry, which, as institutionalized in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), has prevented the outbreak of major war between the two dominant powers in the international system and, until recently, had frozen the strategic situation in Europe in a bipolar mold. The second is the entrance of unprecedented numbers of new members into the system of states as a result of the decolonization process—such that the newcomers now constitute a majority among the membership of that system. Although the latter event has had as far-reaching effects as the former on the workings of the international system, it has unfortunately not received attention in the literature on international relations commensurate with its actual and potential impact on international affairs.

Despite the moral dilemma related to the capacity of nuclear weapons for mass destruction, the existence of superpower nuclear arsenals with second strike capacities helped during the last four and a half decades to stabilize the global balance of power and make it relatively immune to transient shifts in the capabilities of the great powers. By contrast, the influx of the weak, intruder majority of Third World states into the

World Politics 43 (January 1991), 257–83

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international system[1] introduced a great deal of fluidity, and therefore instability, into that system. In strategic terms, this resulted primarily from the fact that there existed a large group of "floating" states with no alliance commitments, a group that was, in a sense, "up for grabs" by the highest bidder or the great power with the largest capability to help or harm it. Consequently, Third World regions became gray areas of the globe to which cold war energies, frustrated in Europe by the existence of MAD, were diverted. They became the primary site of the new "great game" played out by the United States and the Soviet Union.

As a result of the superpowers' involvement in the Third World, particularly in conflictual situations, a great deal of the international relations literature on the Third World has been written from the perspective of superpower competition for power and influence in the strategic regions of the developing world. And it followed that the security of Third World states and regions has been analyzed primarily from the point of view of American and/or Soviet interests and concerns.[2] Other than individual country studies, little has been written in a systematic fashion about the interaction of Third World states with the international system,[3] in particular, about their overriding concern with security in terms of reducing the vulnerabilities of their structures, institutions, and regimes.[4]

The books under review attempt to fill this gap in the existing literature on the subject. The volumes by Azar and Moon and by Thomas address the issue of the interaction of the Third World states with the international system in the light of these states' demonstrated weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Both books emphasize the search for security on the part of these states as the major determinant of their external and internal behavior. In their own contribution, Azar and Moon (chap. 4) em-

[1] For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?" *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (March 1989), 67–79.

[2] For example, see Michael Nacht, "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security," *Daedalus* 110 (Winter 1981), 1–22; and S. Neil MacFarlane, "The Soviet Conception of Regional Security," *World Politics* 37 (April 1985), 295–316.

[3] There are, however, significant exceptions to this rule and they include Robert I. Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Robert A. Mortimer, *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); and Jacqueline A. Braveboy-Wagner, *Interpreting the Third World: Politics, Economics, and Social Issues* (New York: Praeger, 1986).

[4] For a commendable effort at bringing together analyses of the security problems and policies of important Third World countries within some sort of a common framework, see Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., *Security Policies of Developing Countries* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982). See also Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phasize what they call the "software" side of the security problematic in the Third World as opposed to the traditional Western analyses of security, which tend to concentrate on the "hardware" side of the problem. They operationalize the concept of "security software" by disaggregating it into three primary components—legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity—and attempting, in the light of these variables, to formulate a typology of Third World states based upon eight clusters. These in turn are dependent upon the different ways in which the three dimensions of state security, namely, threats (security environment), hardware (capabilities), and software, interact in the case of particular states.

Thomas also attempts to broaden the scope of the discussion of Third World security but in directions somewhat different from those chosen by Azar and Moon. In her own words:

> A basic theme running through the book is that security in the context of the Third World states does not simply refer to the military dimension, as is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state's existence which are already taken care of in the more-developed states, especially those of the West. . . . [F]or example, the search for the internal security of the state through nation-building, the search for secure systems of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for security through nuclear weapons. (p. 1)

This all-inclusive definition of security, while valuable as an antidote to the traditional military-oriented definition of the term, nevertheless runs the risk of making the concept so elastic as to detract seriously from its utility as an analytical tool.

For this reason it is preferable to define security in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten, or have the potential, to bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally. According to this definition, the more a state or regime falls toward the invulnerable end of the vulnerable-invulnerable continuum, the more secure it is. This is a definition that assumes the basic primacy of political variables in determining the degree of security that states and regimes enjoy. Different types of vulnerability, including those of the economic and ecological varieties, become integral components of this definition of security only if and when they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival. In other words, debt burdens, or even famines, do not become part of the security calculus for the purpose of this definition unless they threaten to have political outcomes that affect the survivability of states (in either the territorial or the institutional sense or both) or of governing elites within those states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The volume edited by Litwak and Wells is in its orientation the most traditional of the four books under review, in that it emphasizes the East-West dimension of security problems in the Third World. Nevertheless, it also acknowledges the "turbulent nature of the target environment itself" and the fact that "regional conflict[s] create the preconditions for outside power intervention and involvement" (p. xi). Furthermore, the editors do not hesitate to criticize the superpowers, who, they charge, "proclaim their sensitivities to the nuances of regional politics" but tend "to view Third World developments as a function of East-West competition" (p. xii). Overall, the volume attempts to juxtapose the geopolitical (East-West) and regionalist approaches to the study of security in the Third World. The two-part organization of the book reflects this approach. The first part, consisting of four chapters, is devoted to the perceptions and policies of the developed states, and the second, comprising seven chapters, deals with issues of superpower competition in the Third World on a region-by-region basis.

The fourth and last book under review, Ball's study of security and economy in the Third World, takes a rather different approach by trying to explore the relationship between what appear to be the two most important concerns of Third World policymakers—security and development. Ball poses and attempts to answer the query: "Does expenditure in the security sector of Third World countries hinder their development, or does it, as some analysts have suggested, promote the development process?" (p. xiii). More specifically, according to Ball, the volume "seeks to incorporate the security sector into the debate on the development process in the Third World" (p. xxv). This very important, though relatively neglected, field of inquiry has a great bearing upon the question of how Third World governments perceive and prioritize their objectives and in what fashion they allocate resources to the two sectors that impinge directly on the legitimacy of both states and regimes in the Third World.

Together the four volumes—by attempting to broaden the definition of security, by opening up relatively new and neglected areas of enquiry, and by pointing toward fresh directions for research—raise some very important issues in the field of Third World security studies. These are issues that, in turn, need to be addressed from both historical and comparative perspectives, as follows: (1) How does the concept of security as applied to the Third World context differ from its traditional use in the international relations literature? (2) What are the factors that inhere within Third World states that can help explain this difference? (3) In what ways does the interaction of Third World states with the interna-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional system affect the security of the former? (4) Are there specific factors related to technology in the late twentieth century that affect the security of Third World states in ways that are unique to the developing countries? (5) What is the relationship between the security and developmental concerns of Third World states, and how does the interaction between these two preoccupations of Third World state elites affect the levels of legitimacy enjoyed by Third World states and regimes?

II

The term *security* as it has been traditionally used in international relations literature is based on two major assumptions: one, that threats to a state's security principally arise from outside its borders, and two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually need a military response if the security of the target state is to be preserved. These assumptions were best summed up in Walter Lippmann's celebrated statement that "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."[5] Lippmann's definition, according to Arnold Wolfers, "implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in accord with the common usage of the term."[6]

Even those scholars who have differed from this starkly state-centered realist perspective and focused on *international* rather than *national* security have been primarily concerned with reconciling national security (in terms of reducing external threats to the security of a state, especially of a major power) with systemic security concerns. They have taken their philosophical cue from authors like Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, who have argued, to quote Wight, that

> if there is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a collective interest, and security acquires a broad meaning: it can be enjoyed or pursued in common.[7]

Indeed, the earliest of the twentieth-century proponents of international security—the "idealists" of the first three decades[8]—refused to distin-

[5] Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), 51.

[6] Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 150.

[7] Wight, "Western Values in International Relations," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), 103.

[8] For a representative sample of idealist thought, see Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 4th ed. (1909; New York: Putnam's, 1913).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guish the security of the parts from that of the system as a whole. The post–Second World War breed of system-centered scholars has been more discriminating than its predecessors. They have argued from the assumption that the various segments of the international system are interlinked to such an extent that their security and welfare are dependent upon each other. While much of the initial impetus for this line of argument came from the awesome concentration of nuclear weaponry in the hands of the two superpowers and the periodic crises in their relations from the Berlin blockade of 1948 to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the economic problems that the leading Western industrialized states faced from the early 1970s, including the two oil shocks of 1973–74 and 1978–79, led to the crystallization of the "interdependence" argument.[9]

What is most interesting for our purpose is that both these dominant strands of security thinking (in their many variations) defined the concept of security in external or outward-directed terms, that is, as external to the commonly accepted unit of analysis in international relations: the state. This definition and the process by which it was reached were understandable because both reflected a particular trajectory of historical development that could be traced back at least to the Peace of Westphalia if not earlier. Between 1648 (to use it as a symbolic date) and 1945 the evolution of the European system of states and its interaction with the domestic political processes of state building and national consolidation within the major European powers led to the legitimation both of the system and of the individual participants (at least of those twenty-five or so that survived the processes of war and change in the European system and emerged as modern states by 1900). These two trends—of interaction among sovereign states and of greater identification of individuals with their respective states—strengthened each other and in doing so firmly laid the foundations of the intellectual tradition in which, at least in terms of the literature on diplomatic history and international relations, security became synonymous with the protection of a state's vital interests and core values from external threats.

Developments since 1945 strengthened the traditional Western notions about security. In dividing the Western world (that is, Europe and its offshoots) into two halves and in stabilizing that division until recently by means of a mutual balance of terror, the cold war (and its later manifestation, detente) froze the predominant Western connotation of security in a bipolar mold. The concept of alliance security was, therefore, superimposed on the concept of state security, while its essential, exter-

[9] For example, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nally directed thrust remained unchanged. Moreover, by making the security of major industrial states of Europe and North America the central concern of the security of the international system as a whole, the dominant strand in Western strategic thinking increasingly obliterated even the distinction between the realist (state-centric) and idealist (system-centric) approaches to the study of international security.

The application of this historically conditioned definition of the concept of security to the analysis of Third World situations has, however, created major conceptual problems. This is so because the three major characteristics of the concept of state security as developed in the Western literature on international relations—namely, its external orientation, its strong linkage with systemic security, and its binding ties with the security of the two major alliance blocs—are, if not totally absent, at lest thoroughly diluted in the Third World. Thus, the explanatory power of the concept, as traditionally defined, is vastly reduced when applied to Third World contexts.

The first and, in a sense, the fundamental attribute of the Western concept of security (in that it is a corollary of the doctrine of state sovereignty in its pure and pristine form) is external directedness. But it is clear that in the Third World, despite the rhetoric of many of its leaders, the sense of insecurity from which states suffer emanates to a substantial degree from within their boundaries rather than from outside. This is borne out by, among other studies, the findings of a recent project on the security perceptions of leaders of Southeast Asian states. That study presents the conclusion that "most Southeast Asian leaderships, like their counterparts in the rest of the Third World, are preoccupied primarily with internal threats to the security of their state structures and to the regimes themselves."[10] While this does not mean that external threats are nonexistent, it does imply that where external threats do exist they often attain saliency primarily because of the insecurities and conflicts that abound within Third World states. Furthermore, it can be argued that these internal conflicts and insecurities frequently get transformed into interstate conflicts because of their spillover effects into neighboring states that often suffer from similar domestic insecurities. Several contributions to the Azar-Moon volume, particularly those by Barry Buzan (chap. 2) and by the editors (chaps. 1 and 4), as well as the second chapter of Thomas's book, which deals with nation building and the search for security, highlight this internal dimension of the Third World states'

[10] Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Exploring General Propositions," in Ayoob and Samudavanija, eds., *Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 256.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security problems and its capacity to become enmeshed in and, not infrequently, to generate interstate conflict.

The Third World's weak linkage with the systemic security agenda further circumscribes the utility of the traditional concept of security in explaining the problem (or problems) of security that Third World states face. This reflects the remarkable difference between the respective relationships of the security concerns of the Third World states, on the one hand, and those of the developed countries, on the other, to the security and stability of the international system as a whole. The Third World's relative unimportance to the central strategic balance is, paradoxically, borne out by the fact that

> during the postwar era, the Third World has been a principal arena of East-West rivalry. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East to Southern Africa to Central America, the superpowers have found themselves on opposing sides of regional conflicts, locked in a global competition for influence. (Litwak and Wells, ix)

The very fact that the superpowers chose the Third World as the arena in which they could afford to be "locked in a global competition for influence" in the thermonuclear age demonstrates the low priority they attached to gains and losses in the Third World and the vast distance that separated their Third World concerns from their vital interests, which were, and are, protected by the nuclear balance of terror. It is no wonder then that conflicts have proliferated in the Third World, while the industrial and strategic heartland of the globe has been free of major interstate conflict since the end of the Second World War. Systemic security has therefore often contributed to insecurity in the Third World.

The close linkage between alliance security and state security that has been such a prominent feature of the postwar political landscape in Europe has been conspicuous by its absence in the Third World. While several Third World states have been allied with one or the other superpower, such alliances have been either fluid and temporary (as in the case of Egypt and Somalia) or inadequate deterrents to regional conflicts involving superpower allies (for example, Vietnam and Iraq) or incapable of preventing the dismemberment of at least one aligned state (Pakistan). The nature of alliances and of superpower commitments to their allies in the Third World are therefore vastly different from the character of alliances and of alliance commitments in the developed world. Alliance security, in contrast to the postwar situation in Europe, is not synonymous with, or even inextricably tied to, the security of even the most overtly aligned states in the Third World.[11]

[11] Israel is the only exception to this rule because of the intensity of one superpower's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For all the three dimensions of the traditional definition of security—its external orientation, links with systemic security, and the correspondence with alliance security—the situation in the Third World is radically different from that prevailing at the heart of the global strategic system, which includes the two superpowers, Europe and its offshoots, and Japan. The security of Third World states therefore needs to be looked at from a perspective that differs somewhat from the one that is prevalent in the Western literature on international relations.

III

This leads us to our next question: Are there any factors that inhere within Third World states that can help explain this difference in the Third World state's security problematic as compared with the paradigm of security that is dominant in the international relations and strategic studies literature?[12] The principal problem that seems to distort a great deal of Western analysis of the security of Third World states is the tendency to compare states (that is, industrialized states with developing ones) that are unlike each other in many respects. This is especially so in relation to the crucial variable of state making, where the commonality is simply that both are in formal possession of juridical statehood. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of Third World states eventually approximating more closely the ideal type of the modern industrialized state (which is the reference point of most security analysts), given adequate time to complete the prerequisite twin processes of state making and nation building.

Time is, therefore, the crucial variable in explaining the difference in the security concerns of the two sets of states. Most security analysts tend to gloss over the fact that today's modern states—which are internally relatively cohesive, possess rational bureaucratic structures as well as a good deal of "infrastructural power,"[13] and are responsible to their peo-

commitment to its security, as defined largely by Israel itself. This, in turn, is related to the fact that Israel is a domestic political issue in the United States and not merely a foreign policy concern. Moreover, Israel, in terms of its ideological origins, the organization of its society and polity, the composition of its elite, and its links with strong and important European and American constituencies is not a Third World state. In other words, Israel may be physically located *in* the Third World but, in terms of the defining characteristics of the Israeli state, is not *of* the Third World. For details of the nature and evolution of the special relationship between the United States and Israel, see Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1981).

[12] For a critique of the application (or misapplication) of the strategic studies paradigm to the Third World, see Bahgat Korany, "Strategic Studies and the Third World: A Critical Evaluation," *International Social Science Journal*, no. 110 (1986), 547–62.

[13] Michael Mann has used the term *infrastructural power* to denote "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ple as well as responsive to the demands of their populations—were not created overnight. They went through a long period of gestation (during which most embryonic and also some not-so-embryonic states were aborted) before they acquired the functional capacities as well as the legitimacy they have today in the eyes of the populace that they encompass territorially and over which they preside institutionally.

It is worth noting in this context the testimony of two leading scholars of state making in Europe. According to Joseph Strayer:

> While the sovereign state of 1300 was stronger than any competing political form, it was still not very strong. . . . It took four to five centuries for European states to remedy their administrative deficiencies, and to bring lukewarm loyalty to the white heat of nationalism.[14]

Charles Tilly makes the same point even more forcefully:

> The seventeenth and eighteenth century focus [of his edited volume] has us dealing with periods in which, for most of Europe, both the primacy and the ultimate form of the state were much in doubt. Perhaps that is the most important historical insight the book has to offer: as seen from 1600 or so, the development of the state was very contingent; many aspiring states crumpled and fell along the way.[15]

Most European political entities had to endure the precarious balance between success and failure for centuries before their statehood was assured; during that time their state makers were constantly preoccupied with the problem of consolidating their power and control *within* the territories they aspired to dominate. Seen in light of the European historical experience, then, the magnitude of the internal security problems faced by the new states of the Third World today is not all that astounding. These problems assume inflated dimensions only when compared with the "finished" products in Western Europe and North America. And, indeed, some of those, despite the centuries available to them, have yet to establish their unconditional legitimacy with some, and sometimes significant, segments of their populations. (Witness Northern Ireland, Quebec, and the Basque country, to mention only a few.)

Recent events have clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Union, despite its claim to be the successor state to tsarist Russia with its long history of statehood, does not even come close to the model of the cohe-

---

the realm"; Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 113.

[14] Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 23, 57.

[15] Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sive nation-state or even of a multinational federation whose institutional and territorial legitimacy is accepted by the overwhelming majority of its diverse ethnic and national groups. The same applies to the states in the Balkans, created out of the debris of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, which generally fall midway between the model of the relatively cohesive nation-states of Western Europe and the postcolonial multiethnic, polyglot states of Asia and Africa. Yugoslavia, the most extreme example in the Balkans, betrays a classic Third World syndrome in terms of interethnic antagonism and intrastate insecurity. One suspects that here, again, the time factor, coupled with the way these states were brought into being as a result of decisions largely taken by major external powers, provides the most fruitful explanation for the predicament faced by the Balkan states.[16]

Barry Buzan's distinction between "strong" and "weak" states, which accords primary explanatory power to what he calls "the variable of sociopolitical cohesiveness" (Azar and Moon, 18), is related in important ways to this difference in the time available to different categories of states to complete the twin processes of state making and nation building. This comes through clearly in his conclusion: "Building stronger states is virtually the only way in which the vicious circle of unstable states and an unstable security environment can be broken" (Azar and Moon, 40). Similarly, the emphasis placed by Azar and Moon (chap. 4) on the "software" side of national security in the Third World is an acknowledgment on their part that not enough time has been available to state makers in these countries to develop the intangible ingredients of security, including the identification of the people with the state (legitimacy) and of people with each other (integration). It is also an acknowledgment of the fact that in the absence of these intangibles, the state elites in the

[16] For an insightful analysis of state making and nation building in the Balkans, see Najdan Pasic, "Varieties of Nation-Building in the Balkans and among the Southern Slavs," in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Building States and Nations* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973), 2:117–41. Pasic refers to the Balkan experience as the "missing link" and "a transition between the way nations were formed in Europe at the beginning of the present era and the nation-building now going on in the developing countries" (p. 118). Pasic also makes another interesting comparison between the way the Balkan states were carved out and spheres of influence established among them and the way many Third World states were formed as a result of intraimperial understandings:

> From the Holy Alliance and the Congress of Berlin to the Yalta Conference, where spheres of influence in the Balkans were calculated in percentages, the Balkan peoples had their destinies carved out by others. The parceling out of political and national structures in the Balkans was in a substantial part the product of such external forces. In this respect, the historical circumstances surrounding nation-building in the Balkans bear a close resemblance to those in which nations and independent national states have taken shape in other parts of the economically underdeveloped world. (p. 130)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third World are bound to take frequent recourse to the "hardware" instruments of security, namely, military force, to meet what are essentially political challenges from disaffected groups within their populations.

It should be noted here that the Latin American case in terms of the availability of time for purposes of state building appears to be somewhat different from that of the rest of the Third World because the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in South America acquired political independence over a hundred years before the process of decolonization began in earnest in Asia. For a number of reasons, however, their processes of state making and nation building remained retarded. Prominent among these was the importation, along with Spanish and Portuguese colonists, of the economic and political culture of preindustrial Iberia, which led to the fossilization of Latin American political development. As Skidmore and Smith have pointed out, "However much Latin America struggled, it was to remain an extension . . . of the Europe that had sailed west in the fifteenth century."[17]

The era of industrial society (in terms of its demonstration effect rather than its realization) caught up with Latin America about the same time that it did with much of Asia, if not Africa. (It needs to be pointed out here that the model of the industrial society includes as its essential elements a socially mobile population, forming part of a society that is culturally relatively homogeneous, that is encompassed within a legitimate state structure with adequate "infrastructural power," and that is presided over by a representative government.) While the intervening century may have provided Latin America the time to consolidate state boundaries, its social and political structures retarded other aspects of state making, above all those of societal penetration and the achievement of political legitimacy both for state institutions and for ruling elites. Thus, the acquisition of formal political independence relatively early in the game gave Latin American states only marginal advantages over their Asian counterparts. In any case, a head start of a little over a century, especially in the absence of other elements conducive to state and nation building, was not much in relation to the length of time it took Western European states to complete their process of state making.[18] It

[17] Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 16.

[18] For interesting analyses of the Latin American case, see Robert E. Scott, "Nation-Building in Latin America," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), 73–83; and Howard J. Wiarda, "Social Change, Political Development and the Latin American Tradition," in Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America*, 2d rev. ed. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 3–25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is no wonder, therefore, that state elites in Latin America continue to put as much emphasis on the "hardware" instruments of internal security as do their counterparts in other parts of the Third World.[19]

Overall, the Azar-Moon analysis cooroborates the thesis that the study of the European experience of state making is very relevant to the explanation of the current security predicament of states in the Third World. This European experience, in Tilly's words,

> cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor. . . . The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state-building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities. . . . Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of strong states.[20]

The applicability of this description to the present reality within most Third World states is too uncanny to be purely coincidental.

While this similarity between the early European and current Third World experiences of state making provides part of the explanation for the internal security problems faced by Third World states, the difference in the pace of state making and nation building and the telescoping of these two processes into a combined and drastically shortened process in the case of the Third World provides the rest of the explanation. This is the result of the fact that unlike the centuries available to most European (especially West European) state makers to complete their process of state making, today's Third World state makers are under tremendous pressure to complete this extremely complicated and costly process in only three or four decades rather than three or four centuries. As a result, the process of "primitive central state power accumulation"[21] has to be speeded up tremendously. The various phases of state and nation

[19] Alain Rouquie comes close to tackling this question while attempting to provide explanations for the military's involvement in Latin American politics, but he inexplicably shies away from addressing it directly in his otherwise knowledgeable treatise *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

[20] Tilly (fn. 15), 71. This conclusion is also borne out by the historical evidence presented by Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. Organski in their article "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 4 (1981), 901–10. They argue that "instead of indicating political decay, violence in these [new] states is an integral part of the process of the accumulation of power by the national state apparatus" (p. 909).

[21] "Many of the new states of today are engaged in struggles whose logic is similar to that of the European period of primitive central state power accumulation"; Cohen, Brown, and Organski (fn. 20), 902.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

building, which were undertaken and completed by and large sequentially (although with significant degrees of overlap between the phases)[22] and without any significant amount of premeditation in the case of early modern Europe, have to be undertaken and completed deliberately and simultaneously within a time-bound framework of ridiculously short duration.

This drastic shortening of the time frame and the telescoping of the various phases of state making, combined with the initially low level of state power from which state making takes place,[23] provide the primary explanation for the sharp internal challenges to the centralizing state structures in the developing countries and for the high level of violence endemic in the current phase of state making in the Third World. These challenges—whether posed in the garb of ethnicity or class or a combination of the two—and the violent responses to them are functions of the low level of legitimacy enjoyed by most Third World states within their societies; they form the core of the security problems facing these states and their regimes. Several contributions to the Azar-Moon volume as well as the second chapter of Thomas's book refer to the connection between low level of legitimacy and internal security problems in Third World states. But they do not adequately probe these linkages and do not delve into root causes that are embedded in the process of state making in the Third World. This is an area that can prove to be very fruitful in terms of further research on the interconnections between the factor of time, the process of state making, and the problem of insecurity in the countries and regions of the Third World.

IV

The security problems of Third World states are exacerbated by the fact that state making in the Third World does not take place in an interna-

[22] Stein Rokkan, in a very incisive essay in which he attempted to construct a paradigm explaining the various dimensions of state formation and nation building in Europe, provided four sequential phases over which these twin processes took place and termed them penetration, standardization, participation, and redistribution. For details, see Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe," in Tilly (fn. 15), esp. 572–74. Rokkan analyzed the internal variations in the patterns of nation-state building in Europe and concluded that, despite these differences within the European experience, "what is important is that the Western nation-states were given a chance to solve some of the worst problems of state-building before they had to face the ordeal of mass politics" (p. 598).

[23] This point is made by Cohen, Brown, and Organski (fn. 20), who argue that "the extent to which an expansion of state power will generate collective violence depends on the level of state power prior to that expansion ... the lower the initial *level* of state power, the stronger the relationship between the *rate* of state expansion and collective violence" (p. 905).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional vacuum. While the internal or intrastate dimension of state making may be the primary preoccupation of state elites in the Third World, the impact of international forces, whether military, political, economic, or technological, makes a substantial and substantive difference to the fortunes of the state-making enterprise and to the larger security problematic of Third World states. This is particularly so in the contemporary era when the technologies of communication and destruction link the various parts of the world in a way that is qualitatively different from the situation prevailing in any previous historical epoch.

Moreover, as a result of the colonial experience of most Third World societies, external factors have traditionally had a predominant influence in shaping their polities and, therefore, their security environments. In fact, it would not be wrong to say that many Third World states, particularly in Africa and the Middle East but also elsewhere in Asia, emerged into the postcolonial era as sovereign entities with recognized boundaries only because they had been consolidated into separate colonial protostates by the European imperial powers in the nineteenth century.[24]

This has had two major consequences for both the internal and the external security of Third World states. First, decisions taken by colonial powers for reasons of administrative convenience or intraimperial tradeoff have been largely responsible for the ethnic mix inherited by many postcolonial states as well as for the creation of new communal identities in some instances. The colonial inheritance thus fundamentally determined the internal cohesiveness of most Third World states during their initial and crucial stages of state building and, therefore, the intensity of internal challenges to their boundaries and institutions.[25] Second, decisions taken by colonial powers have also been responsible for creating

[24] There is a growing literature on this subject, particularly in relation to Africa. A recent, perceptive article on the creation of colonial protostates in Africa is Jeffrey Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," *International Organization* 43 (Autumn 1989), 673–92. For the creation of protostates in the guise of mandates in the Middle East, see Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); and for the impact of the European division of Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire on international and regional security, see David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1989).

[25] For an insightful analysis of the colonial inheritance and its impact on Third World "stateness," see Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). See also Crawford Young, "The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Sheldon Gellar, "State-Building and Nation-Building in West Africa," in Eisenstadt and Rokkan (fn. 16), 2:384–426. For examples of the creation of "traditional" authority structures as well as the evolution of new communal identities during colonial rule, see Migdal (pp. 97–141); and Ulf Himmelstrand, " 'Tribalism,' Regionalism, Nationalism, and Secession in Nigeria," in Eisenstadt and Rokkan (pp. 427–67).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many postcolonial interstate conflicts: (1) by dividing ethnic groups into more than one state and thereby igniting the embers of irredentism, as in the Horn of Africa; (2) by denying self-determination to certain ethnic groups like the Kurds, who possibly qualified for statehood better than many that were granted that status; and (3) by leaving behind extremely messy situations, as in Palestine and in Kashmir, that have contributed tremendously to regional tensions and conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia, respectively, during the last four decades.

Equally important, in terms of the feelings of insecurity that are very widespread among Third World state elites, is the legacy of the colonial entities' individual and collective weakness and vulnerability in relation to the metropolitan centers. This sense of insecurity has been transferred after decolonization to the sphere of the Third World's relationship with the industrialized states in general and with the superpowers in particular and has largely become a function of the glaring disparities in economic, technological, and military power between the developed states on the one hand and the Third World on the other.[26] It has been further exacerbated by the division of the globe into a relatively secure and conflict-free zone, populated by European and North American states plus Japan, and the Third World, where conflict is endemic. As Ball has pointed out, "All interstate wars since the end of World War II have taken place in the Third World, although there have been industrialized country participants in some of these conflicts" (p. 33).[27] In fact, some analysts have argued that conflict in the Third World has until recently been encouraged by superpower policies largely aimed at testing each other's political will and power projection capabilities in those areas of the globe that are not of vital concern to either superpower and, therefore, do not threaten the maintenance of the central strategic balance.[28]

This de facto division of the globe, roughly corresponding to the core-

[26] It is worth pointing out in this context that Krasner's (fn. 3) assumption that "political weakness and vulnerability are fundamental sources of Third World behavior" (p. 3) is substantially correct. However, his characterization of the consequent North-South relationship as "structural conflict" is, like its obverse, dependency theory, too extreme, simplistic, and one-dimensional in nature; it does not do justice to the much more complex reality of that relationship.

[27] The high incidence of violent conflict in the Third World is borne out by a number of studies, including Mark Zacker, *International Conflicts and Collective Security* (New York: Praeger, 1979); and Nazli Choucri, *Population and Conflict: New Dimensions of Population Dynamics*, Policy Development Studies No. 8 (United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1983). For an earlier, pioneering study of the subject, see Istvan Kende, "Twenty-five Years of Local Wars," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 1 (1971), 5–22.

[28] This point was best made by Sisir Gupta two decades ago; Gupta, "Great Power Relations and the Third World," in Carsten Holbraad, ed., *Super Powers and World Order* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971), 105–39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

periphery dichotomy of the world system theorists,[29] allows for the exportation of the developed world's conflicts to the Third World, while effectively insulating the "core" of the international system from the conflicts and instabilities prevalent in the Third World. As a result, it enhances the insecurity of Third World state elites who suffer from a feeling of dual impotence. First, they are unable to prevent superpower rivalries and conflicts from penetrating their polities and regions, and second, they are equally unable to affect, except marginally and in selected cases, the global political and military equation between the two superpowers and their respective alliances. This conclusion is borne out by even a casual reading of the Litwak-Wells volume and is corroborated by Thomas's statement that "the outlook for the Third World remains bleak. While it is very far from true to suggest that everything that happens to them is a result of external factors, it is fallacious to believe that indigeneous factors play the most influential role most of the time" (p. 199).

All this does not mean, however, that external threats of conflict and intervention in relation to Third World states do not also arise from within their regions, that is, from other Third World states. Obviously, Third World regions do possess autonomous dynamics of conflict and cooperation. In fact, the predominant reality of these regional dynamics is the great propensity for conflict that inheres within them. As the various contributions to the Litwak-Wells volume demonstrate, there are reasons intrinsic to Third World regions, for example, historical mistrust, territorial disputes, ethnic overlap, and hegemonic ambitions, that provide much of the raw material for interstate conflict in the Third World. Two points are worth noting in this context, however. First, many of these intrinsic reasons for intra–Third World conflict are related to, if not the products of, external domination during the colonial era. Second, the permissive attitude on the part of the dominant global powers toward conflict in the Third World promotes and exacerbates interstate violence in the gray areas of the globe.

V

One major factor that has increased the level of violence in the developing world as well as the propensity of Third World states to indulge in

[29] For details of the core-periphery dichotomy, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2 (1971), 81–117; and the various works of Immanuel Wallerstein.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interstate conflict is the transfer of modern weapons and weapons technology from the industrialized countries to various parts of the Third World. According to one specialist on the arms trade, "These transfers have resulted in a significant shift in military resources from the industrialised 'North' to the underdeveloped 'South,' producing new configurations of power and contributing to the intensity and duration of regional conflicts."[30] Certainly, weapons are mainly of instrumental value and are not in themselves the primary cause of war; but relatively sophisticated weapon systems that provide a Third World state with temporary technological superiority over a regional rival are very often a crucial factor in the calculation of decision makers to escalate disputes to a point where war becomes a distinct possibility. To cite just one instance: Pakistan's decision to go to war against India in 1965 with the objective of changing the status quo in Kashmir was based in part on the assessment that the former's edge in sophisticated weapons over the latter was likely to be eroded over the next few years.[31]

Sophisticated weapons acquired at great cost to provide greater security can often increase prospects of conflict and, therefore, add to the insecurity of Third World states.[32] Andrew Ross's contribution to the Azar-Moon volume (chap. 7) concentrates on "the various forms of arms acquisition options available to Third World countries and the impact of alternative acquisition strategies upon national security" (p. 154) and makes the point sharply that "the acquisition of military power may itself erode rather than enhance security" (p. 153). As a result of the combination of various factors (including the escalation in military technology, the superpowers' strategy to use arms transfers as political instruments to buy the loyalties of Third World clients, the leading arms exporters' interest in using arms sales as a major booster for their economies, and the inability of even the most technologically advanced Third World states independently to manufacture more than a fraction of the sophisticated weapons they need or desire to possess), "the Third World's de-

[30] Michael T. Klare, "The Arms Trade: Changing Patterns in the 1980s," *Third World Quarterly* 9 (October 1987), 1257.

[31] Gowher Rizvi, "The Rivalry between India and Pakistan," in Barry Buzan et al., *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), 107–8.

[32] The availability of large surplus stocks of modern weaponry combined with cold war motivations on the part of superpower suppliers has contributed to regional arms races and to the instability of regional balances, which must constantly be restabilized at higher levels of technological sophistication. As Raju Thomas has pointed out in the case of South Asia, "The net result was that both India and Pakistan acquired substantially more arms than they otherwise would have thus producing less regional security for both states at a much higher price"; Thomas, "Strategies of Recipient Autonomy: The Case of India," in Kwang-Il Baek, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon, eds., *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries: Supplier Control or Recepient Autonomy?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 188.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendence upon arms imports from the advanced industrial countries" has become "the defining characteristic of post-colonial North-South military relations" (Ross, in Azar and Moon, 156).

The 1980s saw an appreciable increase in the capacity of certain Third World states, like India and Brazil, to produce, and even export, indigenous arms. There was also a perceptible decline in the value of arms deliveries to the Third World during most of the 1980s as a result of the fall in the price of oil, which drastically reduced the purchasing capacity of major oil-exporting countries that had been among the leading acquirers of sophisticated weaponry, and of the saturation of many Third World markets. However, these two phenomena mask a different, and growing, form of weapons transfer from developed to developing countries: the transfer of sophisticated arms production technology, now an integral part of the international arms trade.[33] The transfer of such technology has two major consequences. On the one hand, as conventional wisdom holds, given both the high rate at which weapons and weapons technologies become obsolete in the late twentieth century and the inability of Third World countries to keep up with the latest technologies, the transfer of weapons technology amounts to nothing more than the substitution of one form of dependence for another. Indeed, it might even increase the level of dependency. On the other hand, as Ross has argued in the Azar-Moon volume,

> The nature of military dependence undergoes a subtle but potentially profound transformation as developing countries turn from arms imports to arms production. . . . A static dependence relationship is inevitable when a country relies upon foreign arms suppliers. But when arms production programmes are initiated, and military production technology rather than arms are imported, a more dynamic relationship is established, one that has an inherent potential for the reduction, if not elimination, of military dependence. (pp. 169–70)[34]

The political autonomy of Third World arms recipients was further enhanced during the 1980s by the appreciable increase in the number of arms suppliers and the increasingly intense competition among them, the decline in the market share of the superpower suppliers, and the increasing transformation of the nature of the arms market from a seller's to a

[33] For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Michael T. Klare, "The Unnoticed Arms Trade: Exports of Conventional Arms-Making Technology," *International Security* 8 (Fall 1983), 68–90.

[34] Ross's contention is borne out by Raju Thomas's study (fn. 32) of Indian weapons procurement and production policy, which, according to its author, attempts "to strike an optimum balance among the three basic strategies of indigeneous production, licensed production and overseas purchases" (p. 199).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

buyer's market. However, this should not lead us to conclude that commercial calculations alone dictate the flow of arms supply or of weapons technology from the industrialized countries to the Third World. There are a number of political and strategic considerations, many of them connected with superpower global rivalries and with the myriad of political and strategic links between the superpowers on the one hand and the leading nonsuperpower arms suppliers on the other, that have a major bearing on the pattern of arms trade and even more on the transfer of sophisticated weapons technology to Third World recipients.[35]

Either way, the net effect on the overall security of the Third World can turn out to be negative. If the transfer of weapons technology increases the dependence of Third World states on major industrial powers, then the feeling of vulnerability and insecurity among the elites of Third World states is intensified. However, any reduction in such dependence, consequent upon the transfer of technology and the diversification of sources of arms supply, increases the autonomy of decision making in relation to war and peace as far as the more developed Third World countries are concerned, and it removes important international constraints on their conflictual behavior. Transfer of weapons technology also strengthens their war-fighting capacity by making them relatively independent of the original suppliers for spare parts and ammunition and by increasing the sophistication of the technology that their war machines can command indigenously, at least in the short run. As a result, wars in the Third World, especially among major regional actors, can now be started without the protagonists being overly concerned about supplier reactions, can be sustained for longer periods of time, and can be far more costly in human and material terms than they were in the past decades.

Nuclear proliferation in the Third World is a subset of the problems connected with the transfer of sophisticated weapons technology. It is, however, the most dramatic among this set of problems. As the only Third World security issue that ties Third World security concerns directly to those of global security, it is the only one in which the great powers have taken direct and immediate interest. They have attempted to institutionalize international controls on Third World behavior through the medium of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, as Thomas has pointed out, "From the point of view of Third World states (even those that have joined the NPT), the nuclear non-proliferation regime in its present form institutionalises inequality between

[35] For details of the latter argument, see Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, Aid, and the Superpowers," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (Summer 1988), 1044–66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states" (p. 141). This has led to a certain amount of tension between the members of the nuclear club, especially the superpowers, and the have-nots in the nuclear arena. Such leading members of the latter group as India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa have, in fact, attempted to circumvent the controls imposed by the nuclear club in order to expand their actual or potential nuclear capabilities. These capabilities, all shrouded in policies of deliberate ambiguity, include a substantial arsenal of small nuclear weapons (Israel), a "peaceful" underground nuclear explosion coupled with an increasingly sophisticated delivery capability (India), a dual-track effort to manufacture nuclear warheads by uranium enrichment and/or plutonium reprocessing (Pakistan), and an atmospheric explosion that seemed suspiciously akin to an atomic test (South Africa).[36]

Such unacknowledged but nonetheless credible instances of nuclear proliferation pose problems not merely for the security of Third World states and regions but for the security of the international system as a whole. Moreover, the problems are not confined to the largely abstract ones of managing a world with a dozen or so nuclear powers. The practical problems of proliferation are far more acute because the four de facto nuclear powers mentioned above are all involved in regional conflicts and confrontations that could become overtly nuclear[37] and consequently lead to the direct involvement of one or both of the superpowers in the disputes.

It is, however, impossible to put the genie of nuclear proliferation back into the bottle, especially because possession of nuclear weapons has become the hallmark of enhanced status within the international system. The Chinese example has very sharply driven home this lesson to Third World ruling elites, in particular those of the larger and regionally powerful states. In light of the Chinese experience, no Third World leadership aspiring to graduate to the status of a major, or even moderately influential, actor in the international system can feel comfortable about giving up its nuclear option. This factor of prestige, combined with genuine security concerns on the part of several Third World states facing

[36] For overviews of the four countries' nuclear capabilities, see, for Israel, Peter Pry, *Israel's Nuclear Arsenal* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); for India and Pakistan, Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security, *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988); and for South Africa, Michele A. Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell, "South Africa's Bomb: A Military Option?" *Orbis* 32 (Summer 1988), 385–401.

[37] For a prospective scenario on the Indian subcontinent, see Leonard S. Spector, "India-Pakistan War: It Could Be Nuclear," *New York Times*, June 7, 1990, p. A23. For the Middle East, where a situation of de facto nuclear monopoly prevails, see Helena Cobban, "Israel's Nuclear Game: The U.S. Stake," *World Policy Journal* 5 (Summer 1988), 415–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

potential anatagonists that are nuclear or near-nuclear powers, has created a situation in which the security of a number of leading Third World states has become intertwined with the issue of nuclear proliferation. While all major Third World states on the nuclear threshold continue to abide by a policy of deliberate ambiguity for the moment, external or domestic stimuli could change this situation with dramatic suddenness in individual countries, thereby setting off chain reactions that may be difficult to control.

VI

As security cannot be bought cheaply in the late twentieth century, many Third World states spend substantial proportions of their relatively meager resources on the security sector.[38] While expenditure on costly weapon systems and military technologies is a part of security expenditure, Ball has demonstrated that it is not the major part in the case of the overwhelming number of Third World states, which "appear to spend a very high proportion of their security budgets on operating costs, particularly salaries and emoluments for the troops" (p. 393). Appendix 1 of Ball's book (pp. 396–402) examines the evolution of operating costs as a percentage of total security expenditure of twenty selected Third World countries for the years 1951–79 and finds that in all cases except one (Iran under the Shah) operating costs have clearly dominated in the mix of security expenditures for these countries. Ball concludes therefore that while "in the public mind, security expenditure in the Third World is firmly linked with the arms trade" (p. 107), "for most of the Third World, the arms trade and security expenditure are not synonymous: Operating costs, particularly personnel-related outlays, form a large and permanent portion of most developing countries' security budgets" (p. 111). This, Ball suggests, is connected to the fact that "the internal security role of the armed forces is considerable throughout the Third World and, in many cases, is their primary function" (p. 393).

Ball's sample leaves out such oil-rich and population-poor countries as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for which capital costs, including expenditure on defense infrastructure and weapons procurement, would be appreciably higher than is reflected in her data. Nevertheless, her basic point regarding high operating costs and their relationship to internal regime

[38] Ball has correctly pointed out that it is preferable in this context to refer to the "security" sector rather than the "military" sector, "in order to indicate the inclusion of paramilitary forces" and to reflect "the fact that Third World governments frequently use their armed forces to maintain themselves in power, that is, to promote regime security" (p. xvi n. 2).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and state security is valid for most Third World countries. This reflects not merely the relatively low level of technology and the high level of manpower required by Third World states for the maintenance of internal control; it is also indicative of where they are along the continuum of the state-making enterprise. As the European experience has demonstrated, three areas—taxation (extraction of resources under the protection of coercive state agencies), policing (maintaining domestic order where it has already been imposed), and warfare aimed at the primitive accumulation of state power (extending and consolidating a particular political order by the use of force against potential as well as dissident subjects and fending off rival claimants to the same territorial and demographic space)—comprise the bulk of the activities undertaken by early state makers.[39] These are all labor-intensive tasks that engage relatively large numbers of persons in the security arena and thereby raise the ratio of operating (including personnel) costs relative to the total expenditure on security. Security sector costs in the Third World are understandably linked to the performance of these essential functions in their current early stage of state making.

In this context, Ball's central question regarding the relationship between security expenditure and development seems to be of secondary concern, if not misplaced. Despite the declared commitment of Third World state elites to the goal of development (defined as economic growth plus some degree of distributive justice), as far as most of them are concerned this is an instrumental value that helps them achieve their primary objectives of political legitimacy and state and regime security. Therefore, Ball's conclusion that "available evidence does suggest that expenditure in the security sector is more likely to hinder than to promote economic growth and development in the Third World" (p. 388) misses the essential motivation behind such expenditure, even though the point may be valid.

This motivation has to do primarily with the "primitive central state power accumulation" mentioned above and secondarily with meeting threats from the regional environment. As a result, development, measured as a serious objective and not merely on the basis of the rhetoric of Third World leaders, comes a poor third in the policy priorities of most Third World elites and is hardly ever considered an autonomous goal that deserves to be fulfilled independently of security considerations. It

[39] For details, see the following essays in Tilly (fn. 15): Samuel E. Finer, "State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military" (chap. 2); Rudolf Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia" (chap. 4); and David H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe" (chap. 5).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is not surprising, therefore, that, as Ethan Kapstein has argued in chapter 6 of the Azar-Moon volume, "Third World states have allocated scarce resources to meet national security threats, and in so doing have influenced the timing and/or trajectory of economic development" (p. 138).

Furthermore, given the fragility of many Third World polities, it is no wonder that "one negative effect of security expenditure," as Ball terms it, has been "the strengthening of the armed forces at the expense of civilian groups within society" (p. 390). There is no other institution that is more important as far as the interface between issues of state making and those of internal and external security are concerned than the military. While Ball devotes the whole of chapter 1 to the discussion of the military's role in development and offers a critical evaluation of various theories that profess to explain this role, none of the four volumes under review has attempted to relate the role of the military to the process of state and nation building in the Third World. The closest one comes to it is in the last few pages of Ball's volume:

> By relying on the armed forces to remain in power or by producing political and economic conditions that provide the military with the justification for intervention, many governments have facilitated the entry of the armed forces into the political arena." (p. 391)

This generalization glosses over the fact that Third World polities are currently caught in a vicious circle that is a product of their historical circumstances. As the early modern European experience has demonstrated, the role of the coercive apparatuses of state—meaning primarily military and paramilitary institutions—in the early phase of state making is considerable. In the case of most Third World states the problem has been compounded by the existence and combination of two additional factors. The first is the weakness of civil society and of other political institutions, which precludes the emergence of strong checks on the natural proclivity of the security apparatuses to usurp as much of the power and resources at the command of the state as possible. Second, the encapsulation of the various phases of state and nation building into one all-encompassing phase and the drastic curtailment of the time available to Third World states for the completion of these twin processes enhance the political importance of the coercive functions of the state and, therefore, of the agencies that perform such functions. Even in India, where a democratic political system has operated more successfully than elsewhere in the Third World, the important and increasingly dominant role of the security apparatuses is clearly visible in states like Punjab and Kashmir, which pose major overt challenges to the Indian state in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arena of state and nation building. It should therefore come as no surprise that the security sector in most Third World states hogs a large share of the state's disposable resources irrespective of the impact this may have on the process of economic development.

Furthermore, in terms of the allocation of scarce resources to the security sector, there seems to be very little difference between those Third World polities that are overtly dominated by the military and those that are under civilian control. This is demonstrated by Ball's own data (Figure 10-1, p. 387), which include several states under civilian rule within the category of the heaviest spenders on security. It is also corroborated by a recent study of defense spending by the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which, notwithstanding several caveats and qualifications, came to the conclusion that "the countries [in ASEAN] in which the military has the largest political role (Thailand and Indonesia) are the ones in which defence spending has grown more slowly than the ASEAN average."[40] State making and the violence that accompanies it obviously make no distinction between military-dominated and civilian-ruled polities in the Third World.

VII

Despite their divergent treatments of the subject and some of their shortfalls noted above, the four volumes reviewed in this article taken together make a substantial contribution to the study of Third World security problems by highlighting areas of analysis that have remained relatively neglected so far. These problems will remain with us for the foreseeable future in spite of the changes that seem to be underway in the superpowers' relations with each other and with the rest of the world. In fact, recent and projected changes may even contribute to the accentuation of some of the security problems faced by Third World countries and regions. The anticipated withdrawal of one superpower from the Third World arena may not turn out to be an unmixed blessing. The other superpower may feel free to act more cavalierly as far as the security and the vital interests of Third World states are concerned; it may be tempted to intervene militarily if developments in what it considers to be "strategic regions" of the Third World are not to its liking. Important Third World state elites, deprived of the presence of a balancing

[40] David B. H. Denoon, "Defence Spending in ASEAN: An Overview," in Chin Kin Wah, ed., *Defence Spending in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power that could in some measure neutralize the dominant superpower's interventionist proclivities, may therefore begin to feel more vulnerable and insecure. If this happens, such an escalation of insecurity will be reflected in their internal and external behavior patterns.

It could also happen that a genuine disentanglement on the part of both superpowers from arenas of tension and conflict in the Third World may remove some of the restraints on the conflictual behavior of important Third World states. The aggressive potential of those states has been constrained by the apprehension that it could draw negative reactions from one or both of the superpowers and thereby end up tipping the regional balance against them. But were the superpowers to pull back, it might lead to greater assertiveness on the part of regionally preeminent powers interested in translating their preeminence into hegemony or at least into a managerial role within their respective regions. Resistance by other countries in a particular region to such hegemonic behavior might in turn, lead to situations of violent interstate conflict relatively unhindered by concerns regarding superpower intervention.

Furthermore, the prospects of conventional arms control pacts and troop reduction agreements between the superpowers, which are expected to lead to major redundancies in their arsenals, are already spurring both Washington and Moscow to increase arms sales abroad.[41] This trend can be expected to accelerate once these pacts become realities and force both superpowers to remove various categories of conventional weaponry, including tanks, artillery, aircraft, and helicopters, from their inventories. Much of this surplus hardware is expected to be sold to Third World countries to fulfill hard currency needs (a particularly important consideration for Moscow), to shore up friends and allies by making them more "self-reliant" in terms of hardware, and to find alternative sources of profitable returns for domestic arms industries. This projected escalation in the transfer of sophisticated weaponry to the Third World in the 1990s will almost certainly reverse the trend of decreasing arms transfers to the developing countries that had been visible for most of the 1980s[42] and will further enhance the destructive potential of Third World conflicts.

In the final analysis, however, most of the deep-seated sources of conflict and violence in the Third World—sources that inhere within Third

[41] For details, see Robert Pear, "Prospects of Arms Pacts Spurring Arms Sales," *New York Times*, March 25, 1990, p. 12.

[42] For the latest analysis of this trend, see Richard F. Grimmett, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers, 1982–1989* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1990), esp. 1–3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World societies and are related to their simultaneously ongoing processes of state making and nation building—cannot and will not be fundamentally determined by superpower actions and interactions, even if the latter has had the capacity to exacerbate many of them in the postwar era.[43] Therefore, although changes in superpower relations may continue to affect some of these sources of conflict and insecurity in the Third World, these changes alone are not capable of transforming the basic nature of the security predicament of the Third World states. As it stands, the existing parameters of the security problematic of the Third World can be altered only if Third World states have adequate time to complete the twin tasks of the state making and nation building, plus enough political sagacity on their leaderships' part to attempt to accomplish these tasks in as humane a manner as possible. At such time the security concerns of developing states will approximate more closely those of the developed states, which in the traditional literature on international relations have constituted the model for state behavior in the security arena.

[43] Notwithstanding the fact that the most highly visible facet of the latest Gulf crisis has been its global dimension involving the United States projection of power in the Gulf, this crisis has its origins in the internal dynamics of the region. These, in turn, are closely intertwined with issues regarding the establishment and legitimization of state boundaries, institutions, and regimes in the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf in particular. Iraqi ambitions regarding Kuwait date back to the founding of the Iraqi state under British tutelage in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Iraq's claims on Kuwait rest both upon Ottoman assertions of sovereignty over Kuwait and upon the widespread feeling in the Arab world that post-Ottoman borders in the Fertile Crescent and the Gulf were arbitrarily drawn by Western colonial powers to suit their own selfish requirements and are therefore less than fully legitimate. In recent times Baghdad made two abortive attempts, in 1961 and 1973, to enforce its territorial claims on Kuwait. Viewed in its proper historical perspective, the latest crisis is therefore not exclusively an Iraqi attempt to control Kuwait's huge oil resources and dictate oil production and pricing policies within OPEC. While the American reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 globalized the crisis, it was basically just that—a *reaction* to a crisis that was fundamentally grounded in regional realities and intimately related to rival claims over both territorial and demographic space (and, of course, over the only major resource of the region), as well as linked to issues of state and regime legitimacy in the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REFORM AND THE REDEFINITION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER GORBACHEV

By JANINE LUDLAM

Anders Aslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989, 219 pp.
Walter D. Connor, *Socialism's Dilemmas: State and Society in the Soviet Bloc*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 299 pp.
Jerry Hough, *Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, 301 pp.
Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1988, 176 pp.

BY becoming president of the Soviet Union in March 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev skillfully managed to decrease the power of the ruling bodies of the Communist Party and to transfer it to the newly created executive structure of the state government. The power of the party's top echelon was further reduced in July 1990 when a new Politburo was elected at the 28th Party Congress. The Politburo was swept clean of its old membership with the exception of Gorbachev himself (who was easily elected general secretary by the Congress delegates) and V. A. Ivashko (now a deputy to the general secretary), and its size was expanded, in part to include a representative from every Soviet republic. Gorbachev thus freed himself of many policy restraints placed upon him by the Politburo, while the party—the majority of whose members, despite factionalism and defection, are still loyal to Gorbachev—remains the dominant political force in Soviet society.

As president, Gorbachev faces no serious opposition in the legislative branch of the government for the time being. Although the infamous Article 6, which guaranteed the Communist Party's monopoly on power, was struck from the Constitution last March, no opposition party has yet gathered enough strength to challenge the communists' real monopoly on power, which extends from the villages to the ministries. The vast majority of the peoples' deputies in the Congress and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union are members of the Communist Party: of the 2,250 deputies, 1,973 hold party cards.[1] Thus, by shifting some power from the

[1] *Narodnye Deputaty SSSR: Spravochnik serii 'Kto est kto'* [People's deputies of the USSR: Reference book of the "Who's Who" series] (Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1990).

World Politics 43 (January 1991), 284–312

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party elite to the government, Gorbachev has amassed a large amount of power in his own hands.

Although Gorbachev appears to be unafraid to use traditional methods of power politics to manipulate his country's political structures, he has employed a more tactful approach toward the population at large. His understanding of the social dynamics and the structure of Soviet society is more profound than that of his predecessors. Appreciative of the changes that have taken place in the makeup of the Soviet population over the last forty years, Gorbachev seeks to accommodate these changes within a partially revised political and social structure in the hope that the result will be a more efficient and productive society. How successful is Gorbachev likely to be? While reviewing some recent books on this important theme, I shall analyze the forces that are propelling his efforts at economic and political reform as well as those that may obstruct them.

Background

In the years following Stalin's death, Soviet leaders sought to redefine the legitimacy of the Soviet polity and the control of Soviet society. They aimed to get away from terror and arbitrary lawlessness (where legal boundaries were deliberately fluid) and to move toward a more "contractual" political legitimacy and social control, based primarily on economic guarantees to the population. Still, they counted on the continued deprivation within mass society of real political power and political concerns, and on the continued dominance of an official state society over an indigenous civil society. This rather limited social contract served several purposes, for a time. It was undoubtedly a relief from the terror and arbitrariness of the Stalin period. It also fit well into the extensive phase of industrial development, in which most workers held basic blue-collar production jobs, were nonintellectual, and were more interested in economic security than in political rights and cultural expression. This contract neglected only a minority of the population: intellectuals, highly skilled technical workers (engineers, chemists, and so forth), as well as the emerging service class.

As the economy and society developed, the limitations of this Khrushchev-Brezhnev social contract grew more conspicuous, and also more dangerous to ignore. The relative ineffectiveness of the extensive approach in the emerging postindustrial phase of economic development revealed that a more modern, intensive strategy for further development was needed: a strategy based on better-skilled and better-educated workers (manual, managing, designing, and intellectual) who had been pour-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing out of schools and institutes at an increasing rate during the previous decades, but who had found their skills and talents underutilized. This had political implications: higher-skilled labor had become a crucial ingredient for further development, yet the social contract tacitly agreed upon over thirty years ago was, for the most part, geared toward lower-skilled, blue-collar workers. Although the latter's importance to the economy was still great, it was declining relative to their better-educated cousins and neighbors.

Another integral part of the social contract was the mutual agreement between the leadership and the populace that Stalinist terror and generalized lawlessness should be tempered. The masses, like their leaders, found great relief in this aspect of the contract. But the young, educated, upwardly mobile professionals in the Soviet Union today do not personally remember the Stalin days. Furthermore, they themselves did not agree to that contract. Just as the Khrushchev-Brezhnev social compact does not advance an intensive approach to economic development, it does not suit the broad class of skilled and educated workers that has become indispensable to the economy as it makes its transition from the industrial to the postindustrial world.

In this essay, I will develop three themes: (1) Gorbachev has realized that the present social contract cannot properly serve the comprehensive reforms he has visualized. (2) Pressure to change the social contract has built up within society itself, beyond the control of the Soviet regime; that is, the behavior and decisions of groups in society (concerning place of work, participation in communist ideology, higher education, diligence in work, and so on) are weakening the old contract. Moreover, the government itself has deliberately loosened its control over the behavior of the population with the end of terror, the weakening of economic incentives, and the more open flow of information from outside. This challenges the idea that in an authoritarian system the government is the only actor involved in defining the terms of the contract. (3) There will be "winners" and "losers" as a result of a revised social contract. As he moves forward with reform, Gorbachev will continue to face the resistance of those in entrenched positions (persons who have benefited from the post-Stalin contract), especially blue-collar workers and lower-level party functionaries.

Social Contract Theory and the Soviet Case

The application of social contract theory to the Soviet Union became popular (though not universally accepted) in the 1970s as a way of ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plaining the stability of a Soviet political system that no longer relied on terror and a charismatic absolute leader for its survival and even legitimacy. The general idea of contract theory is that both regime and population contribute something that the other needs for its survival. In a general case, the government agrees to protect its citizens and to provide circumstances for their well-being, while the population agrees to acknowledge the legitimacy of the government, at least passively. Some scholars have argued that because Soviet citizens have not participated openly in government in the past—that is, they have not been voters in the Western sense—no contract could have been reached between the Soviet regime and its populace. I maintain, however, as do others, that the Soviet regime has been forced to consider the interests of the population in order to protect its own ability to govern. In the early 1960s under Khrushchev, for example, riots over announced increases in food prices broke out in the southern part of the Soviet Union; the increases were never enacted. Brezhnev's consistent policy decisions protecting the welfare state in return for labor's quiescence and its acceptance of the Soviet regime's right to rule are evidence of an implicit agreement, or contract. For five years, Gorbachev had avoided the question of raising prices—especially on basic commodities—despite economists' insistence that such increases were absolutely necessary for the welfare of the economy. Now that the issue can no longer be ignored, the government has promised that any increase in prices will be accompanied by corresponding increases in wages, and that pensioners and the poor will receive adequate social benefits. Because fear of unrest due to a decline in living standards is very great, the government has endured massive subsidies on food and basic items so as not to disrupt economic, and potentially political, stability. I therefore make the assumption that the application of social contract theory to the Soviet case can produce insights into the relationship between state and society in the Soviet Union.

In most countries, political leaders and citizens understand that an implicit social contract—a balance (or sometimes an imbalance) between economic, political, and civil guarantees and restrictions—partially legitimizes the authority of the leadership to rule, and guarantees controlled social behavior on the part of a majority of its citizens. Thomas Hobbes, one of the first political theorists to elaborate on the concept, argued that the original social contract developed so that people could leave what he called the "state of nature"; that is, man in his pregoverned state, which was unpredictable and violent, "a war of every man against every man." In this primitive contractual stage, man renounced his natural liberty and authorized a single ruler (or oligarchy of rulers) to govern him. In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

return, the ruler agreed to protect him from an untimely death (an extremely likely fate as long as man lived in the state of nature). This rudimentary contract was the source of the ruler's legitimacy. At that point man, now a "citizen," received little in return for the absolute obedience he gave the ruler. Hobbes's ruler was not accountable to the individuals who had sanctioned his power, nor did these individuals have the right to participate in the shaping of the terms of the contract. Contract theory subsequently went beyond being a theory of the historical *origin* of government/society to become a theory that, in addition, explained the *nature* of government/society.

Hobbes's description of the nature of government/society is partially obsolete now, in that the citizen has in many countries gained more rights and guarantees vis-à-vis his government. John Locke went beyond Hobbes in arguing that the political authority of a government was restricted by a citizen's inalienable rights, especially his right to have his property protected. A century later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau stated that active and continued participation by citizens in their government's political processes was an indispensable condition for the contractual relationship between a government and its people, or "government by consent."

In the advanced industrial democracies, the duties of citizens to the state have remained basically the same (compliance/support for the existing government, controlled social behavior), while the rights and guarantees given to citizens by the state have proliferated. In the United States, the right to participate in the political process has been secured, respect for the individual has been a long-standing premise of legitimacy, and the right to be better-off economically than one's neighbor (which has always elicited more support in the U.S. than has the socialist ideal of economic egalitarianism) is taken for granted. At the same time, the government has provided a limited safety net for the country's elderly and sick. Sweden has struck a somewhat neater, and potentially less discordant, balance between political, civil, and economic rights and responsibilities. While similar to the United States in the first two aspects, Sweden is attempting to guarantee a constraint on economic inequality: it allows its highly centralized trade union organization (instead of the state) to distribute investment and profits and to limit wage inequality (for the same work) throughout the country's so-called sheltered economy (that is, enterprises not involved in foreign competition).

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has historically defined the social contract between its government and citizens in much more restricted terms. While it has emphasized the responsibility of citizens to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the government, it has given short shrift to the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the government, especially civil and political rights. In fact, one could argue that a social contract did not emerge in the Soviet Union until after Stalin's death in 1953. One might ask whether citizens were indeed protected from violence and death during the Stalin period, or whether that period was a perpetuation of the uncertain and arbitrary state of nature described by Hobbes. Was the comprehensive system of neighbors telling on neighbors in order to preempt a strike against their own persons not a "war of every man against every man," the very feature that defined the state of nature? Thus the Soviet Union was in the mid-1950s just emerging from a deliberately reimposed state of nature. Its first social contract, despite the already highly industrialized character of the Soviet state, was Hobbesian in content; it reflected the continuing dominance of state over civil society and the low (repressed) level of the political culture of the masses.

Now, in the 1990s, Gorbachev is trying to accomplish more than either Khrushchev or Brezhnev aspired to. The low level of the political culture of the masses and their escape into private life has become a hindrance. The official dominance of state over civil society has meant that a second, somewhat autonomous civil society has developed which the state cannot easily tap into and use to promote its own objectives. The "*extreme* autonomy of the state" (Walter Connor's term for the condition in which a state is not dependent on the support of social groups or classes for its existence) has left state-society relations severely underdeveloped (Connor, 9–16). Although dominated by the state, Soviet society has remained separate from it and has had to find outlets other than political channels for expressing itself. By the early 1980s, the social policy of "to each according to his needs" rather than "to each according to his labor" had resulted in what Jerry Hough calls "excessive coddling of the workers" (p. 99). It was a policy that left the workers little incentive to work hard and well, and it consciously, albeit reluctantly, sacrificed high rates of economic growth and encouraged economic inefficiency. Gorbachev's comprehensive reform package was not served well by such an underdeveloped social contract.

Pressure on the Post-Stalin Contract

Two important questions arise regarding the application of contract theory to the Soviet case. First, what concrete changes are being made in the social contract? In other words, what policy changes are being implemented, or at least visualized, that will change the content of the con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tract? Second, is the government the only player in the shaping of the contract? That is, is the Soviet social contract still primarily Hobbesian (where individuals have no voice in defining its terms), as it was under Stalin, or is it becoming more Lockean (where individuals are permitted some say)? It is fairly easy to find answers to these questions. The answer to a more difficult question may shed some light on the dilemma of how Soviet society interacts with its authoritarian state: Who or what is responsible for forcing a change in the contract? Is Gorbachev's struggle for reform putting pressure on the old social contract, or are social forces themselves pushing for a new social contract and, implicitly, for reform?

Both Hobbes and Locke had observed that the social contract was often not freely negotiated between a government and natural men. Hobbes noted that a strongman could force individuals to participate in the contract; Locke stated that individuals could be induced into compliance by a godlike "king" (not dissimilar to Max Weber's charismatic leader). In a recent article, Peter Hauslohner comments that the word "contract" is somewhat misleading in the Soviet context, for the deliberations that lead to social policy are conducted by one side only—the government.[2] This explanation, however, does not take into account the existence of complex forces in Soviet society. Westerners in general have been too willing to see the Soviet state as all-powerful and as possessing the ability to control its citizens at will. In reality, as was noted earlier, while the state officially continued to dominate its citizens, an unofficial "second" society developed alongside—a society in which the populace privatized its existence, a second economy flourished, and samizdat culture proliferated. Soviet society, although not independent of its state, became individualized and decentralized.[3]

In *The Gorbachev Phenomenon*, Moshe Lewin argues that Western scholarship on the Soviet Union has focused primarily on the state, to the exclusion of other aspects of the Soviet system. The state dictated policy and ruled society; therefore it was assumed that anything to be learned about the Soviet experience would come from the study of the state. Lewin maintains that our long-term neglect of other social systems

[2] Peter Hauslohner, "Gorbachev's Social Contract," *Soviet Economy* 3 (January–March 1987), at 58.

[3] S. Frederick Starr, "The Soviet Union: A Civil Society," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1988), at 27. Starr argues that "much of the initiative for change has shifted from the Communist Party to society." Because of the party's neglect or denial of social realities, Soviet society no longer perceives the Communist Party as its leader; since the party has disposed (intentionally or unintentionally) of many of its instruments of control (ideology, charismatic leader, terror), it can no longer force its subjects to follow.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Soviet Union has left us unprepared to understand the totality of the conceptualization of Gorbachev's reform efforts.

Lewin submits that the Soviet state (like all states, regardless of their degree of despotism) is itself susceptible to pressures and influences from outside factors. Even under Stalin, the state had to battle for its policies and could not always control and mold spontaneous movements in society to fit its policies. In the 1930s, for example, workers in industry jumped from job to job looking for better wages; the peasants who were pushed into kolkhozy exhibited an indifferent attitude toward work there; and bureaucrats covered up realities with which they thought the leadership would be displeased (pp. 25–26).

Lewin's central thesis (writing in 1988) is that the political structure of the Soviet Union had not changed to accommodate the vast shifts that have taken place in the Soviet social system. Urbanization, industrialization, and the growth of the professional and intellectual classes signaled a transition to a new historical era; now, Lewin argues, it is Gorbachev's task to reform all spheres of the system simultaneously. Indeed, Gorbachev's acknowledgment that these spheres are interconnected (in particular, his emphasis on the importance of the coincidence of economic and political reform) differentiates him from his predecessors.

During the last sixty years, the Soviet Union has been transformed from a predominantly peasant-rural society into a predominantly urban one. In 1940, 33 percent of the Soviet population lived in urban areas; by 1981 that figure had risen to 63 percent.[4] The mass urbanization of Soviet society involved a qualitative transformation, from relative homogeneity to considerable heterogeneity. Over the last several decades, the number of people willing to be employed in agriculture and positions of physical labor has been declining, while the number aspiring to nonmanual jobs in industry, information, and services has been increasing. The intelligentsia is growing relatively faster than the working class.[5]

Educational standards have improved dramatically during these decades. Secondary education is now compulsory for all children, and more

[4] Blair Ruble, "Social Dimensions of *Perestroyka*," *Soviet Economy* 3 (April–June 1987), at 176.

[5] Manual workers, of course, still comprise the largest group in the Soviet work force. Presently, approximately 58% of the work force are blue-collar workers (of these, 10–12% are unskilled or low skilled; 44–46% are skilled physical laborers; 3–4% are highly skilled), about 38% are officials and specialists, and 1–5% are *kolkhozniki* (Lewin, 51). Because the economy craves labor, the authorities are always trying to pressure young people to enter educational tracks that will lead to nonprofessional jobs. The problem is that the Soviet economy, stuck in the industrial stage of development, cannot accommodate the occupational aspirations of its young students.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people are entering into specialized secondary training and higher education. In 1930, only 300,000 individuals received a higher education in the Soviet Union. By 1960, the number had risen to 2.4 million, and by 1980, it was 5.2 million. The increases in secondary specialized and professional/technical school enrollment are similar. In 1930, 600,000 individuals were enrolled in secondary specialized education programs; by 1960, that number was 2 million, and by 1980, it was 4.6 million. In 1927, there were 250,000 students in professional/technical schools; by 1960 there were 1.1 million, and in 1980, 4 million. (All figures are approximate.)[6]

Yet the Soviet economy is still "labor-hungry": there is what Ed Hewett has called a "major unemployment problem with machines,"[7] which appears to indicate a discrepancy between the educational level of employees and the economic needs of the country. Periodic attempts at reform in the Soviet education system over the last forty years are evidence that the leadership itself acknowledges this discrepancy. In the mid-1950s, Khrushchev began a program to combine education and productive labor in the classroom, to return the principle of polytechnical instruction to the secondary schools, and to discourage students from pursuing study programs that would lead to higher education. The point of the reform, according to Roy Medvedev, was to bridge the gulf that divided school from later life, to satisfy the needs of the economy, and to correct the one-sided orientation of students toward higher education.[8] In spite of such attempts to steer young people into productive-labor programs, the number of individuals enrolling in higher education has grown rapidly. Gorbachev is thus faced with the problem of making the economy fit the educational standards of the country, not vice versa.

Other important consequences of urbanization beyond more and better education and occupational heterogeneity have put subtle but real pressure on the state to rethink and revise its social policies. The values of the urbanized population, and especially of the better-educated and professional elite, have undergone considerable change. In the formation of modern cities, people are often separated from family and friends and must learn to survive outside the security of the collective that is so predominant in a rural setting. To cope, they must learn to develop as individuals primarily concerned with personal life and activity independent of any collective, including the state (Lewin, 63–66). Gail Lapidus

[6] Roger A. Clarke and Dubravko J. I. Matko, *Soviet Economic Facts 1917–1981* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 44–46.

[7] Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1988), 91.

[8] Medvedev, *Khrushchev* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984), 130.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has recognized several broad shifts in values that have marked the maturation of the educated elite: a shift from an emphasis on *partiinost'* (party élan) to a preoccupation with universal moral concerns; a shift away from collectivism to an increased recognition of individual and social diversity; connected with that, open recognition of conflicting interests and the admission that there can be no "single truth"; and a gradual retreat from a yearning for utopia to a growing realization that there are limits to "social engineering."[9]

These broad shifts in values, combined with the improvements in educational standards and the increasing relative importance of nonmanual and intellectual labor to the economy, are indicative of an increasingly independent, private, and self-sustaining broad stratum of Soviet urban life. People in this stratum are prepared and trained to contribute to the intensification of the economy, and are capable of participating in political processes. Yet the economy underutilizes them and the old social contract discriminates against them; indeed, that contract has until now deprived them of any real participation in the political life of their country. The question also arises: how many workers are now capable and willing to take on the same responsibilities, for the workers, too, have benefited from higher educational standards and other developments attributable to the urbanization of Soviet society.

In *Russia and the West*, Jerry Hough takes the thesis a controversial step further, arguing that the broad educated public of the "Gorbachev generation" is infected with a "Western orientation" due to a number of social processes that took place as this generation came of age in the 1950s and 1960s. While largely agreeing with the trends and shifts in values recognized by Lewin and Lapidus, Hough argues that much of the xenophobia and extreme censorship of Western ideas formerly prevalent in Soviet society reflected the values of the generation born at the turn of the century rather than the unchanging Russian national character or the inner laws of the Soviet system. He maintains that later generations have different values: they grew up in an era in which urbanization and industrialization were taken for granted, in which the war alliance with the United States and the West was an early childhood memory, in which patriotism and nationalism eroded old ideological dogmas, and in which the younger people in particular absorbed the Western values of the nineteenth-century *obshchestvo* (society) through Russian literature that had reappeared under Stalin.

Thus, not only the educated and trained stratum of Soviet society, but

[9] Gail Lapidus, "Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System," *Daedalus* (Spring 1987), at 8–9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many of the members of the political leadership itself, including Gorbachev, are eager to dismantle what Hough calls the "two Iron Curtains"—the one that was erected to keep out Western ideas and the one that was erected against Western market forces. They are willing to discard the old social contract which, by depriving the population of the opportunity to participate in the political process and the circulation of information, and by creating blue-collar economic egalitarianism, helped to maintain the Iron Curtains (p. 7). A new contract, Hough implies, would have to be closer to Western-style social contracts, which include many more aspects of the system, primarily civil and political aspects. Such a contract would allow the leadership to tap broader human resources more comprehensively.

Thus, the authors under review support the thesis that the Soviet system has moved beyond the restricted Hobbesian contract, in which the political leadership alone dictates its terms. The broad, educated elite, matured through the twin processes of industrialization and urbanization and their by-products, is forcing a redefinition of the relations between the state and its citizenry. In addition, as Hough reminds us, the younger members of the political leadership have been manipulated by the same social forces: many of them, including the president and general secretary, share a set of values, and consequently are part of the social force that is putting pressure on the first post-Stalin social contract.

It would be a mistake, however, to argue that individuals in the Soviet system have consciously or intentionally influenced the process of shaping the contract. Decisions regarding work, education, political outlook, and so on are made by individuals for personal reasons, not by groups seeking to influence the social policies of the leadership. Participation in the sense of Locke and Rousseau requires individual involvement to guard the contract and to validate it continually. Multicandidate elections to the soviets and congresses, in which non-communists can run and win against members of the Communist Party, are an important step in that direction. The balance of power over policy (and thus over the contract) is just beginning to shift. In the meantime, the population's past participation in nonpolitical spheres of life has in some ways changed the reality in which the regime must make decisions.

Relationship between State and Society: Autonomy versus Class

In *Socialism's Dilemmas: State and Society in the Soviet Bloc*, Walter Connor examines the question of how, if at all, the interrelationship between state and society has changed in the Soviet Union. He describes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet state as having been born in isolation from social class (in 1917, the urban proletariat it supposedly represented was only a small percentage of the population in Russia); so far, it has been able to maintain a high degree of independence of any class. The party-state, not wanting to become tied to particular social classes for its authority, has tried to resist the solidification of classes in Soviet society, classes that could eventually reduce the state's autonomy. Connor asserts, however, that while Soviet society itself has not remained static over the last seventy years, the rapid changes that took place during industrialization are largely over, and the structure of that society now has a stable shape. Connor's case study of the working class serves as a basis for understanding the relationship between state and society.

The transition from agriculture to industry is mostly over, and many of the opportunities for upward mobility of the 1920s and 1930s are no longer available. As a result, Connor reports, the working class has become largely self-reproducing. He then raises the question whether Soviet workers consider themselves a "class"; that is, whether they are conscious that they have common interests and common goals, and that they could therefore assert themselves collectively as a potential political and economic force. His answer is that there is no evidence that Soviet workers assert their rights and needs as a class—that, in fact, "mass" concerns remain within the borders of the workplace (job security, decent pay, availability of consumer goods, and the like), and that the politicization of the workers in the near future seems unlikely.

I would argue, however, that the strikes that broke out in the coal mines of the Kuznets Basin in the summer of 1989 show some weaknesses in Connor's analysis because: (1) Although these strikes were primarily concerned with improvements in work conditions, the important point is that the strikers, by using the strike as a political tool (though not primarily for political ends), forced the government to bargain openly. (2) The strikers did achieve one overtly political goal—the replacement of appointed trade union officials with their own men. (3) The list of grievances presented during the strikes in Siberia that took place in the fall of 1989 included calls for the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution which, until March 1990, upheld the dominant position of the Communist Party in Soviet society. A discussion of whether these actions signify a hardening of the class consciousness of workers is beyond the scope of this paper; it seems clear, however, that the workers showed a certain level of political maturity by forcing the government to negotiate, rather than simply dictate, economic and political policy in the workplace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A potentially more disturbing question for the regime, as Connor points out, is the relevance of the Communist Party itself to a complex and industrialized Soviet society. The party apparatus is still in place and functioning at all levels of society. As before, it maintains its organizations in factories, institutes, kolkhozy, and so on. The repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution cannot immediately reduce the pervasiveness of the Communist Party in the social, political, and economic systems of the country. Because the party does not have any intention of simply relinquishing its entrenched position, it is relevant to ask these questions: What does the party contribute, relative to other sectors, to society? Does it just occupy positions or does it actually perform legitimate functions? Have its attempts to remain independent of society made it unable to provide for that society? Most importantly, is the party appropriate to Soviet society at this point in that society's history?

The functions the Soviet Communist Party has traditionally performed were especially relevant during the period of industrialization, when quantity was more important than quality, when unskilled labor was at least as valuable as skilled labor, and when the population of the Soviet Union consisted more of peasants than workers.

The party must act (via the state bureaucracy) as the economy's caretaker and coordinator, since, as Seweryn Bialer has pointed out, the system is not self-generating;[10] it is still strictly centralized and goal-oriented. The job of the party apparatus is (1) to harmonize economic goals and strategy between the center and the localities (although it coordinates primarily from the center), and (2) to maintain pressure on local economic units—enterprises as well as farms—to ensure acceptable performance.[11]

The party's interference in the economy, however, has turned out to be a brake on efficiency and initiative. Before the Soviet economy can make the transition from the extensive to the intensive approach, from the industrial to the postindustrial era, the mentality of meddling must be overcome.

The party also played a role as the creator of official culture in the Soviet Union—a culture of futuristic communist ideology and chauvinistic propaganda. This function was legitimate as long as people submitted to that culture. It seems obvious that the number of Soviets who believe in this ideology and propaganda has declined greatly (although

[10] Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 19.

[11] See Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), one of the most comprehensive works on the party's role in the economy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the number of people who continue to subscribe to it for various reasons is undoubtedly still high). Robert C. Tucker writes, "Soviet Communism as a culture is in deep trouble, because the belief-system on which it was founded has lost vitality."[12]

With the Soviet economy under severe pressure to catch up with the advanced industrialized countries, and with the official culture of the Soviet Union scorned by a large part of its population, the party must now recognize that its relevance to Soviet society has weakened; it must adjust to new realities in order to regain its legitimacy and authority.

According to Connor, the party bureaucracy now maintains power only through the co-optation of the population's skills and training (p. 34). It must do this because it has little to offer society in this stage of its historical development. Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that "the real failure of the Communist system lies in its inability to transcend the phase of industrialization, to move from the industrial era to the postindustrial world."[13] *In its present form*, the party bureaucracy serves no genuine purpose in society; its power is illegitimate and its authority seriously damaged. Gorbachev must reform both the party and the bureaucracy so that they learn to regulate the economy rather than to control it, so that they permit real participation in the country's politics (where citizens can vote for different candidates in a legitimate multiparty system), and so that they permit expression of group and class interests through all channels. If the party is to be the artery for reform, it must become a leader; that is, it must understand and steer dynamic social realities. The issue is whether the party can so radically and in such a short time shift from a policy of keeping itself separate from society to a policy of including the population in its most sacred rites and processes.

The party has also deliberately loosened its grip on several of the tools it formerly used to control the behavior of the Soviet population. The most obvious of these is the psychological and real terror that was exercised under Stalin. In the 1930s and 1940s, tardiness, absenteeism, drunkenness on the job, poor work performance, and theft of state property—all common occurrences in the Soviet workplace today—were ruthlessly punished and thus discouraged. By not connecting work performance with either reward or punishment, Stalin's successors have largely lost economic incentives as an effective tool of control over individual work-

[12] Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 136.

[13] Brzezinski, "The Crisis of Communism: The Paradox of Political Participation," *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1987), at 168.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ers. Furthermore, Soviet leaders are now unable or unwilling to regulate the flow of information from outside—especially in the form of Western books and video cassettes; and so Soviets have other standards of living and of knowledge with which to compare their own. Thus, the party does not control the population's economic and private behavior to the extent it once did. Through lack of discipline at work and attraction to outside knowledge and products, individuals are expressing their dissatisfaction with a social contract that does not reward them for hard work either in their paychecks or at store counters. Thus, although the party may be the only actor (in the sense of Locke and Rousseau) with final decision-making power in the area of social policy, other forces are pressuring the regime to validate its legitimacy through an update of the social contract, in ways partially defined by the nature of these forces themselves.

Job Security and the Welfare State

The state does have an interest in changing its social policy. After all, one of its primary concerns is to secure its legitimacy and stability, and to block forces that appear to be weakening it. Bialer (writing in 1980) maintains that the performance of its domestic economy is one of the chief sources of the stability of the Soviet regime.[14] In 1979, however, economic growth started to decline sharply; it stayed at a low level into the 1980s. Anders Aslund, in *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform*, argues that this decline, combined with the government's recognition of serious social problems such as alienation from and apathy toward the functioning of the economy (which are manifested in statistics on the theft of state property and drunkenness and in a weak work ethic), gave impetus to perestroika. Both Aslund and Lewin assert that rapid industrialization has left the economic structure struggling to keep up with the public's demands for a service-oriented economy. Aslund concludes that it was the realization that "significant improvements of Stalin's system were no longer feasible" that led Gorbachev to adopt a comprehensive approach to economic reform (p. 111). On the whole, Aslund's book lacks a conceptual framework of how the Soviet economy functions. It is, however, a useful summary, more descriptive than analytic, of Gorbachev's economic reforms between 1985 and 1988.

Aslund does make clear that the leadership is concerned about the economy's ability to deliver goods and services to the population. Because

[14] Bialer (fn. 10), 148–58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brezhnev actively pursued a policy of developing the economy's capacity to produce consumer durables, the standard of living of the average Soviet citizen increased during the 1960s and 1970s. The Brezhnev regime's commitment to investment in agriculture is well documented. Both meat consumption and living space per capita increased, as did the percentage of families owning refrigerators, washing machines, television sets, automobiles, and other consumer goods.[15] At the same time, the scope and extent of the state's welfare program improved. The size of retirement pensions increased, peasants became entitled to social security benefits, the minimum wage was raised, and so on. The Brezhnev regime had made a conscious decision to increase consumption relative to investment; as a result, the rate of economic growth continued to slow down.[16]

Another aspect of Brezhnev's economic policy was an unyielding commitment to the egalitarianism and security that had been established under Khrushchev as the basis of the first post-Stalin social contract. The Soviet government had issued to workers what Hewett has called "an insurance policy against personal economic risk."[17] Soviet-style socialism promises the right to work to everyone who is of age and able; full employment is possible largely because of an excess demand for labor, which, in turn, is the result of an extensive approach to growth and the inefficient utilization of labor. In the past, workers had an implicit understanding with the regime: retail prices for basic necessities would remain stable, and wages would continue to rise. Indeed, the monthly incomes of tens of millions of people increased dramatically between the mid-1960s and early 1980s. The average monthly salary (in 1982 rubles) for the state-employed labor force (that is, excluding kolkhozniki) jumped from 90 rubles in 1964 to 173 rubles in 1981.[18] Thus, the workers have always enjoyed job and income security, and have been protected from the economic uncertainties that persist in many of the Western capitalist democracies.

Economic egalitarianism was also an objective of the Brezhnev regime; it is a bias that has come to be taken for granted among workers and managers. Wages for those employed in the same type of job tend

[15] Meat consumption for the entire population increased from 38 kilograms per capita (per annum) in 1964 to 57 kilograms in 1975, but leveled off after 1975. In 1965, there were 22 television sets per 1,000 people in the Soviet Union; by 1980, there were 249 per 1,000. Refrigerators: 29 per 1,000 in 1965, 252 per 1,000 in 1980. Washing machines: 59 per 1,000 in 1965, 205 per 1,000 in 1980. See Clarke and Matko (fn. 6), 24–25, 28.

[16] It should be noted, however, that the growth rate of national income (national income utilized) decreased dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. Hewett (fn. 7), 57.

[17] Ibid., 39.

[18] Clarke and Matko (fn. 6), 40–41. Although wages rose in this period, growth rates of productivity fell; therefore the buying power of a paycheck did not greatly increase.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be equal, regardless of the individual worker's performance and the profitability of the enterprise. Losses incurred by individual enterprises are often covered by the profits of other enterprises, and are thus socialized. On a larger scale, when one sector does not perform well, the entire society pays for it. Aslund cites as an example the relationship between Soviet energy and Soviet agriculture. The export of energy is the country's foremost earner of hard currency; however, this currency is spent abroad for the purchase of grain because domestic agriculture does not produce enough to feed both the population and its livestock.[19] If it was not needed to make up agriculture's deficit, this hard currency would be used in other ways.

For most of the Soviet population, egalitarianism and economic security are gains that their system has won for them. They constitute the conspicuous achievements of the Soviet socialist economy and are a source of support for the regime among the population. Soviet workers have learned to expect artificially low housing rents, virtually free utilities, and subsidies on food and other consumer products as a part of the socialist welfare package (Connor, 134). These guarantees are so much a part of the post-Stalin contract that it is risky for the government to tamper with them. In the early 1960s, for example, riots broke out in the southern region of the Soviet Union after price increases on basic food items had been announced. (In Poland, such price increases have brought down more than one leader.) Brezhnev preferred to tolerate massive subsidies on food products to cover the gap between procurement and retail prices rather than to permit a decrease in the real incomes of the population. The fear of the potential consequences of violating this aspect of the compact seems to permeate the thinking of many economists, both conservative and reformist, in the Soviet Union; it explains why the Gorbachev regime avoided the issue for the first five years of its administration. Aslund quotes a Goskomtsen (State Committee on Prices) economist who argued for keeping retail prices low in order to ensure the "political stability" of the country (p. 131).

The costs of maintaining this aspect of the social contract have been very high, however. Hauslohner argues persuasively that economic efficiency and growth have been the victims of the guarantees of egalitarianism and security. Here scholars tend to get lost in a complex relationship of cause and effect that is not easily disentangled. The problem revolves, essentially, around economic modernization and the legitimation of the regime. According to Hauslohner, the two are "mutually con-

[19] Hewett cites a similar example (fn. 7), 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

straining"; that is, improvement in the economic system is constrained by the state's legitimation strategy of security and equality; legitimation, in turn, is constrained by the performance of the economic system.[20] He maintains that overall economic growth and a bigger national income pie, plus improvements in the supply of consumer goods and services and a better social infrastructure, would be sources of support for the government. It is Gorbachev's task to break out of the cycle.

How do economic guarantees harm economic growth and consequently, in Hauslohner's schema, the state's legitimation? Hewett argues that the key incentives for getting workers and enterprises to produce efficiently and to innovate are stifled by the concept of "ceilings" and "floors," on which economic security rests, within the enterprise structure. Enterprises know that they will not be allowed to fail or go bankrupt; so there is a permanent safety net, or floor, beneath them.[21] Because profits resulting from efficiency or innovation are cross-subsidized to support poorly performing enterprises, a ceiling exists that automatically discourages enterprises from trying harder.[22] Aslund confirms that in this system of socialization of losses and profits, the "beneficial treatment of inefficient loss-making enterprises and the stifling severity towards the most profitable" effectively discourage any economic initiative.[23] There has been little room for ambition and risk taking in the Soviet economy.

As with the enterprises, so with the workers. While workers can be fairly confident they will not be laid off, they also know that hard work is rarely rewarded and that shoddy work is rarely penalized.[24] The incentive problem has bred a difficult cycle within itself. The general shortage of consumer goods gives the workers even less incentive to work hard, yet they must work harder to help alleviate the deficit in consumer goods. Ultimately, then, the economic guarantees that are implicit in the social contract are *disincentives*, and are at least partially responsible for the lack of labor discipline and for workers' indifference toward work. Furthermore, the costs of food imports, budget subsidies,

[20] Hauslohner (fn. 2), 54.

[21] There is still no law on bankruptcy per se, although the topic has been widely discussed in the press. The possibility of liquidating or selling unprofitable enterprises was mentioned in the Law on State Enterprises (1986), but little progress toward an actual bankruptcy law has been made.

[22] Hewett (fn. 7), 207–10.

[23] An enterprise's profits may be taxed up to 90%; the rate is determined by the ministry within whose jurisdiction the enterprise falls. Interest charges on capital range from 0 to 12%.

[24] It has recently become easier for enterprise directors to lay off redundant or unproductive workers; Connor points out that directors no longer have to find alternative jobs for workers before they can release them (p. 125). Presumably such workers must fend for themselves at local job placement centers in their search for new work. See also Aslund, 82.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and excessive wage increases—all undertaken in order to preserve the contract—have been overbearing.

Most important, however, is that Gorbachev's ideas on economic reform are blocked by the social contract. To reform the economy, he must reform the social contract. He must seek to legitimize the regime with different payoffs for the population. Instead of total job and income security, there must be more and better consumer goods on the store shelves; instead of general equality of wages, there must be faster national economic growth. This transition will not be easy. For more than thirty years, people have considered the economic guarantees as a quid pro quo in their socialist system. Now Gorbachev maintains that the old wage policy stifles productivity and must be changed. Personnel in nonmanual and service-sector positions have traditionally been underpaid relative to the ideologically glorified working class of manual laborers. During the Brezhnev era, wage policy discriminated against two particular groups: professionals and diligent workers. Because there was no distinction in pay between a "good" worker and a "bad" worker, the long-term effect has been to destroy the incentive to work. To correct this situation, Gorbachev has called for greater wage differentiation *among* groups in society, as well as *within* groups in society. Obviously, such a policy will discriminate against less productive workers (Connor, 126–27).

Another important step has been taken toward greater (and undoubtedly resented) differentiation of incomes. It is relatively easy to keep incomes leveled in a society in which the state owns all property, including the means of production. Under Gorbachev, however, the Soviet state has begun to loosen its grip on property. Cooperatives have been formed to provide consumer goods and services (restaurants, furniture, car repairs, and so forth). In the agricultural sector, private activity has been greatly expanded. The size of peasants' personal plots has been increased, along with the amount of livestock and poultry they can raise. They can build farm buildings and greenhouses with state credit, and they are allowed to form cooperatives. In March 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a law that permits individuals and organizations to own land and to pass it on to their relatives. However, they do not have the right to buy and sell land for profit. Profits may only be made from working on the land—either by erecting a small business on it or by farming.[25] These measures indicate that the state will not be overly concerned if incomes differ widely among citizens in private and coopera-

[25] "O zemle," *Pravda*, March 7, 1990, pp. 2–3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive endeavors and those in the state sector. Fairly severe taxes on cooperative profits are being assessed, however, so that the state will benefit as well. Moreover, a highly progressive personal income tax was introduced in March 1988.

The utility of the policy of full employment has also come under severe attack recently. The threat of unemployment might provide a useful tool for disciplining labor and for forcing workers to increase their productivity. Many Soviet economists argue that enterprises should follow the same principles: if they are performing at their potential, they will stay in business; if they are not, they will "lose their job," that is, go bankrupt. The possibilities of unemployment and bankruptcy, like the possibilities of wage inequality and private economic activity, represent the Gorbachev regime's firm bias on the side of efficiency; Hewett aptly calls this the "equity-efficiency trade-off."[26]

How will labor, and especially lower-skilled and unskilled workers, react to the destruction of the economic aspect of the social contract and its replacement with greater uncertainty and market discipline into the workplace and economy? The new social contract undeniably places lower-skilled and unskilled workers at a disadvantage. Under the old policy, they were "winners," but under a redefined contract, they can quickly become "losers"—and many will. In the transition from an industrializing to an industrialized economy, many workers will become superfluous. During the stage of extensive development, labor is highly valued as an input, and there is excess demand for it. With the transition to an intensive approach, the productivity and skill of a labor unit becomes more valuable than purely massive quantities of input. Thus, poorly trained and unskilled workers would be the first to lose their jobs. The earlier implicit social contract had kept that from happening. In the transition to a more intensive approach to economic modernization, the same workers could easily be losers on the wage front, too, as skilled and trained labor will be more highly paid than unskilled and untrained labor. On top of that, as prices of basic goods rise, real incomes are likely to decline. (The leadership has promised, however, that wage increases will correspond to price increases.)

In order to restrict the number of workers who are unhappy with the prospect of a redefinition of the social contract, Gorbachev will have to produce some sort of payoff, in the form of more and better consumer goods and food products. In that case, all workers will be better off as consumers. The reworking of the contract—in which the workers did

[26] Hewett (fn. 7), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not directly participate—will then hold some concrete benefits for them.

What happened to *gospriemka* (state control over the quality of products, created under Gorbachev) is a good example of the conflicting needs and goals of the citizen as worker and the citizen as consumer. Starting on January 1, 1987, *gospriemka* was introduced in selected enterprises. The idea was that checkers would reject low-quality goods, and that workers' pay would vary with the percentage of goods accepted. Consumers would benefit in the long run, but below-standard workers would obviously lose out. When the quality controllers did reject goods of poor quality (after all, they are frustrated shoppers, too), some workers lost their bonuses (Aslund, 76–80). Enthusiasm for *gospriemka* disappeared quite rapidly under social strains caused by disgruntled workers; according to Aslund, these strains became "intolerable" and "politically unacceptable" (p. 80).

Labor can thus be seen either as a constraint on Gorbachev's efforts toward economic reform or as a force that advances these efforts. Weak labor discipline, high rates of alcoholism and absenteeism (which rose rapidly after Gorbachev gave up his "dry" campaign), and low worker productivity may be considered either a result of guarantees of job security and basic necessities or a form of protest against the system's inability to provide acceptable recompense to the workers in the form of differentiated incomes and quality consumer goods. In the late 1970s, the performance of the Soviet economy worsened considerably; for the workers, this meant a continuing slide in the growth rates of real per capita income.[27] A slowdown in production is an expression of dissatisfaction, a response to the decline in the rate of improvement of living standards that is more subtle than (but just as real as) more obvious forms of protest, such as demonstrations and strikes. The growth of labor productivity decreased dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s in all spheres of the economy.[28] The regime must take the workers' revolt against shortages of consumer goods seriously before it can expect more efficient production from them.

The cooperatives upon which Gorbachev laid great hopes have not been particularly successful in easing the deficit of goods and services. (By contrast, the salaries of cooperative employees are generally higher than those of state employees. The result has been distrust of and animosity toward the cooperative movement.) The government is now hoping its economy will improve with the introduction of a "regulated mar-

[27] Ibid., 62–63.
[28] Ibid., 52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ket economy," in which some types of private ownership would be encouraged, production and banking would be "demonopolized" (the government would maintain management of transportation, communications, energy, and defense), republics would be allowed much more economic freedom, retail prices would be reworked to reflect costs more realistically, and the ruble would eventually be made convertible.[29]

Programs of Inclusion: Democratization and Glasnost

It is possible that Gorbachev will find a partial solution to the problem in a redefinition of the other aspects of the social contract. Democratization in the workplace is intended to serve as a payoff to the workers in the economic sphere, especially since it may be some time before more and better consumer goods start showing up in the stores. According to Hauslohner, workplace democratization—in particular elections of managers and broader workers' rights vis-à-vis management—has been presented as an integral part of the entire social policy package. It is, "in effect, a 'good' which the leadership is offering in exchange for other goods to be taken away, in the hope of diffusing whatever protest these take-backs may arouse."[30] Lapidus speculates that Gorbachev has concluded that a greater sense of participation will at least partially compensate the Soviet people for the absence of other immediate payoffs, in return for their participation in the reform effort.[31]

Several things should be pointed out here. First, it is relatively easy to democratize the workplace. This concept has been discussed for a long time. However, its political implications are not confined to the enterprises. Not only would the balance of power between workers and management be disturbed; more importantly, the control of local party functionaries over enterprises could be upset. Long used to interfering at will in an enterprise's affairs (and often to the detriment of the enterprise), these functionaries would be forced to abide by the decisions of elected enterprise representatives. The result would be a serious loss of power for them locally. This type of democratization, however, has had strong support among the leadership; steps have already been taken to democratize the workplace. The Party Plenum of June 1987 endorsed both the idea of enterprise councils (an institutional alternative to trade unions for representing workers' interests within the enterprise) and the idea of

[29] "K gumannomu demokraticheskomu sotsialismu: Programmnye zayavleniye XXIII s'ezda KPSS," *Pravda*, July 15, 1990, pp. 1–3.
[30] Hauslohner (fn. 2), 75.
[31] Lapidus (fn. 9), 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elections for managerial positions (including that of director) within the enterprises.

The coal miners' strikes of summer 1989 are evidence of the reality of the politicization of the working class *from below*. There has been much debate over whether Soviet workers perceive their needs and interests as a group, and whether they are capable of organizing and thus, of becoming a political force. The significance of these strikes does not lie in what they gained by their demands—rights that many other enterprises already had, such as the right to go on *khozraschet* (whereby an enterprise itself, rather than the ministry, covers expenses and reaps profits), higher pay for night shifts, Sundays off, and so forth.[32] Rather it lies in the fact that they compelled the government to bargain openly. The miners formed strike committees and set demands, and the government responded with its own committees; subsequently, compromises were reached.[33] This outcome was a first small but definite step toward the possibility of real interaction and communication between the Soviet government and Soviet society—which is a critical prerequisite for the establishment of civil society.[34] After the summer strikes, workers in the region formed the "Union of Kuznets Basin Workers" to defend their rights and to look after their economic well-being. The union organized a congress in spring 1990, which convened in late April, to coordinate independent workers' groups and movements from around the country. The workers began their own newspaper, *Nasha Gazeta*, in December 1989, and their representatives appear regularly on "*Pul's*," a local television program. Last April, a journalist writing on the situation in the Kuznets Basin complained in *Pravda* that *Nasha Gazeta* was attacking the CPSU and had, on at least one occasion, described socialism as "rotting."[35]

Second, Gorbachev seems to be stressing the importance of professionals in the economy and society, and to be paying less attention to blue-collar workers. That is quite a departure from fifty years of glorification of the working class and the emphasis on the worker as the key to building socialism. The new attitude is reflected in wage policy reform. In

[32] "Trebovaniya gornyakov udovletvorny," *Sotsialiticheskaya Industriya*, July 22, 1989, pp. 1–2.

[33] The strike committees in the Donets and Kuznets basins are still organized and active.

[34] The right to strike, which was pushed, ironically, by the official trade unions, was conceded by the government during the miners' strikes. However, many industries that are essential to the functioning of the national economy—including mining—are not allowed to strike. So far, the miners' strike committees have not been ordered to disband; they have declared that they will strike again if the compromises that were made are not adhered to.

[35] "Bespokoistvo: Tak mozhno opredelit' politicheskuyu situatsiyu v regione," *Pravda*, April 28, 1990, p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1985 and 1986, the government raised the salaries of scientists, researchers, designers, technicians, teachers, and professionals in the health services. In the summer of 1990, Prime Minister Ryzhkov promised further wage increases to people employed in what he called the "cultural sphere." Wage increases for blue-collar workers, on the other hand, are supposed to depend directly on whether their enterprise turns a profit. This means two things: first, they will literally have to work harder for an increase; second, workers' wages will differ at different enterprises, a potentially demoralizing factor.

The point is that we must look beyond the idea of workplace democratization as a payoff to broader movements for better and wider participation in the country's political processes, and beyond democratization as merely a support builder and protest blocker. The working class as a part of the citizenry with which the state must work out a contract has become relatively less important. The better-skilled are the natural constituency for Gorbachev's reforms. But, as pointed out above, Gorbachev must elicit at least the consent and the compliance of the working class. He does not want the lower-skilled and unskilled workers to become protestors *against* the reform effort. Because he cannot expect that they will give their active support, he is hoping for their compliance.

Gorbachev's program cannot proceed (much less succeed) without actual support from a broad segment of the Soviet population. A government can usually remain in place with just the compliance of its population. It is more difficult to fight the ingrained status quo than to fight movement against it. Compliance is not enough, however, when a government desires to change the status quo. Gorbachev's reforms require *active* support from a large part of the Soviet population. One of his greatest concerns now is that cynicism concerning his reform package and distrust of his leadership have recently grown within the Soviet Union. Although in 1987 a large portion of society was excited by the prospect of change, many became disinterested in the political situation in 1990. Passive compliance and apathy, even though they do not constitute dissent, can block the reform effort.

Soviet society has always been largely passive in its relation to the state. The party and the state led, and the people followed, although not always actively. It will be difficult to break this habit; as Brzezinski points out, communist parties in power have always found it easier to control societies than to mobilize them.[36] In the economic system, in official cultural expression, and in politics, the initiative and participation of the people

[36] Brzezinski (fn. 13), 167–68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has been largely muted; in some cases, it has been nonexistent. The first post-Stalin social contract reflected the generally passive role of citizens' involvement in normal social functions. Although they had economic guarantees, they were completely excluded from the political realm. The power of the system, which ideally should reflect the dynamics and maturity of a society, was for the most part determined by the Communist Party and beyond the reach of the people.

This deliberate policy of exclusion has come to haunt the Soviet leadership. Two specific processes have been at work simultaneously for a long time. First, the composition and nature of the Soviet population has changed quite radically from when the party came to power over seventy years ago; the shift reflects a general (if not mass) process of maturation and civilization within society, manifested by trends in education and urbanization. Second, the party superstructure has ignored social realities by refusing to relinquish the vanguard role, which, undeniably, it had in the first years of Soviet power when it was more developed than the base it was leading. It has been unwilling to accept a follower role, in which it would become a reflection of predominant social forces, much like the parties in the advanced industrialized democracies. The result is that it has remained aloof from other social forces and that it has not benefited from the dynamics and the continual development of the society it is supposed to represent. In short, the party has not managed to tap the vast human resources that Soviet society offers. And it is at this point, when Gorbachev desperately needs to change the passivity of the status quo and to reform the system, that many of his generation are finally realizing the party's miscalculation.

As a result, Gorbachev has begun to implement reforms in the political sphere which, in essence, could redefine the social contract toward more active participation on the part of the Soviet public. Effective participation by that public in the country's political processes would provide a communications link between society and the party. With this redefined aspect of the social contract, the system would have the opportunity to develop, in Lewin's words, the "habit of dialogue" with its citizens. In seeking his constituency among professionals and trained workers, Gorbachev might strengthen their support for his reform package by broadening participatory rights. Hauslohner uses the term "middle-class consumption goods" in speaking of glasnost, cultural liberalization, hard news, and the like.[37]

In *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform*, Ronald J. Hill used the

[37] Hauslohner (fn. 2), 73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

writings of Soviet political scientists to study the debates on "democratizing" the Soviet system that have been going on within the Soviet Union since the 1950s.[38] The major practical issues of the past have been problems with the electoral system (including absence of candidate competition, nonsecret ballot, and inertia in voting), weakness of the representative system, underutilization of public opinion, lack of freedom of information, and—resulting from these inadequacies in the system—the underdeveloped political consciousness and culture of the masses. According to Connor, "Soviet political culture lacks a citizenry with participant orientations towards politics adequate to support movement . . . toward democracy" (p. 57). In the past, Soviet political culture has been parochial; that is, people were concerned with the daily affairs of surviving—procurement of food, pay raises, living conditions, and so on; they have been notoriously apolitical on a national level.

Political reform is a long-term process. Hill argues that the political culture of the Soviet Union has been a *subject* culture and that the first step of political reform is transforming it into a *participant* culture.[39] Much depends on the citizens' ability to act as participants in their political system. In order to make informed decisions and choices, people must have wide access to information and must be well educated in the workings of political processes in their country. Moreover, the system should provide institutionalized outlets for public opinion.

So far, the policy of glasnost has been stretched to surprising limits. The public has been exposed to debates incorporating many different viewpoints on almost all topics. Within Soviet society, the flow of information has become quite open, although the party still controls the major means of mass communication. Lenin is openly criticized, and capitalism is openly advocated during the frequent panel discussions broadcast on Soviet television. The home-produced two-page newspaper *Lumpen*, which advertises itself as an "unofficial anticommunist publication," is sold freely on Moscow's streets, as are the liberal newspapers from the Baltic states and other nonconformist "mini-newspapers." (One such paper attracts customers with its sensationalist title, *Tainy Kremlevskogo Dvora* [Secrets of the Kremlin Yard]. Last winter *Pravda* published the complete programs of the former Democratic and Marxist platforms of the CPSU, although it severely criticized both and in general led the campaign against factionalism in its pages.)

The nature and extent of Gorbachev's higher-level political reforms

[38] Hill, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).
[39] Ibid., 12–13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have already gone farther than many in the West expected. In March 1989, the first Congress of People's Deputies was elected directly by the public in multicandidate, secret-ballot elections. The Congress is comprised of representatives from three groups: organizations, territories, and nationalities. (The first of these had to be officially approved; therefore, the "Democratic Union," for example, could not have its candidates elected through the "organizations" channel, but the Komsomol, on the other hand, could.) The Congress elects the Supreme Soviet, which in turn has been granted legislative powers. The Congress has also formed many oversight committees to watch over certain interests, such as defense, transportation, and so on. It was these committees that vetoed several of Prime Minister Ryzhkov's choices for ministry heads in summer 1989. Popularly elected congresses and soviets exist for all the Soviet republics and their localities.

For the time being, Gorbachev, as head of the executive branch of the government, seems to have solid control over the Congress, which is run by his party colleague Anatoly Lukyanov. At present, about 85 percent of the deputies are members of the Communist Party. Close to 700 of the 2,250 deputies have only a high school or agricultural education. Perhaps not surprisingly in a system that in the past has had little respect for the law, only forty-five deputies have any legal training.[40] Gorbachev is thus working with a Congress that is not prepared to make too many waves on national issues, although there are certainly individual deputies who are quite vocal in disagreeing with the regime's policies. Some debates concerning social issues such as pensions and taxes have been quite bitter.

At the national level, therefore, no serious opposition has yet arisen that could challenge the Communist Party for seats. Gorbachev has obviously had more trouble keeping control over the congresses in the republics. For example, even in the Congress of the Russian Republic, in which more than 86 percent of the deputies are party members,[41] Gorbachev's candidate for president of the republic was rejected last spring, and Boris Yeltsin was elected instead. Furthermore, in the local soviets across the country, an average of only 49 percent of the elected deputies are members of the Communist Party.[42]

On the whole, there has been definite movement toward involving the public more in the political sphere, and consequently toward reducing

[40] *Narodnye Deputaty SSSR* (fn. 1).

[41] "Deputatskiy Korpus Rossii," *Pravda*, March 26, 1990, p. 2. Interview with Vitaliy Vorotnikov, then Politburo member and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

[42] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the barrier that separates the party from society. The redefinition of the political aspect of the social contract will help Gorbachev's reform program in two distinct ways. It may help to build broader support for that program (as people realize they have a stake in it)—especially if the reform ends up forcing the Communist Party to compete on equal terms with other parties. Also, just as more information will be flowing from top to bottom, more information will be flowing from bottom to top; the party will benefit from this more open relationship with society.

Conclusion

This essay has developed three themes: (1) Gorbachev has acknowledged that the post-Stalin contract seriously hampers his efforts toward reform. (2) The communist regime still monopolizes the country's national-level political posts as well as the Congress of the Soviet Union. In making final decisions on social policy, however, it is influenced by various groups in society, as information on their responses to existing social policy (that is, what they choose to study, where they decide to work, whether they subscribe to communist ideology, and so forth) flows upward to the decision makers. (3) The forces pushing for a new social contract appear to be firmly entrenched; they face resistance, however, from groups whose jobs and benefits are no longer secure, such as blue-collar workers and party apparatchiki.

So far Gorbachev's program has mainly encompassed policy changes *within* the social contract. "Goods" are being traded—in essence a more efficient economy for more active participation in support of the regime. But the *method* used to maintain the contract over time has not yet been altered, even though the institutionalization of legislative and executive branches of government and the repeal of Article 6 are certainly first steps in this direction. In theory, the government could eventually be controlled by another group. Rousseau proposed that individuals must continually consent to the contract for it to be valid; the General Will was to be determined through a system of voting. The process by which Soviet citizens could consent to preserve the contract has begun to be developed, but for the time being the Communist Party maintains a real monopoly on policy, even though the Constitution no longer guarantees that monopoly.

Gorbachev seems to be telling Soviet society that although he is more appreciative of its evolution than his predecessors were, as head of party and state, he can still make decisions on policy as he sees fit. The national-level Congress by no means has complete control over all legis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lative activities. On the other hand, Gorbachev, intentionally or not, has allowed competition to be created in local areas. Many important questions have still, however, not been answered. Within Soviet politics, will the balance of power (and power over the contract) shift away from the Communist Party? Will the party allow itself to be seriously challenged on the national level as it is being challenged on the local level? And if it is challenged successfully, will the party relinquish its power? Just how far Gorbachev's original theses of glasnost and democratization will go toward presenting a real challenge to the regime's power in society—that is, toward creating a legitimate multiparty system under equal conditions—should be seen in the near future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reflecting the Essence of Today's Extraordinary Events!



New From HBJ!

POWER AND PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Gordon C. Schloming
Lewis and Clark College

Hardcover, 1991

Available in February.

This timely new textbook for courses in international relations or world politics takes stock of recent watershed changes in world events, to transcend the dated Cold War perspective of other textbooks in the field. Up-to-date information and analysis explicate the extraordinary events occurring in the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union from a strong historical perspective. Realism and Idealism are described, compared, and contrasted in a balanced view, with lively pro and con discussions on these viewpoints concluding each chapter. Theoretical and empirical materials are also well balanced; these include numerous case studies and policy applications. Flexible organization allows instructors to cover the material in any desired order after Chapter 1, which presents the tools of analysis. A generous selection of maps, charts, and tables complement the text throughout.

Also Available from HBJ...

THE MODERN RESEARCHER
Fourth Edition
Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff
both of *Columbia University*
Paperbound, 1985

HBJ **HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.**
College Sales Office
7555 Caldwell Avenue, Chicago, IL 60648
(708) 647-8822

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Can you afford *not* to subscribe to

The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs

澳中

Issue 24, July 1990

Tamara Jacka, Back to the Wok: Women and Employment in Chinese Industry in the 1980s 1

Ralph Croizier, Qu Yuan and the Artists: Ancient Symbols and Modern Politics in the Post-Mao Era 25

Stanley Rosen, The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes Toward Party Membership and the Party's Image 51

Y.Y. Kueh, Growth Imperatives, Economic Recentralization, and China's Open-door Policy 93

The Taiwan Factor

William C. Kirby, Continuity and Change in Modern China: Economic Planning on the Mainland and on Taiwan, 1943-58 121

Paul Siu-nam Lee, The Official Chinese Image of Taiwan 143

Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan 163

The Democracy Movement in the Provinces

Tony Saich, The Rise and Fall of the Beijing People's Movement 181

Joseph W. Esherick, Xi'an Spring 209

Roger W. Howard, The Student Democracy Movement in Changchun 237

Anne Gunn, 'Tell the World About Us': The Student Movement in Shenyang, 1989 243

Anita Chan and *Jonathan Unger*, Voices from the Protest Movement, Chongqing, Sichuan 259

Roy Forward, Letter from Shanghai 281

Shelley Warner, Shanghai's Response to the Deluge 299

Forum

Stephen FitzGerald, Australia's China 31

He Xin, Letter from Beijing 33

Geremie Barmé, In Reply 341

Current Developments

David Kelly and Anthony Reid, Weathering a Political Winter: The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1990 347

ate of the Field

san Greenhalgh, Population Studies in China: Privileged Past, Anxious Future 357

ews

king the Economic Institutions of Socialism: a and Eastern Europe, by Victor Nee and d Stark **(Jonathan Unger)** 385

cific Report 1989 Focus: China in the Reform y Charles E. Morrison and Robert F. erger (eds) **(Dennis Woodward)** 389

niversities and the Open Door, by ayhoe **(Ron Price)** 390

Diary, by Harrison E. Salisbury *Square*, by Scott Simmie and n **(R.K.L. Panjabi)** 394

ide to Central Party and Government China 1949-1986, by K nd Bru

Special offer to new subscribers:
A complimentary copy of issue 24
Your subscription will begin with issue 25

Subscription Rates:
Within Australia: $25 per year; students $20; institutions $30.
Outside Australia US$25 per year; institutions US$30; students US$20. Or the equivalent in local currency.
New three-year subscriptions: $60/US$60 (institutions $75) plus complimentary copies of issues 23 & 24.
Back issues Nos 7,9,10 and 12 to 23 can be purchased at $10/US$10 each.
Subscriptions should be sent to: Contemporary China Centre, RSPacSd, ANU, GPO Box 4, Canberra, 2601.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POWERS AND POLITICS

THREE-WAY STREET

Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics

Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman



Goldstein and Freeman analyze relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China over the past forty years, and assess the prospects for great power cooperation in the 1990s.

"This important, innovative study draws upon different approaches to the study of international cooperation to produce better theory and practical knowledge to facilitate great power cooperation."—Alexander George, co-editor of *US-Soviet Security Cooperation*

Paper $11.95 254 pages
Library cloth edition $29.95

THE SUPERPOWERS AND AFRICA

The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990

Zaki Laïdi

Translated by Patricia Baudoin

Drawing on American diplomatic archives, firsthand interviews, and the African and international press, Zaki Laïdi shows that while superpower relations once appeared to regulate the ebb and flow of African crises, the individual political and economic circumstances of the nations of Africa ultimately constrained any efforts by the superpowers to exert control. "A thorough and remarkably original book."—Aristide Zolberg, New School for Social Research

Paper $14.95 258 pages 4 maps, 13 tables
Library cloth edition $45.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5801 South Ellis Chicago, IL 60637

At bookstores, or call: 1-800-621-2736. In Illinois: 312-568-1550

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILLENNIUM

Journal of International Studies

Published three times a year in April, August and December at the London School of Economics.

Recent articles include:

Richard K. Ashley	*Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique*
Robert Gilpin	*Where Does Japan Fit In?*
R.J. Vincent	*Hedley Bull and Order in International Politics*
Robert O. Keohane	*International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint*
Terry Nardin	*The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics*

Millennium offers an extensive BOOK REVIEWS section every issue and regular DISCUSSION and REVIEW sections.

SPECIAL ISSUE **GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE**
Vol. 19, No. 3, **AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**
Winter 1990

Subscription information:

Individuals: £14.00 per annum (US $28.00; Canada $33.00)
Students: £8.00 per annum (US $15.00; Canada $18.00)
Institutions: £30.00 per annum (US $60.00; Canada $72.00.)

Enquiries to: Millennium: Journal of International Studies
London School of Economics
Houghton St., London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Masterly...I recommend this book without reservation."

—Stephen E. Ambrose, *New York Times Book Review*



UPI/Bettmann News Photo

"Lucius Clay played a pivotal role in three epochal events of the 20th century: the rescue of America from the Depression, the mobilization of America for World War II and—his crowning achievement—the rehabilitation of West Germany. In bringing Clay—and his times—to life, Smith has not only rendered a valuable service for students of history but also set a new standard in military biography. **Adroitly balanced, thoroughly researched, beautifully written, consistently fascinating, the book leaves you gasping in admiration."** —Clay Blair, *Washington Post Book World*

By JEAN EDWARD SMITH

32 pages of black and white photographs; Appendix; Notes; Bibliography; Index; 848 pages.
At all bookstores.

SECOND PRINTING

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY, INC.
115 West 18th Street, New York, NY 10011

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Cold War and After Prospects for Peace

Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones

Announcing a new reader from **International Security**

In this timely and important collection of articles from the journal **International Security**, distinguished scholars of international relations engage in a stimulating debate over why the world has avoided major wars since 1945, and whether peace will continue after the Cold War ends. The volume includes:

- John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System*
- John Mueller, *The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World*
- Carl Kaysen, *Is War Obsolete?*
- Jack Snyder, *Averting Anarchy in the New Europe*
- John J. Mearsheimer, *Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War*
- Stephen Van Evera, *Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War*

***"The Cold War and After** is the best guide to the crucial debate on the post-Cold War security environment. The book is a must for scholars and will be of great value to students and teachers of international relations."*
– Stephen M. Walt, University of Chicago

"An important collection of essays by first-rate minds."
– Robert J. Art, Brandeis University

"An extraordinary achievement, and a must-read for policymakers, journalists, and academics trying to puzzle out the direction of world politics."
– Barry R. Posen, MIT

ISBN: 0-262-62081-2
300 pp., est.
$14.95 paper
Available March 1, 1991

To order call
1-800-356-0343
or 617-625-8569
Fax Orders:
617-625-6660
MasterCard and
VISA accepted.

The MIT Press 55 Hayward Street Cambridge, MA 02142 U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Center of International Studies

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Forrest D. Colburn, Editor

This collection of essays explores the recent emergence and consolidation, as well as the future, of liberal democracy in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Central America, and Mexico. Contributors are, respectively, Margaret E. Keck, Juan E. Corradi, Paul E. Sigmund, Cynthia McClintock, Forrest D. Colburn, and John Bailey. The essays are critiqued by Michael F. Jiménez.

Center of International Studies
Monograph Series
Number 1 $7.50

Order from the
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Bendheim Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08544

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION, 10/1/90

Title: *World Politics*. Pub. No. 0043-8871. Frequency: Quarterly. Four issues published annually. Subscription price: $40.00 institutions, $20.00 individuals. Location of office of publication: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 701 W. 40th Street, Baltimore, MD 21211. Headquarters of publishers: Same. Publisher: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 701 W. 40th Street, Baltimore, MD 21211. Editor: Henry S. Bienen, World Politics, Bendheim Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544. Owner: Princeton University. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.

Extent and nature of circulation	Av. no. copies each issue preceding 12 mos.	Actual no. copies single issue pub. nearest to filing date
A. Total no. copies printed	4200	4200
B. Paid circulation, mail subscriptions	3367	3641
C. Total paid circulation	3367	3641
D. Free distribution	108	108
E. Total distribution	3475	3749
F. Copies not distributed	725	451
G. Total	4200	4200

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. Marie R. Hansen, Associate Director for Journals Publishing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Stephen D. Krasner, Editor

"Indispensable for anyone interested in international politics."
— Robert Jervis, Columbia University



"Must reading for any serious student of international relations."
— Robert Putnam, Harvard University

Since its founding in 1947, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION has been an outstanding journal of political and economic affairs which has helped set the agenda for cutting-edge research. In recent years, IO has emerged as *the* political economic resource for the academic community while still maintaining its incisive focus on transnational relations, foreign policy, comparative politics, and international regimes.

Join the hundreds of experts in universities, embassies, corporations, and think tanks all over the world who depend on IO for its insightful, in-depth coverage of the latest developments in international relations. *Subscribe today!*

Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the World Peace Foundation. ISSN 0020-8183

Yearly Rates: Individual — $28.00 Student & Retired — $20.00 Institution — $60.00
Subscriptions outside U.S.A. add $14.00 postage and handling.

Prepayment is required. Send check, MasterCard or VISA number to:

MIT Press Journals • 55 Hayward Street • Cambridge, MA 02142
(617) 253-2889 FAX: (617) 258-6779

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton



Why have not just Japan, but also Taiwan and South Korea, been so successful in economic development? Focusing on Taiwan but with comparisons to Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong, the author traces the government's role in different industries over time, including policies of industrial promotion, organization of the economic bureaucracy, and the political calculations behind the policies. The final chapter presents ten unorthodox lessons from East Asian experience that might inform strategies of economic and political development strategy elsewhere.

"Robert Wade is one of the few interdisciplinary scholars seriously studying the industrial policies of the high-growth East Asian economies. . . . Wade stresses the role played by the state in engineering Taiwan's spectacular economic development. *Governing the Market* is a major contribution to the social science of the future."

—Chalmers Johnson, University of California, San Diego

Cloth: $49.50 ISBN 0-691-04242-X

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR

Princeton University Press

41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • (609) 258-4900

ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED